

PEACE OPERATIONS AND COUNTERINSURGENCY:  
THE US MILITARY AND CHANGE

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
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
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
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PEACE OPERATIONS AND COUNTERINSURGENCY:  
THE U.S. MILITARY AND CHANGE

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This dissertation examines two eras in which the armed forces faced the prospect of adjusting to operations other than war (OOTW): counterinsurgency in the early 1960s and peace operations in the early 1990s. Although the military has had considerable experience over its history with various types of OOTW, their doctrinal treatment and acceptance has been minimal. This study compares the military's reaction to counterinsurgency to its more recent accommodation to peace operations. Unlike the failure to incorporate counterinsurgency in the 1960s, lessons from peace operations have been institutionalized within the armed forces and have led to important adjustments in doctrine and training.

This study focuses on the changes in the United States Army that followed participation in the peace operations of the 1990s in order to document those developments. In turn, these developments raise questions about the potential for more fundamental changes in the military. This is important from a policy standpoint since the crises that precipitate peace operations are expected to continue to occur for the next fifteen to twenty years. Theoretically, this study's relevance is that it addresses the question of change in military organizations and explores the nature and circumstances of such change.

The dissertation reviews organization theory, focusing on the concept of change, and the literature on change in military organizations. It finds that many studies rely on a single factor external to the military to explain change: civilian intervention. They also concentrate on sweeping, fundamental change. Focusing on peripheral change in secondary missions, this study suggests a more integrative approach in which a learning cycle model is combined with contextual factors that may facilitate or impede organizational change. The body of the dissertation summarizes the key operations in the two eras and explores the depth and breadth of change in United States Army doctrine, and training and educational programs.

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## ACRONYMS

AMEDD	Army Medical Department
ALSA	Air Land Sea Application Center
AR	Army Regulation
ARTEP	Army Training and Evaluation Program
AWC	Army War College
CALL	Center for Army Lessons Learned
CARE	Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere
CDMHA	Center for Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance
CENTCOM	United States Central Command
CGSC	Command and General Staff College
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIDG	Civilian Irregular Defense Group
CINCCENT	Commander-in-Chief, Central Command
CIP	Counterinsurgency Plan
CMOC	Civil Military Operations Center
CMTC	Combat Maneuver Training Center
DART	Disaster Assistance Response Team
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DOD	Department of Defense
EC	European Community
FM	Field Manual
GAO	Government Accounting Office
HDR	Human Daily Ration
HOC	Humanitarian Operations Center

HRS	Humanitarian Relief Sector
HSSD	Humanitarian Service Support Detachment
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JRTC	Joint Readiness Training Center
JTF	Joint Task Force
LIC	Low Intensity Conflict
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MACV	Military Assistance Command—Vietnam
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
MRE	Meal Ready-to-Eat
MSF	Medecins Sans Frontiers (Doctors Without Borders)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NLF	National Liberation Front
NSAM	National Security Action Memorandum
NSC	National Security Council
NSDD	National Security Decision Directive
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID)
OIDP	Overseas Internal Defense Policy
OOTW	Operations Other Than War
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive
PEO	Peace Enforcement Operations
PKI	Peacekeeping Institute
PKO	Peacekeeping Operations
POI	Program of Instruction
PRD	Presidential Review Directive
ROE	Rules of Engagement



SASO	Stability and Support Operations
SEATO	South East Asia Treaty Organization
SF	Special Forces
SFG	Special Forces Group
SGCI	Special Group--Counterinsurgency
SOCEUR	Special Operations Command—Europe
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Childrens Fund
UNITAF	Unified Task Force (Somalia)
UNOSOM	United Nations Operations in Somalia
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USAJFKSWCS	US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center & School
USARV	United States Army—Vietnam
USLO	United States Liaison Office

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## **Chapter 1 – Introduction and Overview**

### **Introduction**

From the end of World War II until 1991, the central mission of the armed forces of the United States was to deter and, if necessary, engage the Soviet Union in conventional or nuclear war. During the past decade, however, the military has undertaken a series of “nontraditional” missions that fall into the broad category of operations other than war (OOTW). While such operations are not new, the recent emphasis placed upon them is unprecedented. Within that broad category of OOTW, peace operations have received particular attention. The United States military participated in five such operations between April 1991 and April 1995—in northern Iraq, Bangladesh, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti. The issue that inspires this dissertation project is whether involvement in these peace operations during the 1990s, unlike OOTW in prior decades, has generated changes in military doctrine and training. Framed more generally, the dissertation explores the issue of learning within military organizations.

In a review of the recent literature on peace operations, Collins and Weiss (1997, 79-81) point out that, while studies on American involvement in recent crises make allusions to developments within the military, there is no comprehensive study of the cumulative effect of these operations on the military. Thus, one aim of the dissertation is descriptive, filling this gap. A second aim is more conceptual, namely, to understand why and how organizations change. The question of why and how organizations change had been a long-standing academic interest that has recently attracted considerable attention from scholars who study military institutions (see Farrell 1996). This dissertation contributes to that literature by embedding recent changes in American

military doctrine and training within an analysis of organizational change in two eras, the 1960s and the 1990s. My conclusion is that, unlike the failure to incorporate counterinsurgency in the 1960s, lessons from peace operations have been institutionalized within the armed forces and have led to important adjustments in doctrine and training. In turn, these developments raise questions about the potential for more fundamental changes in the military.

### **Definitions and Context**

There is considerable confusion about what the term “peace operations” encompasses. It is an imprecise term with a spectrum of meanings in use. Some treat it as a relatively narrow category involving primarily multilateral peacekeeping and observer missions, while others see it as encompassing virtually any sort of intervention. Part of the problem is that within the United Nations (UN), “peace operations” is used as an umbrella term to describe the overlapping, but separate, activities contributing to conflict resolution and the maintenance of global peace and security. The use of “peace operations” to encompass all of these actions is premised on the fact that the major categories of action all contain the word “peace:” peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace building, and peace enforcement. Given the definitional confusion surrounding some of these more specific terms,<sup>1</sup> it is not surprising that the general term “peace operations” suffers from similar problems. The UN-developed terminology does go some way in setting boundaries on the different categories (see Clawson 1995; McLean 1996):

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<sup>1</sup> For example, Sewall (1993) notes that while Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 *Agenda for Peace* has clarified some terms, it was not long ago that both NATO and the United States used the terms “peacemaking” and “peace enforcement” interchangeably.

- Peacemaking: Diplomatic negotiations, conferences, mediation, conflict resolution and preventive diplomacy techniques to head off or resolve a conflict or initiate a peace process.
- Peacekeeping: Use of international military personnel, either in units or as individual observers, as part of an agreed peace settlement or truce, to verify and monitor cease-fire lines.
- Peacebuilding: Rebuilding institutions and infrastructure within a country to create conditions conducive to peace.
- Peace enforcement: Coercive use of military power to impose a solution to a dispute, punish aggression, or reverse its consequences.

In several publications, the United States military employs similar terminology, dividing peace operations into peacekeeping operations (PKO) and peace enforcement operations (PEO). In one representative instance, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) define PKO as operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a conflict, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement. PEO are applications of military force, or threat of its use, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order (JCS 1995b, III-12—III-13).

Observers and commentators have used the term peace operations to refer to a much wider range of activities than those suggested by the UN definitions. Some use the terms peace operations, smaller-scale contingencies, stability operations, and even OOTW interchangeably. For example, McLean (1996, 3) states that the term peace operations is “not so dissimilar from the term now widely used by western military establishments, ‘OOTW.’” However, a brief examination of the different categories of OOTW reveals missions (e.g. search and rescue operations, counterdrug operations) that extend the term “peace operations” beyond its usefulness. The United States Army Peacekeeping Institute (PKI) is slightly less ambitious. Its list of peace operations includes preventive diplomacy, preventive deployments, humanitarian assistance, humanitarian intervention, traditional peacekeeping, and peace enforcement (Flavin

2000). Scholars at the Rand Corporation use a more restrictive construct (Pirnie & Simons 1996, 17-18):

Peace operations occupy a middle ground between diplomacy and enforcement, as follows:

- Diplomacy: avert, allay, or resolve conflict through negotiation.
- Peace operations: observation (observe, report, mediate violations), interposition (control a buffer zone), transition (help parties to change the status and condition of a country), security for humanitarian aid (secure delivery, storage, and distribution of aid), peace enforcement (compel recalcitrant parties to comply with agreements or UNSC resolutions through combat operations).
- Enforcement: maintain or restore peace and security through combat operations against a uniquely identified aggressor (e.g. Operation Desert Storm; Korean War).

For the purposes of this study, I modify Ivo Daalder's conception of peace operations that has the benefits of simplicity, including interrelated and overlapping operations, while excluding the unrelated categories found in OOTW (see Daalder 1994, 11). In this dissertation, then, peace operations involve the deployment of military forces and possible use of armed force in traditional peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, and peace enforcement operations. Traditional peacekeeping operations do not involve combat (except in self-defense) and generally are launched to monitor a truce with the consent of all parties involved. Humanitarian relief operations are generally undertaken with the nominal consent of belligerent parties. When these involve the deployment of military forces, authority is generally granted to threaten or use force in defense of the mission. Peace enforcement operations involve the threat or use of military force to compel compliance with international resolutions to maintain or restore international peace and security.

The Cold War's end brought an increase in humanitarian crises and UN operations, forcing American policymakers and military leaders to pay more attention to

these peace operations. During the 1990s, a number of crises produced large displacements of civilian populations, both internally and beyond their national borders, on a scale that transcended the capabilities of civilian humanitarian relief organizations. Traditional relief mechanisms and the government, business, and volunteer organizations that have responded to needs for relief were found to be less effective when dealing with crisis involving entire nations. Challenges of this kind came to be described as complex emergencies. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) defines a complex emergency as a humanitarian crisis in a country or region in which there is a total collapse of authority from internal or external conflicts and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency. Complex emergencies are typically characterized by extensive violence and loss of life; massive displacements of people; widespread damage to societies and economies; the need for large-scale, multi-faceted humanitarian assistance; the hindrance or prevention of humanitarian assistance by political and military constraints; and significant security risks for humanitarian relief workers (OCHA 1999).

While a confluence of international wars, civil wars, natural disasters, and economic disruption led to a series of complex emergencies, extensive media coverage and an increased post-Cold War willingness on the part of the UN Security Council to agree on common approaches to these disasters led to a growth in large-scale international humanitarian action (Roberts 1996, 10). From 1948 to 1988, the UN confined most of its peacekeeping activities to conflict resolution interventions between states, which typically involved sending observers or interposing UN forces between armies once a cease-fire had been negotiated. During this forty-year period, the UN



undertook thirteen of these operations (Clawson 1995). In 1998 alone, there were sixteen active UN operations, many involving a range of new missions including humanitarian relief, protection of refugees, and assisting former opponents carry out complicated peace agreements. An important precedent was UN Security Council Resolution 688 of 1991, which characterized the Kurdish refugee crisis in northern Iraq as a threat to international peace and security. This opened the door to the wider range of missions.

These new, more complex missions engaged the participating units and soldiers in a variety of tasks. They have helped refugees return to their homes, protected relief convoys, maintained order in refugee camps, disarmed and demobilized former fighters, trained and monitored civilian police, monitored respect for human rights, and organized and observed elections (Roberts 1996, 65; UN Chronicle 1998). Thus, one of the consequences of the end of the Cold War and the increase in complex emergencies is the appearance of a large military presence in the humanitarian arena (Donini 1995, 3).

Often, this military presence included American service members. A significant number of American troops have been involved in multilateral responses to most major complex emergencies in the 1990s. For example, Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq mobilized 13,000 personnel in 1991, and shortly afterwards another 8,000 participated in Operation Sea Angel in Bangladesh; Operation Restore Hope saw over 20,000 deploy to Somalia in late 1992. While military participation in relief efforts is not new—the Air Force has regularly conducted humanitarian relief flights for decades—the size, frequency, and complexity of recent crises pose considerable challenges to the armed services in general, and the army in particular. Because the army is the major

contributor of manpower to peace operations, and for other reasons discussed in the next chapter, this study will focus on the army.

The preoccupation with peace operations is not expected to be a short-lived phenomenon. While some argued that the United States had learned from events in Somalia in 1993 not to become involved in such operations (see Taw & Peters 1995, x), major operations in Rwanda, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo demonstrate their continued relevance. In the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review, Secretary of Defense William Cohen projected that peace operations will also pose the most frequent challenge for the military over the next fifteen to twenty years (Cohen 1997).

The size and frequency of recent peace operations combine to pose a considerable challenge for the army. Size is one reason the military is involved in peace operations—there is no other agency comparably equipped, manned, or funded. However, the post-Cold War drawdown of budgets and manpower makes the conduct of peace operations, while maintaining readiness for major theater wars, a pressing issue. The army has become smaller, and it has transitioned from a force that based significant portions of its strength overseas to one that conducts power projection operations from the United States and a few other locations. The combination of deployments for peace operations, training for theater wars, and participation in an increased number of joint and combined exercises strains the army's infrastructure.

Another of the challenges that peace operations pose to the army is their scope. Ranging from observation to relief to combat and including skills the army does not normally practice, such as negotiations and caring for refugees, peace operations put unusual demands on forces prepared for combat. While the Department of Defense

considers its primary purpose is to plan and prepare for two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts, the experience of the 1990s and projections of the future suggest that it will be called upon to deal with a wide variety of peace operations. During the Cold War, a case could be made that, by preparing for war with the Soviets, the armed forces also prepared for lesser crises. This is because the lesser crises envisioned resembled the anticipated conventional conflict with the Soviets. However, in the post-Cold War era there is less similarity between the requirements of the major theater wars that might occur in the Middle East or Korea and the tasks required by peace operations (Chayes & Raach 1995, 7). The implication is that, while the primary function of the American military continues to be winning wars, it must understand and prepare for the full range of potential peace operations—a point emphasized by General George Joulwan in a recent article (see Joulwan 1994, 5). This understanding and preparation requires change in army doctrine and training programs, since the army is not well prepared either by training or experience to plan for or conduct such missions (Taw et al 1998, 11).

Although the army has had considerable experience over its history with various types of OOTW, the doctrinal treatment and acceptance has been minimal. In the chapters that follow, I compare the army's reaction to counterinsurgency in the 1960s to its more recent accommodation to peace operations. Given this dissertation's dual aim of documenting recent changes in OOTW doctrine and training, and explaining organizational change, the selection of these cases was straightforward. The cases had to involve OOTW operations and had to reach an admittedly subjective significance threshold. Other OOTW categories could have been included, such as combating

terrorism, counterdrug operations or arms control support.<sup>2</sup> However, no other OOTW categories impact military doctrine and training or involved presidential advocacy to the extent of the two selected.

During the 1990s, concerns about how preparing for peace operations might affect readiness for conventional combat spurred debate within the army (see Taw & Peters 1995). Some recognized that involvement in those operations was inevitable and began adjusting doctrine and training programs. Others continued to think of peace operations as the army had thought of counterinsurgency in the 1960s—as a less important contingency for which any well-trained conventional force is automatically prepared. As we will see in later chapters, in the early 1960s the army included counterinsurgency in important doctrinal manuals when pressured by the Kennedy administration. But in later versions of those manuals, the emphasis on counterinsurgency was purged and consequently the army school system removed the topic from its curricula. Doctrine and training returned to the traditional emphasis on warfighting, ignoring other types of operations. The effect was to convince a generation of soldiers that armies existed solely to fight conventional wars. Lesser types of conflict and related non-combat tasks were removed from the consciousness of the army and largely relegated to the Special Forces, outside the mainstream of the army (Taw & Leicht 1992, 22). Today, one can view the 1994 publication of Field Manual (FM) 100-23 *Peace Operations* as *prima facie* evidence of the importance of certain OOTW. However, the creation of a separate manual on peace operations could also be seen as relegating the topic to a position of irrelevance to most of the army.

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<sup>2</sup> See Downie 1995 for a study that includes a counterdrug operations case. Its negligible effect on the military as a whole demonstrates the need for a “larger” case.

My conclusion is that the ongoing changes in doctrine and training programs show considerable adjustment on the army's part to the demands of peace operations. The difference between how counterinsurgency was addressed in the 1960s and how peace operations are addressed today raises questions about the nature and circumstances of change in military organizations.

### **Theory and Overview**

One can categorize change in organizations as fundamental or peripheral. Fundamental change requires significant alteration in the organization's primary mission in terms of how it performs existing tasks or through the addition of new, central tasks (Wilson 1989, 222). Fundamental change is rare, especially for military organizations that exist for the particular purpose of fighting wars and defending nations. Numerous studies have attempted to explain changes in the ways militaries perform their primary function. These studies have concentrated largely on grand, sweeping changes of the most noticeable kind. Rarely have they focused on peripheral change as a primary topic. However, peripheral or incremental change is far more likely since it can be accomplished by adding new programs to existing tasks or modifying existing programs without changing core tasks (see Waddell 1994). Peripheral change can produce significant consequences. A series of incremental changes—even the addition of unimportant tasks—may eventually overwhelm the capacity or efficiency of organizations. Equally important, the adoption of peripheral missions may herald further, perhaps fundamental, changes in organizational structure or mission. Counterinsurgency in the 1960s and peace operations in the 1990s, because they challenged traditional views in the military and had political support from civilian officials, are precisely the types of

peripheral missions that could herald more fundamental organizational change. Studying how the military adapted to demands that they undertake these tasks may tell us much about the nature of organizational resistance and possible pathways to organizational change.

Among scholars working in the area of military institutions, there is considerable debate concerning the sources and processes by which military organizations change. Two schools of thought dominate the literature. The first, and more prominent, adopts what is essentially a bureaucratic approach to military organizations and argues that such organizations cannot or will not change on their own (see, for example, Posen 1984, Snyder 1984, Van Evera 1984 & 1986, and Evangelista 1988). From this perspective, forces external to the military bring about change. Intervention from civilian leadership is necessary to overcome the military's resistance. A contending position is that internal forces determine whether organizations change (see Rosen 1988, 1991; Kier 1995). Within this latter perspective, it is only recently that we have seen studies applying an organizational learning to military institutions (see Goldman 1997). These studies suggest that military organizations undergo change as a consequence of internal dynamics associated with organizational learning.

The debate between the protagonists representing these two schools of thought has been hampered in two important respects. First, the debate has focused on changes in military doctrine. While doctrine and doctrinal change are undoubtedly important, it is potentially misleading to focus solely on doctrine since changes in doctrine may or may not affect the essential workings of the military (see Rosen 1991, 7). Accordingly, I broaden the perspective in this study to include training and educational programs in

order better to capture the extent and depth of organizational change. Second, as alluded to above, the emphasis in the extant literature is primarily on warfighting. Following Rosen's (1991) lead most studies concentrate on changes in the way a service branch fights. For example, Goldman (1997) focuses on the mechanization of army warfare, the amphibious assault capability of the Marine Corps, and carrier aviation in the navy. The focus of this dissertation is on what have been, and remain, the secondary missions of OOTW: counterinsurgency in the 1960s and peace operations in the 1990s. The objective is to assess the analytical leverage of different approaches within organization theory in explaining the military's response to counterinsurgency missions and peace operations.

This study explores the relative analytic power of two perspectives on organization theory (i.e. bureaucratic and learning) in accounting for organizational adaptation in situations of potential change in the early 1960s and the early 1990s. In the early 1960s, President John F. Kennedy directed the military to adopt counterinsurgency doctrine; in the 1990s, Presidents George Bush and William Clinton urged the military to pay more attention to peace operations. The key question is why the military was able to resist presidential directives in the 1960s, yet largely acceded to the development of doctrine for peace operations in the 1990s. I suggest that a key difference in the two eras was the completion of a "learning cycle" in the 1990s which did not occur in the 1960s. One important reason for this was an institutional difference in the two eras: in the army of the 1990s, there existed an institutionalized "lessons learned" process. Formalized by army in the 1980s, the lessons learned process facilitated the development and acceptance of peace operations doctrine and training.

I draw upon case studies from those two eras as the domain for studying organizational change, and embed my analysis of change within different approaches to organization theory. I conclude that learning approaches have much to offer in explaining how organizations change, but I also find it counterproductive to ignore the external influences on military organizations. My explanation for military change, then, falls into a third or integrative approach which contends that external and internal factors combine to bring about change (see Avant 1993, 1994). Examining the processes by which an organization deals with new situations and information and then applies new knowledge to its functions is essential to understanding change. Equally important is an understanding of the external and internal circumstances under which learning and change can occur (Goldman 1997).

The body of the study is organized into two case studies preceded by a chapter on theory. The theory chapter reviews the literature on organizational change and outlines the methodology of the study. Part Two presents a case study of counterinsurgency doctrine in the early 1960s, focusing on the Vietnam conflict. It outlines how President Kennedy introduced counterinsurgency, its application in Vietnam, and how it affected army doctrine and training. The case is an example of an incomplete learning cycle in which organizational constraints on learning prevented the army from changing its approach to the conflict. The lack of significant change in the army approach is reflected in doctrine and training programs which underwent superficial changes solely to satisfy civilian political leadership. Due to the lack of key elements necessary for organizational learning, the learning cycle was incomplete. Although President Kennedy's championing of counterinsurgency doctrine provided the necessary domestic political incentives, other



elements were lacking. The Vietnam conflict perhaps should have provided an international environment conducive to learning and change. However, the army's interpretation of the Vietnam conflict prevented individuals and organizations from moving beyond traditional army doctrine. This compounded the difficulty of developing the knowledge necessary for learning and change. Given its concentration on major conventional wars in World War II and Korea, the army had no recent experience of its own in counterinsurgency operations upon which to draw, and new knowledge was blocked. The traditional, bureaucratic approach to military organizations "succeeds" to some extent in this case since bureaucratic politics and organizational processes overcome any contemplated changes. However, the bureaucratic approach still has difficulty with this case because its major predictor of change—civilian intervention—does not prevail, despite President Kennedy's personal efforts.

Part Three presents a case study of peace operations in the early 1990s, focusing on Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq and Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. These operations are taken as representative examples of the several operations conducted at that time. They show a completed learning cycle in which the requisite contextual factors were present and helped to bring about changes in army doctrine and training programs. Presidential interest and prompting provided domestic political impetus to make the changes desirable, and the frequency of the peace operations in the 1990s provided an international environment conducive to learning. Two elements combined to provide the credible knowledge necessary for making changes in doctrine and training. First, it was clearer that peace operations were a new situation that required changes in the army. While the Vietnam conflict could be mistaken for a conventional

war, peace operations required a new approach. Second, the use of the lessons learned process that had been instituted in the mid-1980s facilitated the development of knowledge and the completion of the learning cycle. The traditional, bureaucratic approach to military organizations has great difficulty explaining developments in army doctrine and training programs regarding peace operations because, beyond the notion of civilian intervention (which was not extensive in this case), it has no way to explain change. Finally, Part Four summarizes the conclusions drawn from the case studies and examines some of the theoretical and policy implications of applying the organizational learning approach to change to military institutions.

## **Chapter 2 - Theory**

### **Introduction**

In this chapter, I discuss the theoretical underpinnings of the dissertation. I begin with a brief introduction to organization theory in general and then turn to focus on the literatures on organizational change and organizational learning. The latter part of the chapter examines the place of organization theory in international relations in general and military studies in particular. I suggest that only a small amount of the organizational literature is represented in these fields and that a study employing an organizational learning approach will enrich their perspectives. The chapter concludes by outlining such an approach examining counterinsurgency doctrine in the early 1960s and the peace operations of the 1990s.

### **Organization Theory**

The interest in the phenomenon of organizations stems from the basic observation that human beings create organizations in order to fulfill their needs and to achieve their goals (Argyris 1960, 24). The literature on organizations contends that organizations are more than just collections of people. Some collections of people constitute an organization and others do not. A collection starts to resemble an organization as it begins to meet three conditions: When it devises agreed-upon procedures for making decisions in the name of the collectivity; when it delegates to individuals the authority to act for the collectivity; and when it sets boundaries between the collectivity and the rest of the world (Argyris & Schon 1996, 8). The premise is that understanding the collections that meet those conditions will further understanding of human behavior since we live in a society permeated by organizations. However, applying the insights of

“organization theory” to a particular case or set of cases is a daunting task given the breadth of the literature. One observer commented that what we commonly refer to as organization theory is actually a combination of a sociology of organization, a psychology of organization, and an economics of organization (Moe 1991, 106). While there is basic agreement on the importance of organizations in human society, even basic definitional issues reflect different perspectives. Scott (1981, 19-23) presents three definitions of organizations that shed light on the different perspectives theorists have on organizations. He suggests that these definitions and perspectives are not more or less correct; rather, each has utility in calling attention to certain aspects of organizations.

Rational definitions of organizations emphasize formalization and the pursuit of relatively specified goals in order to distinguish organizations from other types of collectivities. These kinds of definitions and perspectives are common in the literature. Argyris (1960) states that organizations are intricate human strategies designed to achieve certain objectives that require the effort of many individuals. Similarly, Downs (1967) argues that an organization is a system of consciously coordinated activities or forces of two or more persons explicitly created to achieve specific ends. More recently, Robbins (1990, 4) demonstrates the continuity of this perspective in the literature by defining an organization as a consciously coordinated social entity, with a relatively identifiable boundary, that functions on a relatively continuous basis to achieve a common goal or set of goals.

Natural systems definitions and perspectives see organizations as organic systems with a drive to maintain themselves as systems. They are collectivities whose

participants share a common interest in the survival of the system and who engage in collective activities to secure that end.

It is the third or open system definitions and perspectives that have come to dominate the literature on organizations. While the previous two perspectives tend to view organizations as closed systems, the open system perspective sees them as open to and dependent on their environment. The idea that the structure and behavior of an organization are influenced by environmental factors is reflected in several theories. For example, with their population ecology model Hannan and Freeman (1977) take a macro-approach, suggesting that the availability of environmental resources and niches shape organizations. Organizations either fit into a niche, or decline and die as the process of natural selection winnows out those whose structure does not match environmental characteristics. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) make a similar argument with their resource dependence model, in which the key to organizational survival is adaptation to the environment. Finally, variants of institutional approaches stress the effect of external pressure on organizations from a variety of sources such as the state or the structure of the particular professional or institutional environment (see Zucker 1983; 1987).

Reflecting these different definitions and perspectives, the organizational literature takes a wide variety of approaches to its subject. Pfeffer (1982) outlines a useful way to organize these various approaches. He suggests there are two dimensions one can use to characterize the various theories of organization. The first dimension is the perspective on organizational action and the second is the level of analysis at which the action is analyzed. Beginning with the perspectives on action, there are three positions extant in the literature. One position sees action as rational or boundedly

rational, purposive, and goal oriented. Theories that adopt this position work from a stimulus-response model with the stimulus coming from a social unit's preferences, values, needs or goals. They contend that organizational action is intentional and predictable, but understanding this action requires knowledge of those preferences, needs or goals. A second position sees action as externally constrained or environmentally determined. Theories that adopt this position also work from a stimulus-response model with the stimulus conditions lying in the situational context or environment.

Organizational action is again predictable, but understanding it requires knowledge of environmental factors and external constraints. The third position rejects stimulus-response models and focuses on the importance of path dependence. Organizational action is not predictable from a priori conditions, but from knowledge of an emergent and unfolding process. Organizations are seen less as purposive mechanisms than as systems of shared meaning in which paradigms are developed from which behavior flows. Theories working from this perspective model action as emergent from, and in, social processes.

Pfeffer's second dimension for characterizing theories of organizations is the level of analysis on which they focus. Two perspectives dominate this dimension. Many theories use the individual as the unit of analysis, or focus on smaller coalitions within organizations. Others treat the organization itself as a unit of analysis. The individualist position is that organizations do not behave; people do. Organizations and organizational behavior cannot be understood except by considering the organizing process which is accomplished by interactions among human beings. Theorists working from this perspective contend that social patterns, institutions, and organizations are only

abstractions from the behavior of individuals—abstractions that do not act in and of themselves.

The second, or structuralist position, is that there is an empirical reality to collectivities such as organizations. They are more than the aggregation of the individuals or activities that constitute them. Scott (1981, 6) contends that organizations are not merely tools for achieving goals. They are actors in their own right, corporate persons that can take actions, utilize resources, enter into contracts, and own property. Astley and Van de Ven make a similar argument by contending that it is roles, not individuals, that are structured in organizations. Since shared organizational goals impose a need for conformity and coherence, human beings must be carefully selected and trained to meet the requirements of the roles they occupy. Individuals are thereby “immersed as component parts of an interdependent collectivity” (1983, 248).

### **Organizational Change**

Combining Pfeffer’s two dimensions suggests there are at least six different approaches that theorists can take to explaining organizations and their behavior. Given this wide variety, we should not be surprised to find a similarly wide variety of positions on the topic at issue in this dissertation—organizational change. Noting the variety of positions on organizational change is especially important as a prelude to a review of the literature on change in military organizations. That literature tends to reflect a narrow view of organizational change, a view this dissertation will expand. In this section, I review the two basic perspectives on organizational change.

Amburgey, Kelly and Barnett (1993) point out that the literature contains many theories about the ease of organizational change. Some depict a world of relatively

inflexible organizations in which change is difficult. Others suggest that organizations are relatively malleable, able to adapt when circumstances change. First, I touch on the argument that organizations are resistant to change or change only with difficulty and follow this with a similar argument from the institutionalization literature. The combination of these arguments influences the perspective taken by most observers of military organizations. I then focus on how organizations can change, and outline the different perspectives taken in the literature on organizational and institutional change.

### *Resistance to and Difficulty of Change*

The position that organizations are characterized by stability and resistance to change is perhaps best exemplified by Hannan and Freeman's (1977; 1984) structural inertia theory since it subsumes several arguments for organizational constancy. Attempting to bridge the levels of analysis gap in the literature, they point to organizational routines as producing both internal and external constraints on organizational change. They argue that organizations exist because they are able to perform with reliability. This reliability is based on routines—the repetitive patterns of activity by organizational members. Inertia theory assumes that the reproducibility inherent in organizational routines generates strong inertial forces and resistance to change. Organizations are likely to behave in the future according to previously used routines. Externally, routines involve extensive contact with the environment. A change in such routines will involve disruptive modifications of linkages between the organization and its environment (see also Nelson & Winter 1982). These modifications could upset the success or legitimacy of the organization and are therefore resisted. Routinization also generates strong internal pressures against organizational change.



First, organizational members often oppose change. Those members in the best position to initiate change are organizational leaders. As leaders, however, they have the most to lose with change, so are reluctant to engage in it or encourage it. Other members are socialized and learn the appropriate behavior and routines that conform to organizational expectations. Second, changing established routines, roles and rules, especially in large organizations, is a formidable task and, hence, unlikely.

Thus, the very characteristics that give an organization stability also generate resistance to change and reduce the probability of change. Other scholars echo this theme. Daft (1982) posits that organizations do not change easily because they are not designed to do so. They exhibit functional specialization, rules and procedures, and centralization of authority, which make them efficient for routine tasks. At the same time, this functional efficiency makes them unlikely to promote creativity, initiative and thus innovation. Robbins (1990) points to the performance-evaluation and reward systems of most formalized organizations that discourage doing things differently. Finally, Wilson similarly concludes that organizations resist change because they are supposed to resist it. Organizations are created in order to replace the uncertain expectations and haphazard nature of individual activity. Organized relationships provide routine and stability with standard operating procedures. Wilson sees these standard operating procedures not as detrimental to organizational activity, but as the essence of organizations (1989, 221).

### *Institutionalization*

The literature on institutionalization tends to reinforce the idea that organizations resist change or change only with difficulty, and is particularly applicable to military

organizations. The idea of organizations as institutions extends back to Selznick who argued that constraints on organizational action arise from commitments enforced by institutionalization. The goals and procedures of a formalized organization tend to achieve an established, value-impregnated status (Selznick 1949, 256-7). In Selznick's conception, organizations are technical instruments for mobilizing activity toward set goals. They can be regarded as expendable tools designed to do a certain job. Institutions, on the other hand, are infused with value beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand. This institutionalization is something that happens to an organization over time, reflecting the organization's distinctive history, the people who have been in it, and the way it has adapted to its environment. The force of habit, history and tradition creates value congruence among organizational members around re-enacted activities, causing these activities to acquire a rule-like status that renders them highly resistant to change. By taking on a distinctive set of values such as one finds in military organizations, an organization acquires a character structure, an identity (Selznick 1957, 18-22). As it acquires that character structure and identity, its processes, programs and behavior become stable and predictable, not because the actions are rational or coerced from without, but because that is how things are done in that organization. Other acts are meaningless, even unthinkable (Zucker 1977). The institutionalization of values and beliefs has the advantage of permitting predictability and stability in work settings, but it constrains fundamental change (Oliver 1992). These internal processes are often bolstered by external pressures for organizational conformity from the state and society which sustain and perpetuate adherence to particular organizational activities (Zucker

1983). Thus, military organizations are identified with the mission of, and activities associated with, defending the state.

Contemporary scholarship echoes Selznick's contention that institutionalization provides stability in social behaviors. Scott's influential work outlines how regulative, cognitive, and normative elements of institutions combine to shape an "institutional logic" that shapes an organization's behavior and contributes to its stability and resilience (Scott 1995a, 33-34). The regulative element is a common and conventional theme in the organizational and institutional literatures. Regulative systems and processes constrain and regularize behavior. They involve the capacity to establish rules, monitor conformity with them and manipulate sanctions in the attempt to influence behavior. This conception is consistent with the perspective that sees actors as having interests they pursue rationally according to a cost-benefit logic. Institutions affect the behavior of actors, and thereby their organizations, by altering their cost-benefit calculations (Scott 1995a, 35-37; 1995b xiv-xv).

Scholars who emphasize the normative element give priority to values, beliefs and internalized obligations as the basis for behavior. In this conception, behavior is guided not primarily by interests but by an awareness of a given role in a situation and a concern to behave according to expectations. Beliefs and values provide a stabilizing influence on behavior as they are internalized and imposed by organizations. March and Olsen's (1998) distinction between the logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness highlights the differences between regulative and normative conceptions of institutions. A consequential logic exerts regulative pressure by asking, "what are my interests in this situation?" A logic of appropriateness exerts normative pressure by asking "given my

role in this situation, what is expected of me?" Normative systems thus define goals, but they also define the appropriate way to pursue those goals; they specify how things should be done (Scott 1995a, 37-40). They specify this through the roles, routines, and scripts particular to an organization. These roles and routines prescribe not only what individuals in an organization should do, but also define what the organization itself should do. Organizations, as well as the individuals in them, follow rules and engage in behavior specified in routines and standard operating procedures (see March and Olsen 1989, 21).

A third, and more recent, branch of organizational and institutional research stresses the centrality of the cognitive element of organizations. This branch sees institutions and organizations shaping action by conferring identities on actors. Borrowing from constructivist thought, this school emphasizes the importance of the social construction of situations and identities. Organizations help to construct actors who are endowed with differing capacities for action. The quarterback plays football, the bride participates in a wedding ceremony, and the soldier goes to war. Social life is orderly because of shared role definitions and expectations (see Scott 1994a, 65-6). Again, this is true for both individuals and collectivities. Actors in one type of setting, called firms, pursue profits; actors in another setting, called political parties, seek votes; actors in still another setting, called the army, prepare for war. For cognitive theorists, routines are followed because they are taken for granted as "the way we do these things." While normative theorists stress the power of roles and expectations in guiding behavior, the cognitive perspective stresses the importance of identity (see Scott 1995a, 43-44). Specific roles are identified with specific activities so that the relation between actor—

individual or collective—and action is socially tautological. Cognitive systems control behavior by controlling society's conception of what kinds of action can be taken by what types of actors (Scott 1995b, xviii).

There are a variety of perspectives on what constitutes an institution. Scott encourages us to recognize the importance of each perspective and each element, regulative, cognitive and normative in the production of an “institutional logic” which gives particular organizations their identity and direction. Indeed, he attributes much of the resilience and stability associated with institutions to their multiple sources of support. He argues they are “overdetermined” systems in the sense that regulative sanctions, normative pressure for conformity, and shared cognitive meanings all act together to give an organization its directive force (Scott 1994a).

### *Possibility of Change*

In contrast to the exponents of organizational stability, resistance to change and institutionalization, there is a voluminous literature on how organizations do, indeed, change. March (1988, 167) contends that although they often appear resistant to change, organizations actually change routinely. In this section, I review the different approaches to change in the organizational and institutional literatures which, in respect to the issue of change, often overlap. We can identify two main approaches to explaining organizational change (see Hannan and Freeman 1984; Tushman and Romanelli 1985).<sup>1</sup> Reflecting the general approaches to organization theory outlined above, the approaches to change also incorporate two dimensions. The first dimension concerns the source of

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<sup>1</sup> The literature often refers to three approaches, but one of them is a population ecology theory usually associated with Hannan and Freeman. The conception of change in their approach is restricted to changes in the population of organizations as some organizations dies and new ones are created. Since this approach is unlikely to help us understand change within organizations, I omit it here.

organizational change—whether it is external or internal. The second dimension concerns the nature of organizational change. Some approaches conceive of such change as revolutionary, with periods of relative calm punctuated by periods of upheaval. Others take an evolutionary, incremental perspective that sees changes as occurring continuously.

Adaptation models generally work from assumptions of external sources producing evolutionary change. They propose that organizational variability is the product of purposeful changes in the strategy of individual organizations in response to environmental changes, threats and opportunities. Adaptation models based on Thompson's (1967) contingency theory and Pfeffer and Salancik's (1978) resource dependence theory emphasize incremental change and moving equilibria as organizations adapt to their environments. The other recognized approach, transformational theory, focuses on internal sources of change but is ambiguous about the nature of change. Theorists taking this approach claim that organizations change in response to endogenous processes as they transform through a series of fundamentally different periods or stages. For example, Weick (1976) emphasizes how organizations can be only "loosely coupled" to their external environments, leaving internal factors to account for change. Similarly, March (1988), while not discounting the importance of environmental forces, focuses on the internal processes of organizations as important elements in explanations of change. He argues that looking for dramatic explanations of change is often a mistake since changes actually depend on the stable, routine processes of organizations such as rule following, problem solving and learning. Thus, change takes place because organizations, and their members, do what they are supposed to do (March 1988, 169).

Several scholars attempt to blend these approaches in order to include both internal and external sources of organizational change and/or account for both evolutionary and revolutionary change. Greenwood and Hinings (1996) explain change as a result of the interaction of events in the environment with internal member behaviors. They see change occurring as members of organizations interpret and respond to exogenous contextual pressures. For them, both environmental pressures and the resulting interpretations and behavior of organizational members constitute influences on the resulting changes. Thus, change results from contextual pressures as well as the effects and interpretation of those pressures by actors within organizations.

Focusing on the nature of change, Miller and Friesen (1984) suggest that incremental change regularly occurs within an organizational design or archetype while major change occurs only infrequently. Since there is significant momentum inherent in a dominant organizational condition, there is continuity in the direction of organizational evolution in line with existing goals, power structures, programs and expectations. Organizations exhibit inertia because they exist in an organizational archetype. What Miller and Friesen call “quantum change” only occurs when there are important, unmistakable problems to be faced. This approach emphasizes the unfolding nature of change. Organizations take actions to solve a small problem, which leads to other problems, other actions, and finally the unraveling of the whole organizational design. In other words, profound or quantum change can occur as the result of incremental changes. The process begins with information indicating a specific problem with an organizational process. The organization interprets this as indicating a flaw that impedes the success of an otherwise viable system. The corrective action is an attempt to preserve this system

with the least possible change. But the corrective measures raise new ambiguities and flaws and lead to further corrective action. In this way, the organization unwittingly prepares for radical change through a transitional process in which conservative attempts to protect a dominant system eventually undermine it (Pfeffer 1982, 229-30).

Tushman and Romanelli (1985) expand on this concept, modifying Krasner's punctuated equilibrium model familiar to political scientists, and also explicitly blending theoretical approaches in order to account for both the different kinds of change and the internal and external sources of that change. Krasner (1984) sees punctuated equilibrium as short bursts of rapid change followed by long periods of stasis. Rather than long periods of stasis, Tushman and Romanelli prefer to see organizations progressing through long time spans of incremental change and adaptation. Drawing on adaptation theories, they argue that in these "convergent" periods, organizations adapt their strategic orientation and patterns of activity to match the external environment. These convergent periods are punctuated by relatively short "reorientation" periods of discontinuous change in which strategies, structures and systems are fundamentally transformed. Turning to transformational theories, they contend that the impetus for these reorientations can come from changes in the external environment which render prior patterns of activity no longer effective, or from changes in the internal environment which redefine organizational orientations as no longer appropriate (Tushman & Romanelli 1985, 197). Their proposal of a punctuated equilibrium model of organizational evolution reflects the hope of moving towards a general theory of organizational change which could reconcile the adaptation and transformational perspectives and examine both internal and external sources of inertia and change.



Altogether, the organizational literature contains a variety of perspectives for explaining change and combining different approaches to account for the phenomenon. The institutional literature is not usually regarded as a source of theories of organizational change. As outlined above, institutional theorists stress the stability of organizational arrangements and the characteristic of inertia rather than change. However, the literature does contain several suggestions for dealing with change. Here, I review some representative examples to demonstrate that emphasizing the static nature of organizations or institutions provides only an incomplete picture. For example, Greenwood and Hinings (1996) suggest that stressing inertia may be misleading since, at least from March's (1988) perspective, organizations constantly experience change as they carry out their normal routines. Others point out that inertia also implies momentum (see Amburgey et al 1993). Therefore, an organization involved in its routine processes of rule following, problem solving, and learning is in some respects in constant motion.

Thelen and Steinmo (1992) suggest moving beyond the punctuated equilibrium model often associated with institutional theory. They argue that in that model institutions can explain everything (stasis) until they explain nothing when change occurs. Their contribution is to identify situations in which institutional change can occur. They suggest that "institutional dynamism" can arise from exogenous or endogenous sources. Exogenous factors can promote the emergence of latent capabilities within existing institutions, or can produce a shift in the goals of an institution. Endogenous processes can also result in dynamism as actors maneuver and adapt to changing circumstances. While emphasizing the stability-providing aspect of "institutional logics," Scott takes a similar approach by applying his concept to the

problem of institutional change to show the potential does exist (Scott 1994c). He points out that within an organization there may be different institutional logics present. He identifies three types of situations based on different patterns of institutional logics, some of which allow for the possibility of change. The first situation consists of a single, exclusive institutional logic that dominates the organization and militates against change. This indicates a high degree of consensus within the organization in regard to the prevailing norms and rules. There is a high degree of stability within the cognitive, normative, and regulative aspects, and consensus among the three aspects that supports a dominating institutional logic. The second exhibits a single dominant logic, but alternative secondary forms also exist, albeit in the shadow of the prevailing logic. Here, rising competition both within and between different elements of the institutional logic can promote the possibility of change. The third situation consists of the presence of two or more strong, competing or conflicting logics. Here, change occurs as previously stable or dominating logics erode and alternative logics strengthen and emerge.

### **Organizational Learning Literature**

Thus, agreement exists within institutional schools that change can occur and that there is a need to explain this. There is also agreement within organization theory that explanations of change need to be combined to produce a general theory of change. Several authors, working from different perspectives (see Tushman & Romanelli 1985, March 1988, Amburgey et al 1993), suggest that paying attention to organizational learning would help to better understand the process of change and provide a more accurate view of organizations as a whole. In this section, I review the literature on organization learning—another wide-ranging body of work that includes a variety of

perspectives and debates. Even scholars in the field complain that the research on organizational learning has been fragmented and that there are neither rigorous theories of organizational learning nor any widely accepted theories or models of organizational learning (Shrivastava 1983; Fiol & Lyles 1985). At its root, however, the literature is concerned with the process by which organizations acquire information and either change based on that information or retain existing practices and norms. This makes the insights of the literature key elements in an investigation of change in the military. Despite the complaints about the literature, there are several interesting conceptualizations of the phenomenon that promote an understanding of organizational change, conceptualizations that bring together approaches and perspectives from the literature on change. Three key questions inform the literature and provide a means to examine the various approaches employed by different scholars: Who learns? What constitutes learning? How do organizations learn?

### *Who Learns?*

As to the question of who learns, Huber (1991, 89) states that an entity learns if, through its processing of information, the range of its potential behaviors is changed. He contends that this definition of learning holds whether the entity is a human or other social animal, a group, an organization, an industry, or a society. Levy (1994, 287) counters that the reification of learning to the collective level is not analytically viable, that organizations do not learn in the same sense that individuals do—they only learn as individuals encode their experience into organizational routines. He comments that this perspective is widely accepted in the literature on organizational learning, but his supporting quotes are selectively taken from authors whose emphasis is quite different.

The emphasis of those in the field is that distinctions must be made between individual and organizational learning. Although individual learning is vitally important to organizations, organizational learning is not simply the sum of each member's learning. Organization theorists use concepts such as organizational behavior and organizational learning simply because there are many situations where it makes sense to interpret organizations as cohesive entities that act purposively. As Hedberg (1980, 6) put it:

Although organizational learning occurs through individuals, it would be a mistake to conclude that organizational learning is nothing but the cumulative result of their members' learning. Organizations do not have brains, but they have cognitive systems and memories. As individuals develop their personalities, personal habits, and beliefs over time, organizations develop world views and ideologies. Members come and go, and leadership changes, but organizations' memories preserve certain behaviors, mental maps, norms, and values over time. For example, standard operating procedures constitute behavior repertoires which are available to many members and which are frequently inherited between office holders.

Fiol and Lyles point out that, unlike individuals, in order for organizations to learn they must develop and maintain learning systems that not only influence their immediate members, but transmit information to others by way of an organization's procedures and norms (1984, 804). Individuals are thus the agents for organizational learning. In order for organizational learning to occur, two important processes have to occur. First, individual agents must not only learn about a new situation, but also invent new strategies for dealing with it, implement those strategies and evaluate the results. Second, their discoveries, inventions, and evaluations have to be encoded in organizational memory. If this encoding does not occur, individuals will have learned but the organization will not have done so (Argyris & Schon 1978, 19). Reflecting on developments in the field, Argyris and Schon (1996, 4) comment that in the 1970s the

concept of organizational learning was controversial. People thought it paradoxical to attribute learning to organizations. Yet today, they see it as increasingly common for people to attribute activities such as learning to organizations. They do this by treating the organization as an impersonal agent that can act, and learning as a type of action.

### *What Constitutes Learning?*

While the idea of an organization learning has become more acceptable—keeping in mind the distinctions between individual and organizational learning—there is still significant debate and confusion over the issue of exactly what organizational learning is. Argyris and Schon (1978, 321-329) point out that approaches to organizational learning reflect theorists' approaches to organizations in general. Those who see organizations as groups of interacting individuals conceive of learning as applicable mainly to individuals. For them, one can only speak of the group itself learning as individuals learn to interact with one another to carry out shared tasks. Thus, the study of organizational learning is the same as the study of group dynamics. Those who see organizations as agents treat the organization itself as active, intelligent, and purposeful. For scholars such as Cyert, March, or Simon, an organization is not reducible to the collection of individuals that comprise it. In their view, organizational learning refers to experience-based improvement in an organization's task performance. Other scholars look at organizations as systems—self-maintaining and self-regulating entities. Organizational learning does not rest so much on individuals, but consists of the self-regulating process of error-detection and error-correction. Finally, some take the view of organizations as cultures. They are societies in which people create shared meanings which allow them to interact among themselves and in relation to the world. Scholars who might use this approach

could refer to organizational learning either as the socialization of new members to the culture of the organization or as the processes by which organizational frames of reference are changed in response to errors or inconsistencies.

Working from these various perspectives, theorists conceptualize learning as new insights or knowledge, new structures, new systems, new actions, or some combination of the above. They refer to the phenomenon using terms such as “learning,” “adaptation,” or simply “change” (see Fiol & Lyles 1985, 803). The problem is that these terms have not been used consistently with the same meanings. Consequently, the literature contains multiple interpretations of the concept. For example, Shrivastava (1983) presents what he sees as complementary perspectives on the concept. One perspective, reflecting the work of Cyert and March (1963) and March and Olsen (1979), views organizational learning as adaptation. Organizations adapt to problems, opportunities and environmental changes by incrementally adjusting their goals and behaviors according to their experience. Another perspective, reflecting the work of Argyris and Schon (1978, 1996), views organizational learning as the sharing of assumptions about how the organization approaches the world—its theory of action. Organizational members respond to problems arising from internal or external changes by searching for solutions. They share knowledge and ideas about correcting problems which either maintain or change the organizational theory of action.

Fiol and Lyles (1985, 806-808) expand on these perspectives by pointing to two basic dimensions of learning that appear in the literature. One has to do with the content of learning, the other with the level at which learning takes place. The content produced by the process of learning can be defined as the cognitive effect on an organization's

interpretation of events or the shared understandings of its members. Alternatively, the content can be viewed as the new actions and behavioral outcomes based on those interpretations and cognitive patterns. It is important to note the difference between cognitive effects and behavioral effects since they represent different phenomena and one does not necessarily lead to the other. Changes in behavior may occur without cognitive development; cognitive development may not result in behavioral change.

The other important dimension in the literature refers to the extent of cognitive development and has to do with the level at which development occurs. What several authors (e.g. Argyris & Schon 1978, 1996; Hedberg 1980) call lower-level learning occurs within a given organizational paradigm and may affect only some organizational behavior. It involves problem-solving skills in accepted organizational routines and is restricted to correcting errors in those routines. Less of a cognitive process than one of incremental behavioral adaptation, it is often associated with Cyert and March's view of learning as adaptation. In contrast, higher-level learning redefines the organizational paradigm and changes the organization's norms, values, and worldviews. The result of higher-level learning is new frames of reference, interpretive schemes, or cognitive frameworks within which new behaviors may be developed. While lower-level learning affects mostly the action-oriented elements of an organization, higher-level learning impacts its leadership.

Shrivastava (1983, 16) summarizes the themes in the organizational learning literature regarding the questions of who learns and what constitutes learning with two general comments. First, organizational learning is an organizational process rather than an individual process. Although individuals are the agents through whom the learning

takes place, the process of learning is influenced by a much broader set of social and structural variables. It involves the sharing of knowledge, beliefs, or assumptions among individuals. Second, organizational learning is closely linked with an organization's experience. Through previous experience in an area or activity, the organization learns to adapt to its environment and search for solutions to organizational problems. This process may involve simple procedural changes or fundamental changes in the organization's frames of reference and the reorientation of worldviews.

### *How Does an Organization Learn?*

Despite the number of theories and perspectives on organizational learning, the literature does not offer many suggestions on exactly how organizations learn. Here, I consider two of the more explicit approaches, those developed by March and Olsen, and Argyris and Schon. Even the authors of one of these lament that it is unclear how to model the processes of organizational learning (March & Olsen 1984, 745). March and Olsen's approach builds on three classical observations drawn from behavioral studies of organizations (see Levitt & March 1988, 320). First, organizational behavior is based on routines (Cyert & March 1963). Routines include the rules, procedures, conventions, and strategies around which organizations are constructed and through which they operate. They also include the beliefs, paradigms, and frames of reference that support the formal routines. Second, organizational actions are history-dependent (Steinbruner 1974). Routines are based on interpretations of the past more than anticipation of the future. They adapt to experience incrementally in response to feedback about outcomes. Third, organizations are oriented to targets (Simon 1955). Their behavior depends on the



relation between the outcomes they observe and the aspirations they have for those outcomes.

From these observations, March and Olsen develop a model of organizational learning that is routine-based and adaptively rational. March (1981, 222) sees organizations responding to their environments easily and routinely. Organizational change consists of organizations and the people in them monitoring the environment and doing what is appropriate—according to the rules—given the situation. They act, observe the consequences of their actions, make inferences, and draw implications for future actions (March & Olsen 1988). Based on the environmental feedback and their implications, they make incremental changes to their routines. Thus, an organization might arrive at a critical period for learning when individual members or groups within the organization identify an anomaly in the organization's approach or performance. The organization assesses and interprets the discoveries and, if deemed valid by consensus, explores options to resolve the situation. If consensus is achieved on an option, the organization acts to adapt organizational behavior by institutionalizing the lesson learned. The lessons of experiences are then captured in a way that makes them accessible to organizational members who have not had the experiences themselves. Lessons are recorded in documents, files, standard operating procedures, and shared perceptions about "the way things are done." Routines based on these lessons are communicated throughout the organization by education, imitation, and socialization, and the organization changes its doctrines and procedures to reflect the learning (Levitt & March 1988, 320, 327).

March and Olsen described this process as a “learning cycle”—a stimulus-response system in which individuals’ actions lead to organizational actions which evoke environmental responses. Individuals perceive anomalies or performance gaps in organizational actions that prompt them to search for remedies. This leads to the organizational action of implementing solutions as individuals’ remedies are institutionalized into organizational procedures. Levitt and March (1988, 327) concede that relatively little is known about how individuals’ ideas and experience are transformed into organizational routines. In the case studies that follow, I explore the connections between individual experience and organizational procedures. Finally, the learning cycle continues as environmental responses to implemented solutions affect individuals’ cognitions, beliefs, and preferences and so influence future actions. (March & Olsen 1979, 56; Hedberg 1980, 3).

Argyris and Schon (1978, 1996) expand on this model by blending several of the approaches to change and learning outlined above. Attempting to combine cognitive aspects and systems aspects, they work from the perspective of organizations as goal-oriented agents which have theories of action that can be transformed through encounters with the environment (1978, 329). An organization has a theory of action—routines, strategies, norms, and doctrines—for accomplishing particular tasks. Taken together, these component theories of action represent a theory of action for achieving the organization’s overall objectives. Argyris and Schon conceive of organizational learning as the testing and restructuring of these organizational theories of action (1978, 11). In their view, much like March and Olsen’s, organizational learning occurs when individuals detect a mismatch of outcome to expectation which calls the organization’s

theory of action into question. Error correction takes the form of inquiry into the source of the error and the possible adjustments to the theory of action. Again echoing March and Olsen, Argyris and Schon (1978, 19) point out that in order for organizational learning to occur, individuals' discoveries and solutions must be embedded in the organizational memory as regularized practices and policies that are learned by new members.

### **International Relations and Military Studies Literature**

Interestingly, little of the vast organizational literature makes its way into the field of international relations. The focus that does exist within the field emphasizes organizational inability or unwillingness to change by dwelling on standard operating procedures and bureaucratic politics. Terry Moe contends that for many years a limited number of influential scholars' works defined what organization theory was for international relations. He specifically points to the behavioral school developed by March and Simon and to Graham Allison's work on decision-making (Moe 1991, 110). The central thrust of March and Simon's (1958) work that influenced international relations scholars was the importance of habits and routines. Since individuals and organizations are limited in knowledge and computational abilities, they must rely on programmed behavior and standard operating procedures. Thus, despite the negative attributes of inertia and inflexibility, these organizational procedures are desirable under the circumstances of cognitive limitations. Allison's (1971) *Essence of Decision* reinforced this change-resistant approach to organizations. His organizational process model of decision-making built on the March-Simon tradition with its emphasis on bounded rationality and routine behavior. His bureaucratic politics model added a natural

systems approach to the literature, positing that self-interest drives organizational behavior. Morton Halperin (1974) develops this approach in his study of foreign policy and bureaucratic politics. The overall picture drawn is of government organizations, most notably the military services, as hidebound bureaucratic actors, inert unless pushed, and oriented above all toward domestic political competition and organizational predictability.

As a result of these influential early works, the field of international relations approaches organizations largely through the perspectives of Allison's organizational process and bureaucratic politics models. While clearly not accepting them as the last word on the matter, recent articles demonstrate the lasting effects of these models (e.g. Bendor & Hammond 1992; Welch 1992). Studies of military organizations and military doctrine especially reflect this tendency. Gordon McCormick strikes a common theme when he writes that military organizations "do things as they do for no other reason than that they have always done them that way. Once established, traditional patterns of thought and action become comfortable and difficult to abandon, even when their continued utility has been called into question" (1983, 268). In *The Ideology of the Offensive*, Jack Snyder emphasizes the importance of military organizational ideologies becoming institutionalized. These ideologies include beliefs about the nature of war and doctrines for military operations. They become institutionalized in field regulations, organizational structures, war plans and war college curricula, and evolve into dogma (1984, 30).

Perhaps the most influential use of an organizational approach to military behavior during the 1980s was Barry Posen's. He most fully articulated and applied the

organizational approaches to military doctrine and the possibility of military change in *The Sources of Military Doctrine* (1984). Posen argues that in peacetime, doctrinal choices reflect the military's institutional interests in identity, prestige, and autonomy rather than effectiveness. Reflecting the rational systems approach as received through March and Simon, he sees organizational activity as having a programmed character which constrains the ability of the organization to change. Behavior is the enactment of routines built on standard operating procedures. Reflecting the natural systems approach as received through Allison and Halperin, he sees the central goal as organizational health, defined as maximizing resources and autonomy, and preserving the organization's essence or self-concept. Posen concludes that as a result of routines and institutional interests, military organizations will produce incremental adjustments to their existing programs and resist developing programs that could threaten their autonomy and organizational essence. They will only produce doctrinal innovation in peacetime when they are forced to adopt new doctrines by civilians who intervene in military policy.

During the late 1980s and 1990s, political scientists became increasingly interested in the study of military organizations and the development of military doctrine (see Farrell 1996). Sheehan (1988) suggests that technological innovations drive changes in military doctrine. Rosen (1991) uses a similar construct and challenges Posen's "traditional" organizational approach, arguing that innovation does occur in the military, even without civilian intervention. Viewing military organizations as political communities, he points to technological developments and ideological struggles among senior military leaders as an important source of doctrinal innovation. In his model, change is the result of a change in a military organization's vision of warfare. Showing

that high-ranking military leaders can adopt new visions and bring about change in the absence of crisis or external compulsion, Rosen reminds us that internal factors can play a role in organizational innovation as well as the external factor of civilian intervention.

Similarly, Elizabeth Kier (1995) and Jeffrey Legro (1995) concentrate on internal factors when they contend that organizational culture determines military policy and doctrine. Although focusing on internal influences rather than external, this approach tends to reinforce the difficulty of organizational change. Legro contends that instances of Anglo-German restraint during World War II regarding submarine warfare and use of chemical weapons were the result of the organizational cultures of the respective military organizations. Similarly, Kier argues that while French military doctrine development was constrained by civilian elites and environmental factors, in the end it was determined by the military's organizational culture. Both Kier and Legro emphasize how the culture of an organization shapes its members' perceptions and interpretation of events by shaping values and shared understandings (Kier 1995, 69). They point to the strength of the military's organizational culture and thus implicitly support the traditional conception that change is inherently difficult.

Some studies suggest an integrative approach, considering the role of both internal and external factors in organizational change. Most of these also stress the difficulties inherent in such change. In Kimberly Zisk's analysis of Soviet military doctrine, she acknowledges the open systems approach in organization theory, thus accepting the influence of the environment and opening room for an adaptive view of organizations (Zisk 1993, 15). However, her analysis proceeds along natural systems lines, arguing that military organizations will resist innovative ideas that threaten their

resources or autonomy. She concludes that institutional and organizational interests constrain military beliefs and behavior (Zisk 1993, 184). Deborah Avant's study of the American and British militaries begins by critiquing the traditional organizational approach to the possibility of military change and suggests that it needs to be supplemented by an "institutional" perspective. Her study attempts to deal with both external and internal influences on military organizations, but in many respects her conclusions tend to support the traditional approach, especially in regard to the American military.

Taking an open systems approach that explains military innovation in terms of the long-term interaction between military organizations and their environments, she argues that civilian choices about how to organize the military condition the institutional biases and professional integrity of the organization. Standards for training and promotion bring about a commonality among organizational members and create institutional preferences. These biases and preferences determine the organization's standard set of responses (Avant 1993, 413). Thus, the higher the degree of organizational integrity and professionalism, the greater the ability of the organization to articulate preferences and pursue them as an actor in the political arena (Avant 1994, 12). Examining the ways civilian policy-makers in the two countries structured their militaries, Avant concludes that organizational integrity was encouraged in the United States Army. Civilian policy-makers sought to instill loyalty in the army by fostering professionalism. The result is an organization that has strong preferences and therefore strong resistance to innovation.

An important exception to these recent works is Ricky Waddell's (1994) study on low intensity conflict. While admitting that innovation in bureaucracies is rare, his

dissertation explicitly calls for an integration of Posen and Rosen's approaches since he finds that neither is entirely accurate as he examines periods in which the army faced low intensity conflicts. He argues that a synthesis of their views is possible and warranted due to the need to take into account the influences of both internal and external factors on change in military organizations.

Posen's interpretation of organization theory thus remains the dominant approach, with most recent work arguing that military organizations resist innovation, valuing stability, predictability and their own prestige above all else. Peacetime innovation is often still seen as the result of civilian intervention. Despite Jervis' (1976, 238) reference to the possibility of organizational learning, until the mid-1990s few studies undertook a learning approach with its inherent implications for organizational change. Even Scott Sagan's (1994) article explicitly calling for "bringing organizations back into international relations" and recommending an examination of learning highlights the routines and rigidity of military organizations.

More recently, studies applied the organizational learning literature to the military and offered some possibility for, and explanation of, change. Richard Downie (1995) takes an integrative approach, arguing that change and continuity in military doctrine is the result of a dynamic relationship involving external conditions that make change necessary and an institutional learning process that responds to those conditions. After applying March and Olsen's learning cycle to the Vietnam conflict, military assistance to El Salvador in the 1980s, and counterdrug operations in the 1990s, he concludes that the learning approach has advantages over other approaches, but needs to be supplemented by consideration of environmental conditions. His conclusions highlight the difficulty of



organizational learning in the military and urge the army to become a “learning institution.”

Emily Goldman contends that the organizational learning perspective needs to be applied to military organizations because it demonstrates how they can adjust to their environment without being forced by civilians. She posits that military organizations can change if they have the right combination of pressures and resources to reduce the level of ambiguity that confronts them in peacetime. She cites three factors important in reducing ambiguity (Goldman 1997, 42): domestic political inducements which increase the *desirability* of change; international vulnerability which increases the *urgency* of change, and credible knowledge that supports an innovation which increases the *possibility* of change. Pressure from civilian authorities reduces ambiguity by increasing the political incentives and opportunities for reevaluating military doctrine and procedure. Thus, civilian intervention can play a role but it is a far more modest role than the traditional approach requires. Strategic vulnerabilities refer to the pressures created by specific geopolitical circumstances. These reduce ambiguity by permitting military professionals to focus their training activities and doctrinal emphasis. Finally, credible knowledge about possible innovations reduces ambiguity by bringing experience to bear on the issue and providing direction.

### **Methodology**

Recent studies of change in the military often align with the traditional approach. They echo Posen’s limited application of organization theory which predicts stagnant military doctrine. According to this approach, in peacetime we should expect a high degree of organizational inertia (Posen 1984, 79). This is because military services are

risk averse; they adhere to current routines, protect and maintain existing roles and missions, and resist new roles. Along with Goldman, I contend that despite the strength of organizational processes, bureaucratic politics and military culture, military organizations change, and that the organizational learning approach helps to explain that change. As several scholars point out, organizational learning theory is a way to blend the perspectives and insights of organization theory in general (see Pfeffer 1982, 93; Argyris & Schon 1996, 190). For example, it blends the individual and environmental perspectives with its emphasis on the organizational consequences of individual behavior; behavior that is conditioned and constrained by the environment. The models outlined above clearly show the interplay between the actions of individuals and their interaction with organizational entities. An examination of the learning in military organizations is an opportunity to broaden the perspective on organizational change in the international relations and military studies literatures.

In the following chapters, I combine the learning cycle approach of March and Olsen and Argyris and Schon with Goldman's approach. In this way, I can outline the process of the learning cycle as well as include the contextual factors of the desirability, urgency, and possibility of learning and change. This allows me to follow Downie's suggestion and consider the environmental circumstances under which military organizations will complete learning cycles. I contend that employing these organizational learning approaches is superior to the traditional approach to military studies. Not only do they explain change, but they also encompass the insights of the latter approach. The case studies that follow are examples, not of learning on the one hand and organizational resistance to change on the other, but of complete and

incomplete learning cycles. The traditional approach's insistence that military organizations resist change or change only with great difficulty only reflects part of the story—the obstacles to learning cycles.

Most scholars examining the military through an organizational lens concentrate on the warfighting tasks, primary roles and missions, and core functions of the military. Following Wadell's (1994) lead in examining the phenomenon of peripheral change, I turn to the secondary missions of operations other than war (OOTW) in order to explain the failure to adopt counterinsurgency doctrine in the early 1960s and the emphasis on peace operations in the 1990s. My indicators of organizational change are military doctrine and training. I will conclude that organizational change has occurred if doctrinal publications and educational and training programs are changed to incorporate and integrate counterinsurgency or peace operations into "mainstream" United States Army operations. There is a nuanced, and perhaps subjective, aspect to this assessment requiring a case study approach that allows for detailed analysis of the evolution of doctrine and implications of training or educational programs.

### *Army Doctrine and Training*

Rather than studying each military branch, I will focus on the army. The army is the lead service in producing doctrine for land missions such as counterinsurgency or peace operations, and provides most of the manpower for such operations. Although the army has a unique role and mission when compared to other large organizations such as General Motors or the Department of Health and Human Services, it shares many basic characteristics with them. Like other organizations, the army has developed preferred methods to accomplish its tasks and missions. Two world wars and a limited

conventional war in Korea contributed to produce a bias in the army for approaching conflict within an organizational framework, or mind-set, of conventional war (Krepinevich 1987, 270). This mind-set was institutionalized in the army's doctrinal manuals and its education and training programs. I focus on these aspects of the army because of their importance to any military service. Military training is the process of teaching specific skills required to accomplish tasks under defined conditions. Military education is the process of imparting a body of knowledge to intellectually prepare individuals to deal with dynamic environments and solve ill-defined problems by using critical thought and reasoned judgement (AFDD2-4.3 1998, 5, 17). Both military education and training are guided by doctrine, making doctrinal publications central to this study.

Doctrinal publications are perhaps the key indicators of organizational change in the military since they influence many aspects of military functions. These publications are components of national security policy. They form part of a state's theory about how it can best "create" security for itself. Military doctrine deals explicitly with military means and answers the questions: What means shall be employed? And how shall they be employed? Priorities must be set among the various types of military forces available to the state. More germane to this study, doctrine also prescribes how military forces should be structured and employed to respond to international events. As a result, military doctrine includes the preferred mode of the services for fighting wars. It reflects the judgement of professional military officers about what is and is not militarily possible and necessary (Posen 1984, 14).

A basic concept of military doctrine is that it is a statement of officially sanctioned beliefs and principles that describe and guide the proper use of forces across the spectrum of military operations (AFDC 1998). However, finding a consistent definition of doctrine is difficult since it has varied historically. The term “doctrine” entered the American military lexicon just before World War I when an editorial in the army’s *Infantry Journal* defined it as “a means to some national conception of war” (see Bickel 1998). Early attempts to explain the concept resulted in a variety of definitions. Army publications first defined doctrine as a conclusion about how best to utilize military and economic resources in war. Then it became a theory of using a nation’s force under particular conditions. Later, it became the authoritative teachings of the military establishment for the purpose of governing the conduct of war and training.

The various modern definitions of doctrine lie on a spectrum between two extreme positions. One views doctrine as a set of rules and techniques necessary for success on the modern battlefield which should be followed as closely as possible. It stems from the philosophy that clear and explicit instructions are necessary for subordinates. The other perspective gives subordinates more leeway and discretion, viewing doctrine as a guide requiring judgement in application. Contemporary manuals and writers usually blend these perspectives, characterizing doctrine as both a guide and a template of techniques to be applied. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Joint Publication 1 reflects this (JCS 1995a, vi):

Military doctrine presents fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces. Doctrine is authoritative. It provides the distilled insights and wisdom gained from our collective experience with warfare. Doctrine facilitates clear thinking and assists a commander in determining the proper course of action under the circumstances prevailing at the time of decision. Though neither policy nor strategy, joint doctrine deals with

the fundamental issue of how best to employ the national military power to achieve strategic ends.

Today, doctrine represents the authoritative fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions. These authoritative fundamental principles are the central influence on a military organization's structure, operations, equipment, education, and training. However, doctrine is most often associated with the manuals and field regulations published for schoolhouse and field use. Manuals are the most visible manifestation of doctrine and when revised, show doctrinal change. Training circulars and pamphlets are a less visible manifestation of doctrine. In this study, I refer to these together as doctrine.

In the army, doctrinal publications are classified in a hierarchy, based on their applicability to operational field forces. These doctrinal publications, known as "Field Manuals" (FMs) can be classified either as "capstone" or "implementing" doctrinal publications. The FM series beginning with the classification "100" (e.g. FM100-5 *Operations*) identifies capstone publications. These FM 100 series manuals furnish the source material and theoretical framework for which implementing doctrine provides detailed guidance. The capstone manuals dictate the general means by which the various elements (e.g. infantry, armor, artillery) or the army's operational forces are integrated to conduct military operations. FM 100-5 *Operations*, known as the army's bible on how to fight, is the most important of these capstone doctrinal manuals. Subordinate doctrinal publications detailing army combat practices are to flow from it (Richardson 1989, 107). Thus, the entire field force derives its direction and missions from the doctrine presented in FM 100-5. The presence or absence of an issue in this manual indicates the relative importance of an issue in the army during the period of that edition's currency.

Much of the analysis of the two cases in this study will revolve around developments in FM 100-5. The treatment of both counterinsurgency and peace operations in editions of that publication will indicate its position in army thought at a given time. Special consideration will also be given to the amount of effort on the development of subordinate or implementing doctrine and publications for both counterinsurgency and peace operations. In each case, I expect to find that presidential interest increased doctrinal emphasis on these operations. Thus, it will be necessary to examine closely how the doctrinal publications were written and how they affected the army. These “implementing” doctrinal publications are denoted by an FM number other than 100 (e.g. FM 31-21 *Guerilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations*).

Implementing manuals are usually grouped by branch or function. The 6- series deals with artillery, the 7- series with infantry, the 55- series with transportation, and so on. The information contained in these manuals is directed toward specific elements or sub-elements of the army such as divisions, brigades, battalions and lower echelons.

Implementing doctrinal manuals describe the “how to” details that permit each of these types of units to perform the particular set of functional missions that it is assigned by capstone doctrine. These manuals delineate and clarify specific tactical information derived from the more generalized concepts contained in capstone doctrine.

Implementing doctrinal manuals also provide the necessary details for the organization, equipment, education and training of different kinds of units.

While doctrinal manuals and their evolution are vital, it is potentially misleading to focus solely on doctrine. It is possible that changes in doctrine may not affect the essential workings of the military (see Rosen 1991, 7). Accordingly, this study also

examines education and training programs to discover the extent and depth of organizational change. In each case study, I provide examples of developments at army training institutions and in field training exercises in order to evaluate the nature of organizational change. I give particular attention to the curricula at the army's educational institutions—the intermediate and senior service schools. I present summaries of curricular materials from the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. I assess what the leaders of the army were being taught in each era and evaluate whether it constitutes a change from previous instruction. Additionally, the case studies outline how army centers established specifically to deal with counterinsurgency or peace operations (e.g., the JFK Special Warfare School and the Peacekeeping Institute) affect the army. Examining army doctrine will demonstrate what it believes is the proper use of the service; examining education and training programs will reveal whether those beliefs and principles are actually being operationalized in the organization as a whole.

### *Cases and Analysis*

If the purpose of doctrine is to guide military operations, organization, procurement, training and education, it can do so solely on the basis of assumptions regarding the nature of the threat or situation that may be encountered. Armed forces cannot be trained and equipped for every conceivable scenario without severely circumscribing their prospects for success in any particular set of circumstances (McCormick 1983, 267). Therefore, the possibility for change in the military occurs when existing doctrine confronts new situations or roles which do not accord with existing organizational concepts. The aspects of organization theory in the military



studies literature suggest that military organizations will resist change, and that the only chance for change lies in civilian intervention. Learning theory argues that the military can change as a result of completing a learning cycle; lack of change indicates the interruption of a learning cycle.

In this study, I present two case studies of attempts to bring about organizational change in the United States military. The first case is that of counterinsurgency during the Vietnam conflict. I deal with the time period from President Kennedy's inauguration in January 1961 until the landing of American combat troops in March 1965. I concentrate on Kennedy's presidency during which he strove to establish counterinsurgency as an important military capability. The effects of activities within this period lead me to include events occurring after 1965. The second case is that of peace operations in the 1990s. In this instance, I deal with the four years between April 1991 and April 1995 in which the United States military participated in several major peace operations—in northern Iraq, Bangladesh, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti. I concentrate on the operations in northern Iraq—Operation Provide Comfort—and Somalia—Operation Restore Hope—as precedent-setting missions. Again, I trace the effects of these operations in doctrine and training past the 1995 “cut-off” date into the present day.

In each case, most of the extant literature discourages expectation of change, unless civilian leadership intervenes vigorously. Lack of meaningful change in the army during the 1960s seems to support the literature's pessimism about change, but the failure of forceful presidential intervention to effect change raises the question of how change can occur. The literature's explanation of when change will occur seems to fail in its

“most likely” case. Alternatively, the organizational learning approach leads us to expect to find a learning cycle as army personnel encounter a new situation. According to this approach, the army should respond to developments in the external environment and adopt changes in doctrine and training programs if it can overcome its own bureaucratic interests and organizational processes. Such change is dependent on a combination of geopolitical events (urgency) the acquisition or development of credible knowledge about how to deal with environmental developments (possibility), and pressure to change from civilian authorities (desirability). The lack of change in the first case can be attributed to obstacles in the learning cycle, while changes in current OOTW doctrine are the result of a completed learning cycle.

The case studies lend themselves best to a historical approach. In each case, I use a chronological organization based on narratives of the different operations in order to:

- chronicle the doctrinal developments within the army during, and resulting from, each operation.
- demonstrate the operational basis for the doctrinal developments.
- demonstrate the links between operations, the ideas and lessons that followed, and the doctrinal changes.
- allow the reader to determine the relevance between individual actions and ensuing doctrinal and training developments.

Any research that employs case study methodology is open to criticism based on the selection of cases for review. In this instance, the selection of cases was straightforward given the dual aim of the dissertation: to document recent changes in OOTW doctrine and training in the military, and to explain organizational change in the military. The cases to be analyzed had to involve OOTW operations, and had to reach a subjective significance threshold. Other OOTW categories could have been included, such as combating terrorism, counterdrug operations or arms control support. However,

no other OOTW categories impact military doctrine and training or involved presidential advocacy to the extent of the two selected.


The following chapters employ a controlled comparison to explore organizational change as reflected in military doctrine and training. A key aspect of the controlled comparison case study methodology is consistency in the treatment of the particular cases (George 1979, 62). In these cases, the behavior under consideration is organizational change as reflected in military doctrine and training in the two eras. The cases share aspects that promote a controlled comparison. In both cases, the military had recently been involved in high-intensity combat operations which reinforced the resistance to OOTW: the Korean War and the Persian Gulf War. In both cases, the military was under pressure from civilian leadership to adjust the way it approached a new situation: President Kennedy urged the adoption of counterinsurgency doctrine to deal with communist-inspired "wars of national liberation," while Presidents Bush and Clinton urged the military to address the post-Cold War world's crises. In both cases, from the perspective of learning theory, the military entered a learning cycle, but the learning cycles produced different results. The cases thus contain standardized elements revolving around political and military influences on doctrine and training.

Case analysis will proceed by outlining the process of political and military decisions, statements, and actions affecting counterinsurgency in the 1960s and peace operations in the 1990s. Following historical description, each case will be analyzed as an example of a learning cycle to identify political and institutional factors that influenced the individual outcomes. If the learning approach is correct, we would expect to see elements of a learning cycle, such as the one suggested by March and Olsen or

Argyris and Schon, that proceeds from individual beliefs or ideas to individual action and then to organizational action. We would also expect to see the circumstances necessary for learning according to Goldman: desirability, urgency, and possibility. In this conception, the insights of the literature on military studies about resistance to change are not the end of the story, they are obstacles to the completion of a learning cycle—obstacles that can be overcome.

As related above, according to Goldman (1997) the initiation of a learning cycle requires that learning be desirable, urgent, and possible. Desirability refers to the domestic political incentives motivating actors to examine their approach to problems. Pressure from civilians can trigger a learning cycle by providing the impetus and political incentive for a reevaluation of assumptions. Urgency is the result of pressures in the international environment, which encourage learning in two ways. First, they aid problem identification by making it clear what needs to be addressed. Second, they increase actor motivation to pay attention to those situations that need to be addressed. Goldman also emphasizes the importance of the possibility of learning taking place. The possibility of learning is a function of the state of knowledge or the available pool of experience the organization can draw upon. It is also a function of the opportunities for gathering the data necessary to develop a credible knowledge base (Goldman 1997, 46).

Given the required desirability, urgency, and possibility, an organization can embark on a learning cycle that essentially leads from individual learning to changes in organizational repertoires (see Figure 1). As individuals encounter anomalous situations that do not fit into existing organizational routines, they develop ideas and beliefs about



**Figure 1 – Learning Cycle**

how to solve these problems. Individuals test these ideas and, if successful and if deemed appropriate by consensus, they evolve from individual actions into organizational actions. Once accepted as appropriate organizational actions, new ideas or procedures can be institutionalized into organizational doctrine and training programs.

Learning cycles are not completed automatically. March and Olsen (1979, 56-59) identified four kinds of incompleteness in organizations' learning cycles. First, "role-constraints" occur where the links between individual beliefs and individual actions are blocked. Constraining role definitions and standard operating procedures prevent individuals in organizations from changing their behaviors in response to anomalous situations or new knowledge. A second obstacle occurs between individual action and organizational action when organizational politics counteract or neutralize individual action. Members within organizations can block organizational learning and change by creating barriers to behaviors they perceive as threatening to the organization. They can

distort or suppress information, knowledge, or lessons (Hedberg 1980, 11; Argyris 1990, 25). A third obstacle to a complete learning cycle can appear between organizational actions and environmental responses. Individual beliefs and actions lead to modifications in organizational behavior, but the behavior does not have the anticipated effect—the link between the organization and the environment is misunderstood. Finally, a similar obstacle can appear between environmental events and individual beliefs. Environmental ambiguity can produce a variety of individual interpretations and beliefs which then impact the rest of the cycle.

Taking a learning cycle approach, I will look first for a favorable conjunction of desirability, urgency, and possibility. Not finding it decreases the opportunity for learning and change. A learning cycle approach then looks for the elements of a learning cycle and any potential obstacles to learning and change. The completion or non-completion of a cycle depends on the strength of these obstacles relative to the pressures for change in each situation. While defensive barriers can block the learning cycle and thus prevent change, Goldman's approach shows that organizations can overcome inertia provided there is a favorable conjunction of desirability, possibility, and urgency (Goldman 1997, 46). Such a conjunction of the three enhances opportunities for learning and change by pressuring an organization to focus on a particular problem and by increasing the organization's ability to overcome the problem. Civilian pressure, germane knowledge, and geopolitical events can combine to overcome obstacles hindering the completion of a learning cycle.

## **Chapter 3 – Vietnam and Counterinsurgency**

### **Introduction**

In this chapter, I outline the background to American involvement in Vietnam and then give an overview of American involvement in the early 1960s. The case study covers the period from President Kennedy's inauguration until the deployment of American combat troops in March 1965. It focuses on the Kennedy administration and its effort to introduce counterinsurgency doctrine and methods into the United States Army. However, due to the nature of learning cycles, the study will refer to events before and after this period.

This chapter provides a narrative background for later analysis and also shows how the army attempted to fit events into the framework of its traditional doctrine. The Kennedy administration had a different conceptualization of the Vietnam conflict and this case study is an account of the contending perspectives. Two different theories of how to approach the conflict developed due to confusion over what the terms “insurgency” and “counterinsurgency” meant. This confusion allowed contradicting policies and doctrines to co-exist. For the purposes of this study, I will use the term “insurgency” to refer to a political, economic, social, and military conflict. Insurgents employ the tactics of political subversion, selective terrorism, and guerrilla military operations in an attempt to force political-social upheaval (Hamilton 1998, 21). I will not attempt to use a single definition of the term “counterinsurgency” since many people and organizations used it in different ways. A distinction between “counterinsurgency” and “counterguerrilla” was not often made, but was probably necessary.

Too often, policymakers and military leaders espoused a counter guerrilla doctrine or theory when they meant to promote a counterinsurgency program—one that would address all aspects of an insurgency. The reverse was also true; individuals and organizations would claim to be implementing a counterinsurgency program when they were engaged in counter guerrilla operations—addressing only the military aspect of an insurgency. Civilians in the Kennedy administration were not careful with their use of these terms, perhaps not reflecting on the potential differences. In general, however, whether using the term “counterinsurgency” or “counter guerrilla,” the United States Army emphasized the military aspect of the phenomenon, usually implying that there was a military solution to the problem.

### **Background**

American involvement in what would become Vietnam began with aid to Ho Chi Minh and his followers, the Viet Minh. He had led a resistance force during World War II against Japanese occupation forces who had seized French Indochina from Vichy France in 1941. The insurgency that changed the relationship was the result of France's attempt to reassert its influence in the area in 1946. Having fought to expel the Japanese, the Viet Minh were not ready to submit again to French rule. French military forces arrived in Indochina in September 1945, and when the Allied occupation forces departed in April 1946, the French became the targets of a Viet Minh insurgency campaign (Krepinevich 1986, 17).

The United States took a disinterested stance to the conflict during the following four years. But Mao's defeat of the Nationalist Chinese in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 put the Indochinese insurgency in a new light. The Joint Chiefs of



Staff (JCS) concluded that Indochina was the key to Southeast Asia and, in 1950, the United States began providing financial aid and assistance to the French military effort against the Communist insurgents. In August 1950, the Truman administration established a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in Saigon to administer the provision of supplies and training (Lewy 1978, 3). Initially consisting of only four members, the MAAG grew quickly as the Eisenhower administration continued the policy of aiding the French anticommunist campaign, justifying the effort with the famous domino analogy. As the Viet Minh grew in strength and the French effort lagged, American aid gradually increased. Financial assistance grew from \$10 million in 1950 to over \$1 billion in 1954, and the MAAG grew similarly, reaching 342 advisers by 1954 (Lewy 1978, 4; Krepinevich 1986, 18).

Nineteen fifty-four was a watershed year as it saw the effective end of the French military effort in Indochina. In April, a crisis erupted when Viet Minh forces surrounded the French base at Dien Bien Phu. The French, unable to break the siege, petitioned the United States for assistance. President Eisenhower decided not to send troops, and the French were forced to surrender. At this point, the French, unwilling to continue the struggle, negotiated peace with the Viet Minh. The Geneva Accords of 1954 broke French Indochina into four entities: Cambodia, Laos, and what were essentially two Vietnams. The Accords envisioned elections that would unify the north and south. With support from the Communist Bloc, Ho Chi Minh controlled the Democratic Republic of Vietnam—the territory north of the seventeenth parallel.

The territory to the south of the seventeenth parallel consisted of the French colony of Cochin China and a few provinces of the former French protectorate of Annam.

It was only part of a nation, and one that had had no formal existence for several generations. The French split the former Vietnamese Empire into three parts, submerging it in an artificial entity known as French Indochina. In the southern fragment of Vietnam, the Emperor Bao Dai appointed Ngo Dinh Diem as Premier. But by the fall of 1955, Diem had consolidated his power and held a referendum unseating Bao Dai and establishing himself as President and Chief of State of the Republic of Vietnam (Hilsman 1967, 417). Blaufarb (1977, 91) comments on the political situation in the new republic:

The French, to make ruling the area easier, had tried to erase the sense of identity binding the Vietnamese and the colonial experience destroyed Vietnam's cultural identity and unity. When South Vietnam emerged as an independent republic, the educated elite was quite unprepared for the leadership role it inherited. It had no experience in open politics or self-government, no unifying national goals, and few of the skills needed to manage the institutions of a modern society. As for the traditional institutions persisting through the years of French rule, few were left except in vestigial form. Only two nationwide institutions persisted with approximately their former vitality—the family and the village. Although these demonstrated remarkable strength and continuity, they did not provide a unifying force for the nation. Indeed, they tended to undermine rather than strengthen the development of a national purpose and commitment to it.

At first, Diem was popular but by 1957, his popularity had begun to wane. The political life in South Vietnam degenerated into a competition among various parties and factions which were incapable of cooperating for a common purpose. A developing insurgency campaign compounded a difficult situation. Facing communist operations of terrorism and assassination, Diem's regime became increasingly dictatorial. The communist guerrillas, or Viet Cong, exploited the political cleavage between the educated elite represented by Diem's regime and the peasantry, amongst whom they found support.

Spurred by the cancellation of the unification elections and the progress of the campaign in the south, in May 1959 the Communist Party of North Vietnam publicly called for the unification of Vietnam through all “appropriate means.” A few months later the regime in the north assumed responsibility for the liberation of the south. In September 1960, Ho Chi Minh encouraged the “national democratic people’s revolution of the south,” and shortly thereafter, the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam was formed. Armed units began to deploy in the south to combat the South Vietnamese government forces on their own ground (Hilsman 1967, 418; Lewy 1978, 16).

While the internal situation was deteriorating, external influences also changed. During 1955 and 1956, the French withdrew from the region and the United States assumed responsibility for economic and military aid to South Vietnam. John Foster Dulles, the American Secretary of State, insisted that the development of a modern military represented the first, essential step toward stable government in Vietnam (Shafer 1988, 247). Diem’s forces did not meet American policymakers’ standards. They were seen as too small and ill equipped to meet the threat they faced. Therefore, Eisenhower’s National Security Council (NSC) directed the JCS to estimate the necessary force levels to ensure South Vietnam’s basic security needs. Working with the MAAG in Saigon, the JCS determined that a 234,000-man South Vietnamese Army would be necessary to accomplish the dual missions of internal security and deterrence of external aggression. Considering the cost of this force prohibitive, the NSC redirected the JCS to define the force levels necessary for the more narrowly defined anti-insurgency mission. In response, the military called for a force level of 90,000 which became the basis of an

initial bilateral agreement. The United States agreed to train and fund a Vietnamese force of approximately 100,000 men tailored for internal defense (Krepinevich 1986, 20).

In what would become a consistent theme, MAAG commander General Lawton Collins recommended a divisional structure for the Vietnamese Army. This was because the military's greatest concern was a North Vietnamese attack across the demilitarized zone (DMZ) as had occurred in Korea in 1950. As a further hedge against invasion, out of these forces three field divisions would be formed to hold off a North Vietnamese attack until allies could intervene (Komer 1986, 42). Further MAAG recommendations and negotiations led to an agreement on a force level of 150,000 organized into division formations capable of withstanding a Korea-style invasion from North Vietnam. This force would be arranged into four heavy field divisions, six light divisions more appropriate for internal security and counterinsurgency operations, and thirteen territorial regiments.

The initial policy direction given the MAAG when it took over the security assistance role from the French emphasized internal security as the primary mission. But because of the army's recent experience in Korea and its orientation toward conventional tactics appropriate for a war in Europe, MAAG concentrated instead on preparing the army of South Vietnam for a conventional attack from the north. The American advisors in MAAG saw their role as creating a conventional army. This was a role for which they were trained and prepared. Dealing with internal security in an insurgency situation was beyond the scope of army doctrine and knowledge. The result was that the policy focusing on internal security was converted in practice to emphasis on conventional forces. Ensuring internal security, the reasoning went, was not a primary function of

armed forces; the principal purpose of such forces was to protect the territorial integrity of a state (Pentagon Papers 1971, II-408).

Between 1956 and 1959 American advisors neglected internal security measures and forces and disbanded the light divisions because MAAG thought they would be no match for regular North Vietnamese divisions. Eventually, they organized force structure into seven divisions based on the United States Army (heavy) model. Like the force structure, the MAAG training program for this new army mirrored American instruction. Programs of instruction were copies of corresponding American training courses designed to prepare soldiers to engage in high-intensity combat operations in Europe. Publications and regulations were translated into Vietnamese without any adjustments for the local situation (Krepinevich 1986, 23; Komer 1986, 42). Doctrinally, the South Vietnamese learned the four classic functions of the United States Army: find, fix, fight, and finish (Shafer 1988, 244).

American aid to South Vietnam during the late 1950s was supposed to be directed at what many agreed was the immediate and important danger of insurgency. However, most of the aid funneled through American military advisors who concentrated on making preparations for a conventional attack by North Vietnam. The assumption was that regularly trained troops would be capable of performing internal security duties if the need arose. The MAAG staff apparently believed that the Viet Cong posed only a diversionary threat, with tactics intended to erode the conventional force structure being built in South Vietnam (Hamilton 1998, 119). When the existence of the NLF was announced in 1960, reflecting the growing strength of the insurgent movement, MAAG continued to downplay its significance. As many scholars have noted, the MAAG

leadership was not incompetent, but the environment of insurgency warfare was alien to them. Once they had established a South Vietnamese Army of seven standard divisions, the American military advisors felt they had accomplished their mission. They believed South Vietnam could now hold off an invasion long enough for reinforcements from South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) allies to arrive (Krepinevich 1986, 25; Avant 1994, 52).

### **The Kennedy Administration and Counterinsurgency**

President John F. Kennedy took office on 20 January 1961 with firm ideas about both national security and Vietnam. He was concerned that Eisenhower's strategy of Massive Retaliation could not stop small communist incursions and that what conventional forces the United States did have were not suited for handling small conflicts in the Third World. Kennedy's long-term concern about insurgency soon helped to change national security strategy. Eisenhower's approach had been a calculated cost saving strategy that threatened the use of nuclear strikes in response to communist aggression. Kennedy replaced that policy with the overarching strategy of Flexible Response, which implied a capability to counter communist aggression at any level of conflict. Counterinsurgency—in all the interpretations of the word—would be an important part of that capability.

Kennedy took personal interest in the development of a national capability to deal with the growing threat of insurgency around the world. Shortly after the inauguration, he asked his aides, "what are we doing about guerrilla warfare?" (Hilsman 1967, 413). The result was National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 2 of February 1961, which instructed the secretary of defense to "examine means of placing more emphasis

on the development of counter-guerrilla forces.” Among other things, this would lead to the expansion of Special Forces, discussed in later chapters. Already, however, we see the problem of terminology. Did Kennedy mean to address only the military aspects of insurgency? Later statements indicate he had more in mind.

The immediate stimulus for the interest of the Kennedy administration in counterinsurgency was the 6 January 1961 speech by Soviet Premier Krushchev in which he pledged support for “wars of national liberation.” But Kennedy’s interest in the issue had deeper roots. Comments and speeches on Vietnam, which he had visited in 1951, Algeria, Cuba, Laos, Colombia and Venezuela reveal a long-standing concern with how to address guerrilla warfare (see Blaufarb 1977, 53). His belief in the importance of Indochina was reflected in speeches urging American support for democracy and resistance of communism in the region. In a June 1956 address to the American Friends of Vietnam, Kennedy stated (see Shafer 1988, 241):

Vietnam represents a proving ground for democracy in Asia . . . the alternative to Communist dictatorship. If this democratic experiment fails . . . then weakness, not strength, will characterize the meaning of democracy in the minds of still more Asians. The U.S. is directly responsible for this experiment. We cannot afford to permit it to fail.

The national security strategy of Flexible Response envisioned an American military prepared to operate effectively at any level of intensity across a spectrum of war ranging from cold war to general war. While Kennedy and his advisors saw a series of threats in the Cold War—the omnipresent threat of nuclear war, limited war in Korea, and then guerrilla war—they were particularly concerned with the recent Soviet emphasis on the “wars of national liberation.” They saw these insurgencies as a communist tactic to subvert legitimate governments. While not ignoring other levels of war, they

concentrated on developing a countertactic, a theory of counterinsurgency (Hilsman 1962, 23). As members of the Kennedy administration such as Walt Rostow (Deputy Special Assistant for National Security) and Roger Hilsman (head of the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research) formulated the new theory, they stressed the importance of several broad concepts (see Hilsman 1962 & 1967; Blaufarb 1977, 57-66).

First, they held that insurgency was a global threat resulting from communist exploitation of the revolutionary process of modernization. Modernization had created instability in underdeveloped countries which left governments vulnerable to insurgency (Rostow 1960). Second, the administration maintained that the United States had the capability and the willingness to assist in the protection of underdeveloped countries as they passed through these destabilizing stages of modernization. Third, it asserted that insurgencies demanded a new approach. Rather than emphasizing the military destruction of insurgent forces, Rostow and his colleagues called for an approach of political reforms and social and economic programs that could help a country modernize and assist a government in gaining the support of its people.

Here, we see that the Kennedy administration included all the economic, political, social, and military aspects of an insurgency when its members expressed concern about guerrilla warfare. The tasking given to the Special Group (Counterinsurgency), or SGCI, established by President Kennedy reflects this. In NSAM 124 of January 1962, Kennedy ordered the SGCI to oversee the development of a counterinsurgency strategy. Its brief was (quoted in McClintock 1992, 166):

To recommend actions to obtain recognition . . . that subversive insurgency ("wars of national liberation") is a new and dangerous form of politico-military conflict for which the U.S. must prepare with the same seriousness of purpose as for the conventional warfare of the past. Verify



that this sense of urgency is reflected in the organization, training, equipment and doctrine of the U.S. Armed Forces and in the political, economic, intelligence and military aid programs conducted abroad by State, Defense, AID, USIA, and CIA.

For Rostow, the issue was a straightforward problem of how to apply the appropriate American resources to the right foreign areas and needs. He wanted the United States to learn to prevent the emergence of the situation Mao Tse-Tung outlined: "Guerrillas are fish, and the people are the water in which they swim. If the temperature of the water is right, the fish will thrive and multiply" (quoted in Hilsman 1967, 413). Preventing the growth of guerrilla insurgency would require not merely a proper military program of deterrence, but programs of village development, communications, and indoctrination. The best way to fight a guerrilla war would be to prevent it from happening. Hilsman emphasized that if an established government could gain support of disaffected members of society who supported guerrilla movements, the insurgents could not obtain the resources they needed to overthrow the established government. The underlying assumption was that reform programs could satisfy popular grievances and enable a government threatened by insurgency to wrest the support of its people back from insurgents (Hilsman 1967, 424-6).

The administration emphasized that to implement these concepts in practice and successfully defeat an insurgency, the military needed to make changes to its force structure, training, equipment, and doctrine. This will be the subject of chapter four, but note here that Hilsman especially favored the use of specialized, lightly armed counterguerrilla units which would use aggressive actions and techniques similar to those used by the guerrillas. (Hilsman 1962, 25):

Regular forces are essential for regular military tasks. But guerrilla warfare is something special. Conventional forces with heavy equipment in field formation tend to cluster together, centralizing their power in terrain that allows rapid movement. They rely on roads, consider strong points and cities as vital targets to defend, and so, when they disperse, it is only to get tied down in static operations. In combat, rigid adherence to the principle of concentration keeps units at unwieldy battalion or even regimental levels, usually with erroneous stress on holding land rather than destroying enemy forces.

The administration condensed these counterinsurgency concepts into three prescriptions for countering insurgency: progress, good government, and security. They eventually enshrined them in the basic statement of United States counterinsurgency doctrine—the Overseas Internal Defense Policy (OIDP)—in NSAM 182 of August 1962 (Pentagon Papers 1971, II-689). The OIDP's goal was for a local government to win the hearts and minds of its citizens (see Maechling 1984; Shafer 1988). It called for the rapid incorporation of the vulnerable periphery into the modern center. Proponents of the OIDP argued that once involved in the modern state and served by it, individuals would not be susceptible to insurgents' propaganda. However, while their emphasis on higher standards of living and responsive government administration was real, they identified security as the first problem. In order for the rest of the program to be implemented, the population had to be protected from the insurgents. With this as a priority, counterinsurgency planning acknowledged the importance of socioeconomic conditions, but defined situations initially in military terms (Maechling 1984, 33).

As a policy document, the OIDP was both a prescription for action and a means for government agencies to divide up missions. The security portion fell to the military, which applied its standard procedures for assisting foreign militaries with the equipment and training they would need to fight an insurgency campaign. As we will see in chapter

four, the military's procedures and doctrine treated insurgencies as military targets rather than movements embedded in society. Thus, military assistance and operations emphasized the destruction of guerrilla forces. This tendency revealed itself even before ODP became national policy.

### **Into Vietnam**

At the time of Kennedy's inauguration, Vietnam approached a crisis. The Viet Cong had increased its strength in South Vietnam and controlled a considerable portion of the countryside. Diem's government talked about the need for social and political reforms in order to gain the support of the population, but argued that these could only be implemented after the communist threat had been destroyed. As a result, South Vietnam relied on force alone for its survival. As Kennedy's new administration proceeded to develop new national security strategies, they also confronted an example of the precise problem their new ideas were designed to solve. As the administration perceived Vietnam, it was a classic instance of a successful insurgency. Communist guerrillas were harassing the Diem government's facilities and forces in the countryside with a rising number of assassinations, ambushes, and terrorism. Against these attacks, South Vietnam enjoyed little success. One reason was that MAAG had organized and trained its army to meet a conventional attack from North Vietnam.

In response to the deteriorating situation in South Vietnam, Kennedy established a Presidential Program for Vietnam in April 1961 (see Pentagon Papers 1971, II-30). It called for initiating political, military, economic, psychological, and covert actions designed to democratize Vietnam and uphold freedom there. However, since many concepts in the administration's counterinsurgency doctrine were abstract, the

implementation of these concepts was open to interpretation. People who implemented them exercised considerable discretion in what to emphasize. As it unfolded, distinct differences developed between how the doctrine was understood in Washington policy circles and implemented by civilian agencies, and how the military understood and practiced it (Blaufarb 1977, 119).

The civilian agencies, led by the State Department, concentrated on the good government and progress aspects of counterinsurgency theory. They set about gaining the support of the population and frustrating the insurgents. Their tools were reforms that would improve government services and promote economic development. The army, on the other hand, focused on the security aspect of the new theory. Applying standard doctrine to the problem of security, the army emphasized the destruction of the guerrilla forces through such conventional warfare methods as concentration of force and superior firepower. Thus, the army in general, and MAAG in particular, was not interested in applying the new counterinsurgency principles, especially when they conflicted with traditional military operations. They did not necessarily object to the principles, but did not see most of them as military tasks.

Lieutenant General Lionel McGarr, who took over as MAAG chief in September 1960, exemplified this attitude. He gave rhetorical support to the ideas of the new counterinsurgency doctrine, but executed military operations in accordance with conventional army doctrine. Krepinevich (1986, 57) quotes him as identifying the objectives in Vietnam as finding, fixing, fighting, and finishing the enemy. For McGarr, achieving these objectives required offensive, search-and-destroy operations. The army conceived of two main types of operations in South Vietnam (see Doughty 1979, 31-2).

Search-and-destroy operations sought to locate the enemy and destroy him. Also called combat sweeps or reconnaissance in force, these operations could be conducted from company to multidivisional level. The second type, clear-and-hold operations, sometimes resembled search-and-destroy missions, but they placed a greater emphasis on pacification. While search-and-destroy operations chased the enemy from an area or destroyed him, clearing operations kept him off balance and allowed the South Vietnamese government to extend its influence into the area. They protected pacification efforts with frequent patrols. Clearing operations obviously required more time than search-and-destroy missions. Theoretically, search-and-destroy missions would precede clearing and holding operations. In practice, ground commanders preferred to employ a more offensive-oriented approach to defeat the enemy. The goal of finding, fixing, fighting, and finishing enemy forces thus assumed a greater importance than the theoretical sequencing of operations.

The administration's first program in Vietnam demonstrated the difficulties involved in implementing a new strategy. The Eisenhower administration had put together a Counter Insurgency Plan (CIP) that Kennedy adopted since it reflected the administration's new approach of addressing more than military matters (see Pentagon Papers 1971, II-23; Blaufarb 1977, 101). It detailed the necessity for Diem to broaden his regime, to cleanse it of corruption, and to reorganize it for greater efficiency. These points, however, were added onto a proposal for enlarging the South Vietnamese Army from 150,000 to 170,000. The reforms were not the heart of the plan, and officials ultimately abandoned them as conditions in order to get on with the war. The central aspect of the plan was MAAG's attempt to put the Vietnamese armed forces on a footing

which would make them capable of eliminating the Viet Cong. The foundational doctrine of the CIP was simply the conventional principle of concentration of force. The plan called for a regular pattern of patrolling to find Viet Cong concentrations which could be struck by strong units held in reserve for this purpose.

Before the CIP could be expected to have an effect, events in Vietnam demanded a new response. Viet Cong attacks increased dramatically in the summer and fall of 1961. On 18 September, they overran and briefly held a provincial capital just 55 miles from Saigon. Diem requested an increase in aid and Kennedy sent his military advisor, General Maxwell Taylor, and Walt Rostow to Vietnam to reassess the situation. Their report marked a turning point in American involvement. Where previous recommendations had emphasized providing only financial and advisory assistance, their analysis recommended a high-profile commitment to South Vietnam and the use of American combat troops.

The report consisted of three areas of recommendations (see Pentagon Papers 1971, II-87-98, 652; Taylor in Porter 1979, 138-143; Hilsman 1967, 422). First was a series of demands for political and administrative reforms by the Diem government. Second was a set of recommendations for improving the training and equipping of Vietnamese forces, including the Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps. The purpose of this was to free the Vietnamese Army from static defense and give them the opportunity to engage in mobile, offensive operations against guerrillas. While these sorts of recommendations had been made many times over the previous years, the third recommendation was for a qualitative change in the American commitment. Taylor and Rostow suggested the United States should introduce over 10,000 American combat

troops, with the possibility that more would be required. They argued that the arrival of American troops would improve South Vietnamese morale and deter an invasion while freeing the South Vietnamese Army to engage in counterinsurgency operations. Taylor concluded that the insurgency represented a “new and dangerous method which bypassed conventional responses.” Despite that conclusion and despite Kennedy’s call for a new approach to insurgency, Taylor’s recommendations were overwhelmingly conventional. While suggesting “surveying” the social, economic, and political conditions, he emphasized concrete steps to improve military mobility, firepower, and offensive search-and-destroy missions (see Taylor in Porter 1979, 139).

In NSAM 111 of 22 November 1961, Kennedy approved the first two recommendations of the Taylor-Rostow report. It included the provision of helicopters and light aircraft, manned by American personnel; training for the civil guard to free the regular army for offensive operations; increased economic aid; and an increased number of military advisors. Also, the Memorandum quietly approved the involvement of American personnel in combat situations (see NSAM 111 in Porter 1979, 146; Lewy 1978). While Kennedy did not commit to recommendation regarding the deployment of combat troops, he held out the possibility of its eventual implementation.

Ironically, the public commitment and provisions of NSAM 111 moved an administration which wanted a new, sophisticated approach to Vietnam towards a more conventional path. For example, as part of the effort envisioned in the Memorandum, the Kennedy administration expanded MAAG and upgraded it to the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). In early 1962, Lieutenant General Paul Harkin became

commander of the increasing numbers of military personnel in Vietnam (see table 1).

Because of the relatively small number of nonmilitary officials, MACV established itself

**Table 1 – United States Military Personnel in South Vietnam**

Military personnel in South Vietnam as of 31 December:					
1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
875	3,164	11,326	16,236	23,310	180,000

Source: Lewy 1978, 24.

as the lead agency in Vietnam and the primary source of information about the conflict. Unlike several other candidates Kennedy considered for the post, Harkin had no experience in insurgency warfare. He was, however, a close associate of General Taylor, having served under him in previous assignments. The combination of his unfamiliarity with insurgency and his loyalty to Taylor ensured that the American military view from Vietnam would match that in the Pentagon. Thus, MACV's plans and recommendations focused on traditional, conventional military operations and gave short shrift to the new concepts of counterinsurgency. Another example of the problems the Kennedy administration faced in implementing the new theory of counterinsurgency was demonstrated in the Strategic Hamlet Program.

### **Strategic Hamlets**

While the military concentrated on the security aspect of counterinsurgency which allowed them to engage in conventional offensive operations designed to destroy insurgents, there were still advocates of the new counterinsurgency theory. State Department officials such as Roger Hilsman, W. Averell Harriman, and Michael



Forrestal opposed the Pentagon and the command in Saigon as they strongly advocated those new concepts (Komer 1986, 138). Their recommendations reflected the new counterinsurgency theory's attention to political factors such as improved government services and winning over the population rather than military operations. In the military realm, they called for clear-and-hold operations to separate the insurgents from the population rather than the large-scale search-and-destroy missions which often killed or injured civilians they were supposed to protect.

The proponents of the new counterinsurgency found support in an unexpected source. In October 1961, the small British Advisory Mission in Saigon presented a counterinsurgency plan to President Diem. Heading the British mission was Robert Thompson, who had played a major role in the successful British counterinsurgency campaign in Malaya. Thompson's plan argued, as Hilsman and his colleagues contended, that the focus of operations should be the political stability and security of the populated rural areas, not the destruction of Viet Cong forces (see Pentagon Papers 1971, II-139). Thompson's premise was that the only way to defeat a guerrilla force was to cut it off from its popular base of support. The first step was to find a way to provide for the people's physical security. His instrument of physical security was not firepower and offensive operations, but the "strategic hamlet."

The strategic hamlet program rested on three different kinds of operations that would have to be executed at the same time (see Blaufarb 1977, Krepinevich 1986, Shafer 1988). The most visible element of the program was the strengthening of village defenses. Special military teams would train and arm villagers so that they could defend themselves from small-scale attacks or hold out until reinforcements came in the case of

attack from a large Viet Cong unit. They would also help the villagers construct defenses around each hamlet behind which the population would retire at night. Another visible element was the action of regular army forces, whose presence would be necessary during the weeks and months the program was implemented in a particular village. Thompson envisioned clear-and-hold operations in which the army would protect the unfolding program until the targeted hamlet was ready to defend itself. The final, not so visible element was the most important. Thompson called for civic action teams to provide basic government services as the military implemented the defensive scheme. The idea was to render villagers both willing and able to choose the government over the Viet Cong.

Hilsman had been promoting his vision of counter guerrilla operations using small units that acted like guerrillas themselves (see Hilsman 1962, 29). But he saw that this method would have to be combined with something like the strategic hamlet program in order to prevent the guerrillas from recruiting replacements for their losses. Therefore, Hilsman and his colleagues in the State Department welcomed the strategic hamlet program. They saw it as a way to translate their newly articulated theory of counterinsurgency into operational reality with a specific strategy (Pentagon Papers 1971, II-128). For the program to work, however, the political effort at the village level had to receive priority and the military effort would require a conceptual change. Conventional doctrine required South Vietnamese commanders to seek out the enemy and destroy it. The emphasis was on offensive mobility. But Thompson's hamlet program called for the military to accomplish different tasks, some of which were not congruent with conventional doctrine (see Hilsman 1967, 435). The army would have to engage in clear-

and-hold operations to push the Viet Cong out of an area. This would necessarily involve static defense of the villages and important installations.

Thus, while the civilian agencies in Washington favored the strategic hamlet program and got Kennedy's endorsement, the Pentagon and MACV at first disapproved vigorously, seeing the plan as diverting attention and resources away from the operations they considered vital. The fear was that the hamlet approach was a defensive strategy, and one more suitable for a police than a military force (Cable 1986, 191). MACV leaders disapproved of arguments which stressed that the Vietnamese struggle was essentially political rather than military. While willing to concede that the struggle was multi-dimensional, their organizational bias led them to resist arguments that military considerations were relatively unimportant (Pentagon Papers 1971, II-146). Their experience, doctrine, and training convinced them that the threat lay in large Viet Cong units and ultimately an invasion from North Vietnam. Dealing with this kind of threat required an army prepared for mobile, offensive operations. Lieutenant General McGarr, still MAAG commander during the debate over the hamlet program, objected to several elements of the plan. The Pentagon Papers (1971, II-141) record his protests about the downgrading of conventional forces implicit in a plan that emphasized local security efforts. Following conventional doctrine, he questioned the lack of offensive sweeps in enemy strongholds. Finally, he resisted the anticipated slow pace of the program.

Thompson adjusted the plan to make it acceptable to McGarr and MAAG by leaving room for continued emphasis on MAAG's programs, and Diem approved it in January 1962. In effect, the hamlet program opened a "second front" (Hilsman 1967, Blaufarb 1977). Proponents of the new counterinsurgency doctrine focused on the

population and assisted in the implementation of the hamlet program. The military concentrated on the destruction of the enemy's armed forces. Two programs to combat the insurgency could have achieved synergy, but there was seldom any real coordination between the two efforts. While the military supported the plan with supplies, they continued to conduct their offensive training and operations independently, with little attention paid to common planning with the hamlet program—except when it could further their aims. For example, the initial attempt to establish strategic hamlets in Operation Sunrise of March 1962 reflected MACV priorities rather than the program's requirements. Rather than choosing an area with minimal problems from which to spread in accordance with the premises of the program, MACV convinced Diem to select a province heavily infiltrated by insurgents and near their primary bases. MACV wanted to establish fortified strongholds along routes used by the Viet Cong. The chosen villages may have been strategic in some sense, but they were not pacified and the program never spread out from them.

The hamlet program's troubled start was an omen. The Diem regime began creating strategic hamlets at a reckless pace and in a haphazard manner. Supposedly, 1300 hamlets were created before the national plan was even published. The plan, finally released in April 1962, called for the construction of over eleven thousand hamlets, and by October Diem claimed that more than three thousand had been completed. By July 1963, the official statistics showed over seven thousand strategic hamlets (see Krepinevich 1986, Shafer 1988). Most of these were illusions, fortified on paper only. What happened in all too many cases was that the construction of physical defenses preceded removing the Viet Cong cells that existed, what physical defenses that did exist

were inadequate, and there was no overall plan for where to construct the hamlets. Critical supplies failed to arrive, and volunteers to defend the hamlets never received arms. Groups of hamlets were located wherever a province chief wanted, confounding the purpose of establishing a secure base and spreading out from it. MACV supported the program, and passed along the regime's questionable statistics, since the compromise plan did not interfere with offensive operations designed to destroy Viet Cong forces. As Krepinevich noted (1986, 69), "as long as the strategic hamlet program looked like a success, the army could continue developing the South Vietnamese Army into an effective strike force based on firepower and mobility." Problems in the hamlet program could force the South Vietnamese Army to divert more regular units into the pacification program.

Thus, the attempt to implement the new counterinsurgency doctrine in the strategic hamlet program met with little success. MACV continued to emphasize a conventional military approach and absorbed resources that could have helped the hamlet program. A similar pattern emerged in the use of United States Army Special Forces which I will examine in chapter five.

### **Transition to the Johnson Administration and the Escalation of the Conflict**

In early 1963, Roger Hilsman, who had moved to become the Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East, reported to Kennedy on the situation in Vietnam (see Hilsman 1967, 464; Hilsman in Porter 1979, 169). Reflecting the civilian approach to the problem of counterinsurgency, he outlined the problems in the American approach to Vietnam rehearsed above. There was a lack of an overall plan connected to the strategic concept of counterinsurgency. Despite the theoretical promise in the strategic hamlet program,

the plan was not integrated with the logistical and military plans with the result that efforts to coordinate were nearly impossible. The military was conducting too many large-scale hit-and-withdraw operations and not enough clear-and-hold operations necessary for expanding secure areas.

Kennedy's response to the report was constrained by several factors. First, his military commanders argued equally as strenuously for the opposing viewpoint—that there was a real need for large-scale offensive operations to keep the Diem regime from being overrun. Second, the strategic hamlet program had not been long in place. There was still hope, based on misleading statistics, that it could have an effect. Finally, unfolding events in Vietnam captured the administration's attention. A domestic political crisis surrounding anti-Diem Buddhist protests and the resulting regime raids on Buddhist pagodas dominated the summer of 1963 (see Lewy 1978). By August, the Kennedy administration decided that the Diem regime could no longer be supported and informed generals of the South Vietnamese army that the United States would support Diem's removal. The generals finally moved on 1 November 1963, and Diem was murdered the next day. Three weeks later, President Kennedy was assassinated.

The overthrow of the Diem regime and the Kennedy assassination marked the beginning of the end of the counterinsurgency phase of the Vietnam conflict. Kennedy's personal involvement and interest was gone. The collapse of the Diem regime heralded more than a year of instability and a series of ineffective military regimes in South Vietnam. While in the early days of the Johnson administration Hilsman and his colleagues continued to argue for the application of the new counterinsurgency doctrine,

events drove continuing conventional escalation. Hilsman's ideas were no longer welcome, and he resigned early in 1964.

The Communists apparently concluded that the fall of Diem was a signal for them to escalate their attacks, and through 1964 their offensives intensified. Although official American reaction recognized the need for a viable pacification effort, the increasing urgency of the military situation and the precarious state of the military regimes made it much easier for MACV to argue that conventional operations demanded priority over any counterinsurgency schemes. Counterinsurgency's reliance on arm's length aid to an autonomous government no longer made sense. With seven different regimes in power during 1964 alone, there was not much of a government to speak of.

The tone for the Johnson administration was set early on as the JCS made sweeping recommendations in a 22 January 1964 memorandum. Most significantly, the JCS recommended that the United States take over the direction of the war and commit additional American forces, as necessary, in support of combat action. The JCS also determined that the escalation of the conflict required taking direct action against North Vietnam to pressure it to cease its support of insurgents (see JCSM-46-64 in Porter 1979, 235; Cable 1986, 206). The military's solution was a bombing campaign against what it saw as the source of the aggression. North Vietnam would thereby be cowed into submission, the infiltration would cease, and the Viet Cong would disappear. However, in the first year of his presidency, Johnson was occupied with the problems of taking over executive power and campaigning to ensure that he held onto it. Domestic considerations delayed any dramatic moves until after the 1964 presidential election.

Through 1964, the Viet Cong continued to attack energetically in the countryside. Their offensive progressed to the point that the South Vietnamese Army was pushed back to the major cities and a few principal roads. Early in 1965, it seemed that they would cut South Vietnam in two at its narrow waist and isolate Saigon. To stop the military disintegration on 13 February 1965 Johnson ordered a sustained bombing campaign against North Vietnam—Operation Rolling Thunder. This expansion of the war soon led to still further expansion. One argument for the bombing campaign was that it would reduce the number of American ground combat troops needed to stabilize the situation in South Vietnam. But because the Viet Cong responded to the American escalation with an operation of their own that targeted airfields, sustaining the bombing campaign seemed to require American ground troops to protect airfields in South Vietnam (Cable 1986, 257). On 8 March 1965, United States Marines landed at Danang to defend the airbase there. Within a month, they received authorization to conduct offensive operations. Counterinsurgency had given way to intervention.

After the insertion of combat ground forces, few policymakers emphasized pacification. Most officials continued to refer to its importance in speeches and statements, but this was not reflected in their priorities (Komer 1986, 141). The United States did not adopt Kennedy's "whole new kind of strategy" for dealing with wars of national liberation. During the Kennedy administration, American political leaders engaged in the problem of how to beat a guerrilla enemy in a counterinsurgency war. Many reached the conclusion that such a war could only be won by a combination of military action and political and administrative reform. Most military leaders did not share this conclusion. They consistently stressed the importance of mobile, offensive



operations designed to destroy the enemy. Following the fall of the Diem regime and Kennedy's assassination, almost all counterinsurgency efforts ceased. At the same time, the Viet Cong escalated their campaign and the Johnson administration saw the insertion of large numbers of ground troops as the only option that could help the situation in South Vietnam. The Kennedy administration's counterinsurgency approach of 1961—never accepted by the military—was replaced in the White House in 1965 with a strategy of intervention.

## **Chapter 4 – Vietnam: Doctrine, Training and Education**

### **Introduction**

In this chapter, I shift from theories, strategies and operations in Vietnam to doctrinal and educational developments within the army that occurred during the Vietnam era. The first section documents the Kennedy administration's pressure upon the army to effect change and illustrates the army's initial resistance. The following sections show how that contest played out in doctrinal publications, education and training programs, and within the Special Forces.

### **Kennedy versus the Army**

As the Kennedy administration formulated its approach to counterinsurgency, Kennedy pressed both the military and civilian government bureaucracies to increase their organizational knowledge about insurgency and their response to it. Particularly, the President urged the military to make doctrinal and organizational changes to meet the challenge of insurgency. In a speech to the United States Military Academy's 1962 graduating class at West Point, Kennedy said (quoted in Hilsman 1967, 414):

This is a new type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origins—war by guerillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It requires in those situations where we must counter it a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training.

Through personal intervention, Kennedy attempted to turn the army from its customary procedure towards more effective methods of waging this new type of war. NSAM 2 of February 1961 directed DOD to investigate an increase in counter guerrilla resources. On 28 March 1961, in a message to Congress on the defense budget, Kennedy

argued that the United States needed a “greater ability to deal with guerrilla forces, insurrections, and subversion (Kennedy in Stebbins 1962, 61). Similarly, in May of 1961, Kennedy addressed a special session of Congress concerning “urgent national needs” and declared his intention to expand “rapidly and substantially” the existing forces for the conduct of “non-nuclear war, paramilitary operations, and sub-limited or unconventional wars” (Kennedy 1961, 906). He called for a reorientation in training from conventional warfare to counterinsurgency warfare, with new equipment to complement that reorientation. In September of the same year, Kennedy visited the newly activated Special Warfare Center. His personal attention to the Special Forces underlined his estimation of their potential in counterinsurgency situations.

Kennedy could only devote a fraction of his time to reforming the army’s view of counterinsurgency. Seeming to understand organizational resistance, he summoned all high-ranking army commanders to an extraordinary meeting in the Oval Office in late November 1961. He urged them to support his counterinsurgency program and develop the capability needed to deal with the struggle against Communist insurgents (Krepinevich 1987, 272). His appeal failed. This was at least partially because the conceptual difference between counterinsurgency and counterguerrilla operations was not explicated—Kennedy often used the words interchangeably. The effect of this was that the army focused on the military—counterguerrilla—aspect of the issue, but given its doctrine did not see this as requiring much modification in army operations. Kennedy and many of his advisors focused on the broader political, economic, and military aspects of counterinsurgency. Addressing these aspects would require a reconceptualization of what guerrilla warfare was and how the army should approach it. Speeches and articles

by administration officials stressed that the administration saw the need for a thorough military transformation to meet the challenge of insurgency. This became embedded in the developing theory of counterinsurgency. Counter guerrilla operations were seen as a special skill requiring a special approach. While regular forces were important for resisting external aggression, the United States needed a different kind of force for multifaceted counterinsurgency operations.

Drawing on his own experience in Burma and the army's 1901 encounters with guerrillas in the Philippines, Hilsman (1962, 29) declared that for "effective counter guerrilla operations, we need radical changes in organization, combat doctrine and equipment. He recommended decentralized groups of fifty men, operating autonomously in the countryside. These units would be employed according to a classic counter guerrilla technique, which called for dividing the disputed area into equal sections and cleaning it out section by section. A backup force was to assist in eliminating the enemy units, bringing in reinforcements as required by helicopter and airdrop. The process would be repeated until the area was secured, and the defending force would then move on to other sections after civic action programs consolidated control over the "cleansed" sections. These small units would not have access to the heavy artillery or airpower support of regular army units, avoiding the collateral damage and civilian casualties that alienated the population and robbed the established government of popular support. The implication of his approach was that heavy weapons and equipment, divisional and corps organizations, headquarters staffs, and support elements were superfluous and even dangerous in counterinsurgency warfare.

Hilsman (1962, 25) warned that the notion that well-trained regular soldiers can do anything was a delusion, and that thinking they could deal with jungle guerrillas was “nonsense.” However, these were the attitudes of the army leadership. The generals of the army believed that conventional army forces using standard military tactics and techniques could defeat a guerrilla force. As early as April 1961, after a visit to Vietnam General Lyman Lemnitzer, then Chairman of the JCS, stated that the new administration was “oversold” on the importance of guerrilla warfare and that emphasis on counterinsurgency would impair the ability of the South Vietnamese to meet a conventional invasion (Hilsman 1967, 416). Kennedy’s own military advisor, General Maxwell Taylor tried to reassure the president that “we good soldiers are trained for all kinds of things. We don’t have to worry about any special situation. We’re taking care of that” (Taylor 1972, 184). Taylor felt that counterinsurgency was “just a form of small war” and that “all this cloud of dust that’s coming out of the White House isn’t necessary” (quoted in Krepinevich 1986, 37). General George Decker, then the Army Chief of Staff, declared that “any good soldier can handle guerrillas” (quoted in Guerrilla Warfare 1962, 30). In a speech at Fordham University in November 1962, Decker’s successor, General Earle Wheeler, stated (quoted in Hilsman 1967, 426):

Despite the fact that the [Vietnam] conflict is conducted as guerilla warfare, it is nonetheless a military action. It is fashionable to say that the problems in Southeast Asia are primarily political and economic rather than military. I do not agree. The essence of the problem in Vietnam is military.

These responses reflected the bias of career military men, but also the fact that the army was not mentally or doctrinally prepared for Kennedy’s type of counterinsurgency operations. Although the army had participated in low intensity conflict, its pre-Vietnam

experience in three conventional wars over the previous half-century dominated army doctrine and thought. Low-intensity conflict in general and counterinsurgency in particular represented a trivial portion of the service's history when compared with three major wars. It was the army's experience in these conflicts that formed the basis for its approach to the war in Vietnam (Krepinevich 1986, 7). The general American understanding of warfare emphasized combat—set-piece battles between organized units. The desirable aim of combat was the destruction of the enemy's army in the field (see Weigley 1977).

In the development of a theory of victory in guerrilla war this helped assure that a particular model would be the only one seen and prepared for. As Cable (1986, 5) points out, there are only two basic types of guerrilla war: partisan and insurgent. In the first type, the guerrillas operate as an auxiliary to a state's regular military forces. These partisans only exist with external support and control. Insurgents, on the other hand, operate as armed dissidents with the ability to operate independently. Guided by its understanding of warfare and combat, the army view was that all such wars were partisan in nature. This view drove two army approaches to guerrilla warfare.

First, in 1952 during the Korean conflict, the army created its Special Forces to take part in offensive guerrilla warfare. Using the partisan warfare model, the Special Forces concentrated on the mission of organizing friendly guerrilla forces behind enemy lines, and coordinating the efforts of these guerrillas with conventional force operations. Guiding doctrinal manuals considered only friendly employment of guerrilla forces (see FM 31-21, 1958). The emphasis on partisan warfare was restricted to the few hundred members of the Special Forces. The remainder of the army concentrated on the conflict

spectrum's higher levels: conventional combat operations and, during the Eisenhower administration, nuclear warfare. Second, in rare instances when army manuals considered counter guerrilla methods, they concentrated on the destruction of the guerrilla force (see FM 31-15 1953, 67). The military maintained this emphasis into the counterinsurgency era, while lip service was being paid to addressing the root causes of insurgencies and subversion. There was no distinction between partisans and insurgents—the army's understanding was that guerrillas must have support from an external power. Additionally, guerrilla war was seen as the early warning signal of an impending conventional cross-border attack from a hostile, Soviet-dominated state. Thus, the army saw two keys to victory in guerrilla war: the destruction of the lines of supply and communication between the guerrillas with their sponsors and the destruction of the guerrilla forces in the field through conventional military tactics (Cable 1986, 6).

Kennedy's effort to change the army perspective was delegated to a special panel in the hopes that it could provide the constant pressure that would be needed to effect change. To generate and monitor the implementation of counterinsurgency programs in both the civilian agencies and military services, Kennedy established an inter-departmental oversight board, the Special Group—Counterinsurgency (SGCI). He hoped that high level officials belonging to the group could exert the continuous pressure needed to bring change. The president's military representative, General Maxwell Taylor, chaired the panel. It also included the attorney general, the deputy undersecretary of state for political affairs, the deputy secretary of defense, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, the director of the CIA, the President's assistant for national security affairs, the director of the United States Information Agency, and the administrator of the

Agency for International Development. The SGCI was created by NSAM 124 of 18 January 1962 which itemized four functions for the group (Pentagon Papers 1971, II-660):

- a. To insure proper recognition throughout the U.S. government that subversive insurgency ("war of liberation") is a major form of politico-military conflict equal in importance to conventional warfare.
- b. To insure that such recognition is reflected in the organization, training, equipment, and doctrine of the U.S. armed forces and other U.S. agencies abroad.
- c. To keep under review the adequacy of U.S. resources to deal with actual or potential situations of insurgency, making timely recommendations of measures to apply, increase, or adjust these resources to meet anticipated requirements.
- d. To insure the development of adequate interdepartmental programs aimed at preventing or defeating subversive insurgency in countries and regions specifically assigned to the SGCI by the president.

Laos, Thailand, and South Vietnam were the three countries initially assigned to the SGCI. The group's activities designed to address insurgencies in those countries affected three areas of interest to the army: doctrine, education and training, and the Special Forces—each examined below. Before discussing them in detail, it is important to recognize a key dilemma raised by Kennedy's approach to counterinsurgency. Blaufarb (1977, 80-81) notes that the question was how to distribute responsibility for this kind of warfare. Would certain units be selected for specialization in counterinsurgency warfare, or would the army as a whole be required to add this to its other conventional missions? The answer to this question lay in the army's reluctance to accept the president's commitment to a revision of its combat style, weaponry, and tactics. Accepting such a revision would require unpalatable solutions. On one hand, infantry forces would have to be prepared to fight in two entirely different modes—with different weapons, organization, and goals. On the other hand, certain units would have



to be designated as counterinsurgency forces, reducing their competence and availability for "general purpose" operations.

The army's solution to the dilemma was to dismiss the contrast between conventional and counterinsurgency combat. This approach would eventually prevent the adoption of a counterinsurgency doctrine that bore any resemblance to the concepts advocated by the Kennedy administration. It treated counterinsurgency, not as a different kind of warfare requiring special skills, but as another task for a conventional combat unit. Gradually, rather than the task bringing changes to the army, the army changed the task to fit into its operational repertoire. Kennedy had hoped that the SGCI would provide the oversight for which he did not have time. But most group members were not suited for the task. Many had no military experience or knowledge of military doctrine. Those who did agreed with the military rather than with the new approach to counterinsurgency. General Taylor was a key figure as special military representative, chair of SGCI and then as Chairman of the JCS. Placing him at junction points between the political leadership and the army insulated the service from presidential pressure (Krepinevich 1986, 34).

### **Doctrine**

When Kennedy introduced his Flexible Response strategy, the army welcomed it as a reprieve from the lean budget years of the Eisenhower administration. However, Flexible Response also implied the generation of forces and doctrine capable of addressing wars of insurgency. The impetus to develop this sort of capability conflicted with the army's intention of preparing for conventional war. Kennedy's initial attempts to reorient the army did not satisfy him, but his continued insistence on compliance

resulted in a flurry of activity within the army. In this section, I will demonstrate that this activity resulted in only superficial and short-lived changes.

As Kennedy's demands for action grew more insistent, the army conducted several official examinations of "wars of national liberation" and counterinsurgency. In one of them, thirteen general officers met for three weeks at the Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg under the leadership of Lieutenant General Hamilton Howze. The results of the Howze Board Report were published in January 1962. One conclusion was that (quoted in Cable 1986, 118-9):

The tactical doctrine for the employment of regular forces against insurgent guerrilla forces has not been adequately developed, and the army does not have a clear concept of the proper scale and type of equipment necessary for these operations.

Shortly afterward, the army began to introduce counterinsurgency concepts into its capstone and implementing doctrinal manuals. The question is to what extent did the doctrine reflect Kennedy's understanding of how to approach counterinsurgency?

Evidence from the wave of doctrinal publications in the early- to mid-1960s suggests that the army had a different conception; doctrinal literature reflected the service's tendency to fit all forms of conflict into the framework of conventional warfare.

In February 1962, the army published an edition of FM 100-5 *Operations* that for the first time addressed the lower end of the spectrum of warfare, devoting three chapters to such operations: Chapter 10, "Unconventional Warfare Operations," chapter 11, "Military Operations Against Irregular Forces," chapter 12, "Situations Short of War." Passages in the manual reflected the counterinsurgency concepts expressed by Rostow and Hilsman, the key spokesmen for the administration's theory of counterinsurgency. For example, chapter 10 states that "unconventional warfare" is comprised of guerrilla

warfare, escape and evasion, as well as subversion. However, consistent with the army's understanding of insurgency as partisan warfare, these three elements of unconventional warfare were seen as occurring "within the enemy's sphere of influence largely by local personnel to further military, political or economic objectives" (FM 100-5 1962, 127). The doctrinal focus was on the offensive employment of guerrilla forces in conjunction with conventional forces and the local population of enemy-controlled areas. One section of the manual observed that countering unconventional warfare was important (FM 100-5 1962, 127). However, again in keeping with army doctrine's emphasis on the offensive, guidance in the area of "counter unconventional warfare" was limited to two sentences (FM 100-5 1962, 130):

Enemy unconventional warfare operations must be countered. Measures include the use of consolidation psychological operations in conjunction with civil affairs, and the use of combat troops or friendly guerrillas in an antiguerrilla role.

The rest of chapter 10 focused on guerrilla warfare which was comprised of "combat operations in enemy-held territory by indigenous forces to reduce the combat effectiveness, industrial capacity, and morale of the enemy." The primary mission of guerrilla forces was to "interdict enemy lines of communication, installations, and centers of war production in support of conventional operations" (FM 100-5 1962, 130). The two sentences devoted to the topic of subversion defined it only as an offensive tactic (FM 100-5 1962, 135):

Subversion against hostile states (resistance) comprises the actions by underground resistance groups for the purpose of reducing the military, economic, psychological, or political potential of an enemy. As resistance groups develop strength, their actions may become overt and their status shift to that of a guerrilla force.

Chapter 12, entitled “Situations Short of War” indicated that military forces could be employed in a wide variety of situations in a cold war. The missions it incorporated were the show of force, truce enforcement, police action, and legal occupation. Specific operations included parades, demonstrations, patrol duty or “limited combat action against irregular or partisan forces” (FM 100-5 1962, 156). Beyond these generalities, the chapter gave no specific guidance on what a unit should do beyond maintaining the “highest standards of discipline” and insuring that troops receive orientation briefings (FM 100-5 1962, 161).

Chapter 11, entitled “Military Operations Against Irregular Forces,” came closest to reflecting the new administration’s understanding of the situation at hand. It espoused Kennedy administration counterinsurgency concepts regarding the cause of insurgency, the objectives of a successful counterinsurgency, and the type of forces needed to defeat insurgent guerrillas. First, this chapter noted that army units would normally be employed against “irregular forces” in situations where popular dissatisfaction with political, social, or economic conditions caused “irregular” activities. Although, again conforming to the army’s perspective, it stated that external elements frequently exploited these social tensions by inspiring and sponsoring irregular forces (FM 100-5 1962, 137). Second, the chapter indicated that these operations would include “political and administrative aspects and objectives not usually considered normal to military operations” and that the destruction of the irregular force did not normally provide the complete solution to the problem (FM 100-5 1962, 137, 139). To succeed, the local government and American forces needed to win the support of the people. Finally, reflecting Hilsman’s recommendations, this chapter argued that in counterinsurgency

situations, small, special units would be organized, equipped, and trained to combat irregular forces by using the same tactics and techniques used by the guerrillas (FM 100-5 1962, 143). They would be capable of semi-independent action without the heavy combat support (e.g. artillery and tactical air support) normally provided by a division or corps (FM 100-5 1962, 140). However, those heavy combat support units would be held in a state of constant readiness for situations that would permit their effective employment.

Despite the presence of these concepts congruent with the administration's counterinsurgency theory, the overall tone of chapter 11 left no doubt about how the army framed the problem of irregular forces and what it prescribed to solve that problem. Most of the chapter was clearly oriented toward situations in which commanders found themselves opposed by partisan adjuncts to conventional hostile forces. Although the word "partisan" was not actually employed, it was understood. The solution to the threat presented by irregular forces of all kinds was explicitly based on conventional notions of combat and aggressiveness (FM 100-5 1962, 139):

Operations to suppress and eliminate irregular forces are primarily offensive in nature. Thus, the conventional force must plan for and seize the initiative at the outset and retain it throughout the conduct of the operation. These operations may be required in situations wherein an irregular force either constitutes the only enemy or threatens rear areas of regular military forces which are conducting conventional operations. The operations are similar in either case.

It is important to underscore the last sentence above. This doctrine drew no distinctions between indigenous insurgencies with or without effective external support and sanctuaries, and partisan activities in conjunction with regular forces. These different opponents were to be countered in identical fashion. Irregular forces were to be

“attacked immediately” and “destroyed by continuous determined attack” (FM 100-5 1962, 142).

Thus, while the capstone army manual encouraged a commander facing an insurgency situation to remember political aspects of the situation, it expected him to act aggressively to eliminate the irregular forces. The subordinate, implementing manuals in this area emulated this offensive-minded approach. The 1961 FM 31-15 *Operations Against Irregular Forces* of May 1961 was still in effect when the new FM 100-5 was published. Too short (only 35 pages) and broad to be useful for planning specific operations, it had been the source of much of FM 100-5’s chapter 11. Several passages were simply copied from FM 31-15 into FM 100-5. Therefore, commanders referring to the implementing manual on how to deal with irregular forces received the same advice given in the capstone manual. The objective was to eliminate the irregular force through predominantly offensive operations (FM 31-15 1961, 4) since a defensive attitude permits the guerrilla to concentrate superior forces, inflict severe casualties and lower morale (FM 31-15 1961, 25).

In 1963, the army published an adjunct to FM 31-15: FM 31-16 *Counter guerrilla Operations*. It was the official authority on counter guerrilla operations as the American troop commitment to South Vietnam was increasing. Written by officers at the Army Infantry School at Fort Benning as a “how-to” manual for the lower level units of the army, it ignored possible connections between political and military actions. It focused on destruction of insurgent forces as the counterinsurgency objective, outlining tactical operations designed to harass and defeat a guerrilla force and deny it the support of a sponsoring power. While the 1962 version of FM 100-5 had at least contemplated the

importance of the political and economic situation, FM 31-16 limited its guidance to combat considerations (FM 31-16 1963, 20):

An area confronted with a serious guerrilla menace must be considered a combat area. Units in such areas must maintain the same alert and aggressive attitudes as forward troops in conventional war. A "rear area" psychology makes it easy for guerrilla forces to employ one of their most potent weapons, surprise. Purely defensive measures only allow the guerrilla force to grow and become strong. They are justified only when the strength of the friendly forces available does not permit offensive action. Even limited offensive operations are preferable to a purely passive attitude. Offensive action should be continuous and aggressive.

While there were many other doctrinal manuals published at this time, not all were communicated to the entire army. For example, the Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg produced FM 31-21 *Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations* for the army in September 1961. Even though Special Forces units were then engaged in civic action programs in Vietnam, this manual dealt with combat operations and focused on the offensive use of the Special Forces. The 1965 revision, retitled *Special Forces Operations* included a chapter on counterinsurgency operations but, as the title implies, only as they applied to the Special Forces. Again, the focus was on combat operations. Similarly, FM 31-20 *Special Forces Operational Techniques* of 1965 and FM 31-22 *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces* of 1963 contained extensive consideration of a counterinsurgency operation, but were also directed at the Special Forces.

In summary, while Kennedy called for a new doctrinal approach to counterinsurgency operations, the army concentrated on what it knew how to do. Once a unit encountered guerrillas, it was army doctrine to attempt a set-piece engagement. As we have seen, the governing provisions of FM 100-5 emphasized offensive combat principles. This was expanded for the benefit of tactical elements (FM 31-16 1963, 86):

Once a sizeable guerrilla force has been definitely located, priority of all available combat power is given to offensive operations to eliminate the enemy. Offensive operations normally require a friendly force much larger than the located guerrilla force. The brigade, battalion, and company may conduct offensive operations or participate in the conduct of such operations by larger units. Offensive operations are extremely difficult to execute and, consequently, should be planned in great detail. Troops must be well briefed and rehearsed.

Doctrinal manuals took some account of Kennedy's counterinsurgency ideas in the early 1960s. But there were no adjustments made to basic combat tactics. Publications thus continued to prescribe unit integrity and the full use of available firepower, including armor, artillery, and air support (Blaufarb 1977, 287). Even the attempts at change clung to the assumption that the principal role of military force in a counterinsurgency situation is to find and destroy the armed forces of the enemy. The importance of protecting the population in order to separate the insurgents from their source of support was lost in the noise of all that firepower. Therefore, despite the efforts of the Kennedy administration, the emphasis of the army's counterinsurgency doctrine was on the aspects of combat and offensive tactics that conformed to traditional army concepts and force structure. The army assumed that the guerrilla could be fought with the same tactics and methods which were used to fight a conventional opponent (Cable 1986, 136). It is indicative of the army's disdain for counterinsurgency that most of the implementing manuals referring to insurgency were meant for the relatively inconsequential Special Forces—  
inconsequential enough that the army did not object to their being seconded to the CIA. Even these manuals, however, highlight the army's preoccupation with offensive tactics.

Army doctrine reflected its response to a contingency that it did not really understand, out of a desire to satisfy the requirements of the civilian leadership. This is perhaps best exemplified by the speed with which doctrine changed after the arrival of



American combat troops in Vietnam in early 1965. With President Kennedy's personal interest removed and the prospect of full combat operations in Vietnam, the few counterinsurgency concepts that had entered army manuals were quickly expunged.

As early as 1968, the army revised FM 100-5 and removed the chapter on military operations against irregular forces, leaving no trace of the concept. The chapter on unconventional warfare remained—still focused on the offensive use of friendly guerrillas. In the post-Vietnam era, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War regenerated interest in combat operations. The army then intensified its focus on conventional missions and the Central European theater. The first version of FM 100-5 after Vietnam recognizes the need to employ forces in a broad range of environments, but when discussing specifics it only considers conventional and nuclear conflict. The next version of FM 100-5 stated (FM 100-5 1976, 1-2):

The US Army may find itself at war in any of a variety of places and situations, fighting opponents which could vary from the highly modern mechanized forces of the Warsaw Pact to light, irregular units in a remote part of the less developed world. Wherever the battle begins, the US Army is equipped, organized and trained to undertake appropriate military missions. The purpose of military operations, and the focus of this manual, is to describe how the US Army destroys enemy military forces and secures or defends important geographic objectives.

Battle in Central Europe against forces of the Warsaw Pact is the most demanding mission the US Army could be assigned. Because the US Army is structured primarily for that contingency and has large forces deployed in that area, this manual is designed mainly to deal with the realities of such operations. The principles set forth in this manual, however, apply also to military operations anywhere in the world. Furthermore, the US Army retains substantial capabilities in its airborne, airmobile, and infantry divisions for successful operations in other theatres of war against other forces.

By that point, the army's basic warfighting manual did not even contain a reference to unconventional warfare. The implementing manuals showed a similar pattern. FM 31-16

*Counterguerrilla Operations* was last revised in 1967, falling into disuse after that. Even the manuals directed towards the Special Forces reflected the unpopularity of counterinsurgency. FM 31-22 *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces* was later retitled *Command, Control, and Support of Special Forces Operations*. The word “counterinsurgency” did not appear in the manual.

### **Education and Training**

Like doctrinal developments, education and training programs demonstrated the army’s reluctance to change its conventional focus. In this section, I examine briefly the developments in the army’s education and training establishments. These developments reinforce the evidence presented that shows an organization resistant to Kennedy’s proposed changes. Counterinsurgency education and training was only slowly incorporated into the army schools, and what was incorporated accorded with the army’s conception of the problem and how to deal with it.

When Kennedy entered the White House, he reviewed army training manuals and equipment that pertained to counterguerrilla operations and was not satisfied (Blaufarb 1977, 55). Neither his directives nor his November 1961 Oval Office meeting with army commanders had the immediate effect he sought. In January of 1962, Kennedy sent a two-page memorandum to his secretary of defense criticizing the army’s lack of progress in counterguerrilla warfare. Bluntly, he told McNamara that he was “not satisfied that the Department of Defense, and in particular the army, is according the necessary degree of attention and effort to the threat of insurgency and guerrilla war” (quoted in Krepinevich 1986, 31). Kennedy said he wanted a more aggressive program of training all officers in guerrilla methods and in counterinsurgency. He wanted this training injected into

military schools from West Point to the Command and General Staff College and the Army War College (Norman & Spores 1962, 33).

This letter had two main effects: the army protested that it was complying with the president's directives and the SGCI was formed to oversee military education and training. First, General Lemnitzer, Chairman of the JCS, responded to the president's complaint in a forty-five-page memorandum that listed school courses and military training in counterinsurgency matters from all services (see McClintock 1992, 185). He hoped to dispel any misconceptions about the degree of awareness in the armed forces regarding the importance of the subject and its degree of emphasis in military training. Listing the changes to curricula in the army, the memo described some of the current programs. The memo claimed that at the Infantry School at Fort Benning, more than 400 hours of the 1540 hours taught were related to counterinsurgency applications. It asserted that the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) curriculum at Fort Leavenworth included the planning of unconventional warfare at higher levels, the use of guerrilla forces, military operations against guerrilla forces, and civil affairs. It also claimed that the Army War College curriculum at Carlisle Barracks included unconventional and counterinsurgency strategy and doctrine. Finally, it indicated that the Special Warfare School curriculum offered entire courses related to the counterinsurgency mission. In what follows, I examine these claims and show that they were misleading at best.

To understand the army's approach to counterinsurgency in general and its training aspects in particular, note that while the army appeared to be accepting its presidentially imposed mission, it regarded it as an auxiliary aspect of its conventional role. General Decker (1962, 42), Army Chief of Staff, wrote, "army doctrine today

establishes proficiency in unconventional warfare as a normal requirement for its versatile, modern ground forces.” This could be interpreted as showing that the army wanted to train all its soldiers for both primary and secondary missions. However, the weight of the evidence suggests that the army viewed counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare as areas in which to apply its traditional approach. The doctrinal manuals reflected some understanding of the sources and causes of insurgencies, but operational guidance followed traditional, conventional themes. Education and training programs would follow this pattern, including the topic of counterinsurgency while applying conventional tactics to solve the problem. For example, Kennedy’s complaints reached the army as it was publishing the results of the Howze Board Report of January 1962. Among its recommendations was one for the indoctrination of all army combat divisions in guerrilla and counterinsurgency warfare concepts, weapons, techniques, and tactics. The report indicated that division commanders should include these special courses into troop training, but also that they should have leeway in how to incorporate them into their regular training program (Norman & Spore 1962, 28).

The second effect of Kennedy’s letter to McNamara was the formation of the SGCI, summarized above. When SGCI was established, its first purpose was to build an interdepartmental infrastructure which could generate action in various agencies and services. On 13 March 1962, NSAM 131 laid down a comprehensive instruction on the matter of training in subjects related to insurgency and counterinsurgency (see Blaufarb 1977, 69). It required all military officers to study the history of subversive insurgency movements in courses to be introduced into the services’ schools. Junior- and middle-grade officers would study tactics and techniques related to the subject. Middle- and

senior-grade officials were to receive special training to prepare them for positions of responsibility in the planning and conduct of counterinsurgency programs. The memorandum also directed that a national level school be established to teach counterinsurgency policy and doctrine (concerning which see below in the section on Special Forces).

### *Training*

The training directive had an immediate impact. It proved a very specific guideline, prescribing visible action which could easily be verified and reported. In July 1962, the Joint Chiefs sent a memorandum to the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs entitled "A Summary of U.S. Military Counterinsurgency Accomplishments Since 1 January 1961." In it, they reported that nine special counterinsurgency courses for officers and twenty-five for enlisted ranks had been created since that date. They also claimed that the curricula of all war colleges were modified to include "freshly prepared" instruction on counterinsurgency doctrine and that over half a million troops had received basic counterinsurgency instruction (see McClintock 1992, 185).

The principal problem with the swift reactions outlined in the January and July 1962 memos is their believability. Where did the army find the instructors with counterinsurgency experience to teach these new courses? The answer is that the army did not develop widespread counterinsurgency expertise in a few months. It loosely interpreted the term "counterinsurgency" and the phrase "related to counterinsurgency." Many of the subjects listed in the memos were already in the curricula of various schools. When additional hours of training were needed to show compliance with presidential

demands, they were counted as being “related to” counterinsurgency. Map reading, guard duty, civil defense training, challenging, and the use of countersigns were all treated as subjects related to counterinsurgency. The “new” courses included language training and unconventional warfare courses such as psychological operations or underwater demolitions (see McClintock 1992, 185).

Krepinevich (1986, 49) states that the army’s Infantry School only slowly developed counterinsurgency instruction, dropping it quickly. Little related to counterinsurgency was taught until 1963, when it jumped to twenty-one percent of the total. However, only two percent of the instruction was directed primarily at counterinsurgency topics. Insurgency “related” instruction was reported as fifty-six percent of the total in 1965, but only sixteen percent focused primarily on the subject. After the army committed large numbers of troops to Vietnam, counterinsurgency disappeared from the curriculum. Further, as reflected in the doctrinal manuals that guided training programs, much of the instruction dedicated to counterinsurgency actually concentrated on the army’s approach to antiguerrilla warfare—search and destroy missions.

Counterinsurgency training exercises were difficult to conduct; long term patrolling, civic action programs and gathering intelligence on an insurgency’s infrastructure are not easily simulated. Therefore, army counterinsurgency exercises were often conventional operations with few modifications. Among the exercises considered part of counterinsurgency training were underwater demolition, air rescue operations, and guerrilla warfare. One exercise supposedly offering counterinsurgency

training consisted of corps-level operations in which American units organized forces behind enemy lines rather than combating insurgents (see Krepinevich 1986, 54).

Another example demonstrates the disconnect between the Kennedy administration's concept of counterinsurgency and the army's understanding of the problem at hand. In the spring of 1962, the Eighty-second Airborne Division and the Seventh Special Forces Groups conducted a counterinsurgency field training exercise in which the Special Forces played the role of the insurgent guerrillas and the airborne troops the counterinsurgents. Their missions were defined as follows (Palmer & Flint 1962, 33):

Guerrilla force: Disrupt all lines of communication and gain the support of the local population in preparation for a subsequent invasion from outside the country.

Counter-guerrilla force: Counter-insurgency; that is, defend the people, gain their confidence and support, and assist local authorities. Practically speaking, the operational mission is to find, fix, and destroy all the guerrillas in the area and to protect the vital lines of communication.

Note that, in line with the army's post-Korea understanding, the guerrilla force is the precursor to an invasion. This has implications for how to approach a situation—emphasis must be on the preparation of a conventional response to the impending invasion. Also, the conception of counterinsurgency in the mission statement reflects an understanding of the broader implications of counterinsurgency but, in accordance with army doctrine, the “practical” course of action is to destroy the guerrillas.

Guided by the evolving doctrinal manuals discussed above, army training programs also quickly removed any emphasis on counterinsurgency that had existed once the Vietnam conflict ended. The army's European focus was joined by a back-to-basics emphasis in military training (Lovell 1987, 133). Prompted especially by evidence that

officers and enlisted personnel entering the service during the Vietnam era had failed to acquire some of the fundamental skills of soldiering, the back-to-basics movement resulted in the removal of alternative modes of warfare from the branch schools. Table 2 below is extracted from a study on insurgency and low-intensity conflict (LIC) training at army branch schools. When compared with General Lemnitzer's claim that 400 hours of training related to counterinsurgency was being conducted at the Infantry School at Fort Benning in 1962, it shows how the army had moved away from studying insurgencies. The author also points out that significant portions of the instruction that did exist were devoted to applying conventional tactics to LIC situations, or were functional in nature—for example, outlining how government agencies support LIC operations (Vought 1977, 30). According to another author, these few hours on the subject were eliminated entirely in the late 1970s (see Waghelstein 1985, 44).

**Table 2 – LIC Training at US Army Branch Schools (Vought 1977)**

<b>US Army Armor School</b>			
		Total hours	Hours devoted to LIC
Advanced Course	1969	1186	5.4
	1975	986	0
Basic Course	1971	409	20
	1975	552	0
<b>US Army Infantry School</b>			
		Total hours	Hours devoted to LIC
Advanced Course	1972	1072	34
	1976	845	34
Basic Course	1972	401	Elective only
	1976	557	0
<b>US Army Intelligence School</b>			
		Total hours	Hours devoted to LIC
Advanced Course	1974	1052	22
	1975	829	31
Basic Course	1972	338	2
	1975	361	4



## Education

Two of the army's most important educational institutions for officers are the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, and the Army War College (AWC) at Carlisle Barracks. The purpose of the CGSC is to prepare selected field-grade officers—primarily majors—for duty as commanders or staff officers and to develop their intellectual depth and analytical ability. Traditionally, the army grooms its future general officers at the AWC. Its official mission is to prepare senior field-grade officers—lieutenant colonels and colonels—to assume strategic responsibilities in military and national security organizations.

CGSC officials did adjust their curriculum to demonstrate compliance with administration directives. But, again, they did this slowly and in accordance with traditional army concepts. In the CGSC Program of Instruction for the 1959-1960 academic year, the word counterinsurgency does not appear. It did, however, include a 3-hour block on anti-guerrilla operations in a limited war. In those 3 hours, the faculty planned a discussion and practical exercise on Iran in which students would learn requirements for “continuous offensive action by highly mobile forces,” a “dependable and flexible communications system,” and “political, economic, psychological and unusual military factors” (CGSC POI 1959, 59). By 1965, the college reported that its 1143 hour, thirty-eight week academic curriculum contained only 42 hours of “pure” counterinsurgency instruction and 171 hours of instruction in “related counterinsurgency subjects” (see CGSC POI 1964, 2). An examination of the course circular shows that those 42 hours of “pure” instruction were not what the Kennedy administration had requested. Twelve hours were devoted to unconventional warfare in conventional war,

12 hours to the use of guerrillas in limited war, and 12 to the fundamentals of special warfare. Only 6 hours actually concentrated on counterinsurgency operations (see CGSC Circular #9 1964). It is impossible to tell which of the remaining 1101 hours were deemed the 171 “related” to counterinsurgency, although they probably included the 24 hours on map maneuver, the 6 on the infantry division in jungle operations, and the 3 on psychological operations.

As American combat participation in Vietnam dramatically increased in 1965, CGSC officials further adjusted the curriculum. Hours of “pure” counterinsurgency instruction dropped to 25 in 1970, with a further 27 in related topics such as unconventional warfare, psychological operations, and counterguerrilla operations at the division level. Furthermore, the CGSC Program of Instruction for 1969-1970 reveals that even those few hours overstated the actual amount of instruction. For example, the 6 hours of instruction on the methods of insurgent warfare contained only 1 hour of lecture, 1 hour of discussion, and 4 hours in a practical exercise. In the exercise, students played the role of insurgents planning a campaign in Colombia (CGSC POI 1969, 55).

The tactical problems included in the CGSC curriculum demonstrate the army’s concern with land warfare as it had been customarily taught. A “counterinsurgency” planning exercise called for the insertion of a two-division corps into a country to rid it of insurgents. This was categorized as counterinsurgency training, but its conduct mirrored conventional army operations (see Krepinevich 1986, 51). In an interview with a former CGSC faculty member, Krepinevich reports that the faculty wanted to give the appearance of dealing with insurgency, so they would insert a sentence or two into their problem scenarios suggesting there might be the possibility of some irregular forces.

This permitted them to count the entire subject as related to counterinsurgency (see Krepinevich 1986, 51). This practice was still in evidence in the 1969-70 Program of Instruction which listed an 18-hour planning exercise, "Operation OMEGA," as relating to internal security efforts. The description of Operation OMEGA reveals how loosely the faculty interpreted the word "related" (CGSC POI 1969, 52):

A practical exercise which incorporates the application of the joint planning process in a combined area command in a limited war situation, where the conditions for nuclear warfare exist and employment of nuclear weapons by both sides is a certainty; embraces operations planning for joint and combined forces; covers nuclear weapons employment considerations; emphasizes the influence of personnel and logistical factors on operational decisions; stresses parallel, coordinated, concurrent staff planning for joint/combined force operations; also includes the impact of intelligence and civil affairs considerations in selecting a course of action at a combined command level. Locale: Middle East.

As with most of the army, by the mid-1970s the CGSC faculty had all but phased counterinsurgency out of the curriculum. At that time the college expanded its elective program to allow students to major in an aspect of army operations, thus it is impossible to tell exactly what instruction each student received (see Dastrup 1982, 122). Enough elective courses "related" to counterinsurgency existed that an officer could construct a 480-hour security assistance major dominated by the subject.<sup>1</sup> Given the army-wide tendency to dismiss Vietnam and concentrate on Central Europe, such a program would have been rare. More to the point, in the 1164-hour academic curriculum, the only required course that considered counterinsurgency was a block on security assistance. Out of that 40 hours, only 12 focused on insurgency and 4 on a Vietnam case study (see CGSC Catalog 1974).

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<sup>1</sup> The eight 40-hour "related" courses included: Unconventional Warfare, Internal Defense and Development, Insurgency, Urban Insurgency, Territorial Security Operations, Development, Insurgency Case Studies, Vietnam Case Study.

**Table 3 – Command and General Staff College Counterinsurgency Instruction**

<b>Academic Year</b>	<b>Total Academic Hours</b>	<b>Hours of Counterinsurgency Instruction</b>
1959-1960	1155	3
1964-1965	1143	42
1969-1970	1141	25
1974-1975	1164	16

The Army War College exhibited a similar pattern, although emphasis on counterinsurgency increased and decreased more quickly than at CGSC. In the curriculum for the 1960-1961 academic year which encompassed forty weeks of instruction and study, counterinsurgency was not mentioned. The curriculum for the following year did not mention it directly, but “counterguerrilla” merited two entries. The six-week course “US Global Strategic Concepts and Military Capabilities” included seven topics, one of which was a study of “ways to improve military capabilities in support of Cold War objectives, with emphasis on unconventional warfare and counterguerrilla activities.” The six-week course “Concepts of Future Land Warfare” considered eight topics, including “the demands of unconventional warfare, including counterguerrilla warfare.” If the faculty divided consideration of the topics equally, approximately eight days of the forty-week program would have focused on unconventional and counterguerrilla warfare (see AWC Curriculum 1961).

The next year, most likely as a result of Kennedy’s letter to McNamara, coverage of counterinsurgency increased in the AWC curriculum. Counterinsurgency was a prominent part of the prefatory “General Plan” in the curriculum catalog (AWC Curriculum 1962, 1). As a distinct phase of the three-week course “US Global Strategic Concepts and Military Capabilities,” eight days were devoted to the study of

counterinsurgency. This phase of the course covered the following topics (AWC Course 4 1962, 1):

- Historical background of insurgency and counterinsurgency movements.
- The nature and objectives of counterinsurgency activities, including the analysis of the relationship of the military, political, economic, psychological, and social factors which promote insurgency.
- The tactics and techniques of the insurgent and the counterinsurgent, ranging from cultural and trade competition to the extremes of revolution or violent seizure of governments by military action.
- The tactics and techniques available to the communists and to the United States in relation to insurgency and counterinsurgency.
- The organization and roles of US agencies for the production of national cold war objectives, policies, and programs, and for attaining national counterinsurgency objectives in appropriate areas.
- The capabilities and assets, present and potential, available to US military agencies, particularly the Army, for contributing to the countering of insurgency anywhere in the world.

Some students would have spent more time on the subject in the next course "Strategic Military Capabilities in Selected World Areas." Part of that course entailed a planning exercise in which the students were divided into sixteen committees. Each committee assumed the role of a country team and made appropriate military plans for selected countries. Two of the committees were assigned to report on counterinsurgency plans (see AWC Counterinsurgency 1962, 19).

The 1962-63 academic year was the high-water mark for counterinsurgency education at the AWC. With the intense high-level pressure to emphasize education and training in counterinsurgency, the War College appears to have been sensitive to its coverage. In November 1962, it published a separate document listing all the subjects and topics included in its curriculum that could be considered as relating to counterinsurgency. An examination of the thirty-page-document reveals the extent to which the AWC leadership was willing to go to demonstrate compliance with Kennedy

administration directives. The document outlined the counterinsurgency phase of the course discussed above in just three pages. The rest of the document listed topics and lectures the faculty deemed “related” to counterinsurgency. The preface admitted that the “mere titles of lectures and study directives are not always sufficiently revealing,” but one wonders how much insight into counterinsurgency was gleaned from such lectures as “US Political System,” “US Economic System,” “The Soviet Social Order,” “The Economic Element of USSR National Power,” “Alliances in the Nuclear Age,” and “The Atlantic Community and United States Policy,” to name a few (see AWC Counterinsurgency 1962). It is clear from this document that *demonstrating* compliance with the counterinsurgency movement was more important than actually complying with it.

In the 1964-1965 academic year, the AWC faculty had already reduced its emphasis on counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency was no longer mentioned in the general plan of the curriculum, and no course included a distinct counterinsurgency phase. The amount of instruction on the topic, however, remained about the same. A new course, “Strategic Implications of the Developing Areas,” paid attention to “the history and background of insurgency movements” and the “use of Army forces in low intensity conflict situations, to include stability and counterinsurgency operations” in two of the six topics it covered in five weeks. Additionally, one of the seven topics in the five-week “Army and Joint Capabilities Planning” course was an “identification of critical factors affecting planning and operations in stability operations or counterinsurgency (see AWC Curriculum 1964).

By 1969, even this small concentration on counterinsurgency was shrinking. A short block existed in the course "A Strategic Appraisal of the Non-Communist States" on "the nature and causes of insurgency." The Military Strategy Seminar also included a block on "Concepts of guerrilla warfare and insurgent war" (AWC Curriculum 1969). After that year, however, counterinsurgency came in and out of the curriculum. There was no mention of the subject in the 1971 or 1974 course catalogs, and only single-line entries in 1972 and 1973.

By the mid-1970s, the army's training and educational institutions were more than ready to implement the findings of a Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) task group. Its 1975 report concluded that officer education should focus on fundamental skills to the exclusion of "nice to know" material in the limited time available (see Lovell 1987, 134). Thus in the post-Vietnam era, counterinsurgency virtually became a non-subject in the army's educational system.

### **Special Forces and The Special Warfare School**

President Kennedy envisioned the Special Forces as the vanguard of a counterinsurgency force and placed great emphasis on their development. Nevertheless, as in general doctrine and training matters, the army's definition of the Special Forces' role prevailed. This definition emphasized offensive, unconventional warfare in support of conventional operations, which stemmed from the historical roots of the Special Forces. As did the army, Special Forces troops viewed themselves primarily as an unconventional warfare unit, designed to organize resistance behind the lines during a "hot" war.

When Kennedy entered the White House, the army's small unconventional warfare capability was lodged in its Special Forces. During World War II, the First Special Service Force had been formed as a separate branch. These men were trained in demolitions, rock-climbing, amphibious assault, and ski techniques, and were given basic airborne instruction. The force was inactivated in southern France near the end of the war, but the Special Forces inherited their legacy (Kelly 1991, 4). Responding to developments in the Korean War, the army activated the Tenth Special Forces Group in June of 1952. The first commander, who had worked with the French resistance, set out to develop a unit which would have the capability of training and equipping guerrillas deep in enemy territory (Baratto 1983, 3). The role of the Special Forces would be the generation of resistance forces behind enemy lines. They sought men with special language and other useful talents. Their primary mission as described by army doctrine just prior to the Kennedy era was to develop, organize, equip, train, support and control guerrilla forces and to conduct unconventional warfare in support of conventional operations (FM 31-21 1958, 16).

Kennedy and his advisors saw the Special Forces as a unit that could also meet the demands of the insurgency threat. They ignored or deemed inconsequential the distinction between unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency. Although the two missions share common characteristics, such as raids, familiarity with guerrilla warfare and language skills to facilitate interaction with indigenous personnel, the target of the operations is fundamentally different. In the case of unconventional warfare, Special Forces were to train native partisans to conduct offensive operations against an established and unpopular government. In the Kennedy version of counterinsurgency,



Special Forces were defensive in orientation, tasked to train established military units to combat irregular guerrilla forces—the greatest future threat in Kennedy's eyes.

Consequently, the Special Forces expanded their skills to encompass advising and training counter-guerrillas as well as guerrillas.

To accomplish his goals, Kennedy ordered an increase in the size of the Special Forces and an expansion of the curriculum at the Special Warfare School. He hoped to elevate the status of this kind of special warfare and shift the army's overemphasis on heavy units by demonstrating the importance of counterinsurgency. Accordingly, the Special Forces received considerable presidential attention and favor. Despite army opposition, he authorized the Special Forces to wear the green beret as a symbol of their special status.<sup>2</sup> Kennedy's defense budget increased the number of Special Forces personnel geometrically during the early 1960s. As a result, the Special Forces grew into seven groups of about 1400 men each. In September of 1961, Kennedy visited the Special Forces headquarters at Fort Bragg, upgraded it to a Special Warfare Center, and promoted its commander to the rank of brigadier general—making it the first time a general officer had headed the organization (Norman & Spore 1962, 32; Blaufarb 1977, 76). Kennedy's intentions were twofold. First, the expanded Special Forces would perfect the techniques of counterinsurgency and then impart them to the armies of countries threatened by subversion and guerrillas. Second, the Special Warfare School would become a repository of knowledge about counterinsurgency, and a means for communicating that knowledge to the army as a whole.

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<sup>2</sup> Within the rest of the army, this earned them nicknames such as "green beanies" and "Jacqueline Kennedy's Own Rifles."

The Special Warfare School had originated during the 1950s when a faculty concerned with unconventional warfare had moved out of the Army General School at Fort Riley in 1952 to become part of the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg (Weigley 1967). By the end of 1956 the unconventional warfare segment of the Psychological Warfare Center had become dominant, a change reflected in its new title: The United States Army Special Warfare School. An early commander remembered that “those of us who had worked on these programs were primarily interested in unconventional warfare and not psychological warfare and were very much opposed to have Special Forces association with and under the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg. We felt that there was in general a stigma connected with Psychological Warfare, especially among combat men, that we didn’t care to have ‘rub off’ on Special Forces” (quoted in Sandler 1994, 52).

In early 1961, as the Kennedy administration called for increased focus on counterinsurgency, the Special Warfare Center established the Military Assistance Training Advisor (MATA) Course to train military personnel as advisors, primarily to the South Vietnamese Army. Later that year the center also created its Senior Officer Counterinsurgency and Special Warfare Orientation Course to familiarize general officers and high-ranking civilians with counterinsurgency (Sandler 1994, 58). The school was reorganized into three instructional departments reflecting the anticipated expertise of Special Forces—the Unconventional Warfare, Counterinsurgency Operations, and Psychological Operations Departments. The Special Forces commander saw the Unconventional Warfare Course and the Counterinsurgency Course as two sides of the same coin (Yarborough 1962, 61):

The Unconventional Warfare Course emphasizes the problems of creating an effective guerrilla force in enemy territory during a hot war situation; the Counterinsurgency Course deals with the reasons behind dissident movements and the techniques used in combating guerrilla forces and revolutionary movements. Thus the Unconventional Warfare Course teaches how to help defeat an enemy by developing guerrilla forces, and the Counterinsurgency Course teaches how to prevent Communist inspired dissident movements and guerrilla forces from succeeding.

Despite compliance with the counterinsurgency movement, an outline of the school's other counterinsurgency courses reflected continuing emphasis on the development of resistance movements and offensive operations (quoted in McClintock 1992, 186):

- a. The Counterinsurgency Operations Course (6 weeks) is a comprehensive study of resistance movements to include analysis of causative factors . . . and the doctrinal principals, theories, tactics, and techniques applicable to military actions in countering or nullifying the development and spread of insurgency.
- b. The Special Warfare Staff Officer Course (2 weeks) provides orientation on the same basic organization for Special Forces operations and the tactics and techniques of guerrilla force organization, development, utilization, operations and demobilization; psychological operations; guerrilla and counter guerrilla practical exercise.
- c. The Special Forces Officer Course (6 weeks) includes organization of the Special Forces effort; guerrilla forces development; air and amphibious operations; and guerrilla tactics.

The army interpreted the expansion of the Special Forces as complying with Kennedy's demand for counterinsurgency capability. The increasing numbers of Special Forces personnel and the curriculum changes at the Special Warfare School would be cited as proof that the army was doing something to prepare for wars of national liberation. But neither the army, nor the Special Forces themselves were convinced that Kennedy's counterinsurgency theory was appropriate. The "new counterinsurgents" remained concerned with what they did best: organizing friendly guerrillas for

unconventional warfare (McClintock 1992, 187). As we will see in the next chapter, once removed from CIA control, the Special Forces generally went about counterinsurgency as if engaged in guerrilla operations behind enemy lines. One Special Forces officer was quoted as saying that “we are an extension of the conventional arm and only exist to support the conventional effort” (see Dodson 1962, 53). He saw his missions as demolition and jungle warfare rather than civic action and economic development.

The army had never taken unconventional warfare seriously. As an institution, it was suspicious of the unorthodox Special Forces troops whose uniforms were unusual, who appeared undisciplined, worked with the CIA, and got too much publicity and presidential attention. As an example, this suspicion and resentment reemerged when the army was required to develop counter-terrorism forces in the early 1980s. Instead of the Special Forces, the army turned to the Rangers, a non-controversial, elite conventional infantry unit (McClintock 1992, 325). Thus, the army reversed the expansion of the Special Forces overseen by President Kennedy. Special Forces troops were the first withdrawn from Vietnam in 1971. By 1974, four of the seven Special Forces Groups had been inactivated (Sandler 1994, 82). The army restricted the remaining groups to supporting the conventional operations outlined by army doctrine before the counterinsurgency era. During the 1970s, the Special Forces were considered a “dead-end” career field which had been undercut by the Ranger battalions.

At the Special Warfare School, changes had begun before the drawdown. Renamed the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School in 1964, the title was changed in 1969 to the United States Army Institute for Military Assistance.

Inside the Institute, the remnants of Special Forces and, reminders of counterinsurgency, were hidden among other schools. The Institute was made up of the Civil Affairs and Security Assistance School, the Psychological Operations School, and the Special Forces School. Fourteen years later, a counterinsurgency advocate complained that the school continued to be preoccupied with clandestine modes of infiltration, unconventional operations and special operations, to the exclusion of developing counterinsurgency capabilities (Baratto 1983, 10).

Revised army doctrine and training standards for Special Forces combined to exclude counterinsurgency. For example, a key Special Forces manual that in 1963 was titled *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces* later became *Command, Control and Support of Special Forces Operations*. The later version was devoted almost entirely to unconventional warfare, with only two pages on counterinsurgency-related items—although the term itself was not used (see FM 31-22 1963 & 1981). The training and education at what had been the Special Warfare Center was driven by Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) 31-101. The ARTEP was designed to provide guidance for unit training and evaluation by identifying training objectives and minimum performance standards for critical missions and tasks. The training and evaluation outlines for the Special Forces in 31-101 were to (ARTEP 31-101 1979, 1-1):

- conduct preinfiltration activities
- infiltrate the operational area
- organize and train indigenously
- participate in escape and evasion operations
- conduct psychological operations in support of the unconventional warfare mission
- conduct direct action special operations
- infiltrate the operational area and employ special atomic demolitions

Only the preface mentioned operations related to counterinsurgency: “Special Forces may also be employed in a limited internal defense role to provide advisory assistance to host country military forces or government agencies” (ARTEP 31-101 1979, iv).

Thus, in spite of the Kennedy administration’s attempts to develop the Special Forces and its school into a counterinsurgency force and center, the traditional approach of the army and Special Forces was maintained. Special Forces were supposed to organize guerrilla warfare, conduct unconventional operations, and train counterpart organizations (Baratto 1983, 8)

### **Conclusion**

By August 1962 the Kennedy administration had established the outlines of an organized national approach to the insurgency threat. Policymakers had sent out detailed and urgent instructions to revise the foreign affairs and military educational system, to develop a doctrine, and to establish responsive programs. Through high-level supervisory machinery such as SGCI, Kennedy tried to force the army to develop new doctrine and train a force capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations. The army resisted. It maintained, through its doctrinal manuals and educational and training programs, that it had sound programs which dealt with insurgencies. The army’s overall response was minimal. The response mainly consisted of ineffectual reports, boards, and programs. It paid lip service to the administration’s directives while instituting very few actual changes. Indeed, the changes the army did make were determined not by what would best counter the insurgent threat, but by what could satisfy the president’s request and still be applicable to a war in Europe—for example, airmobile operations (see Avant 1994, 57). In short, the army saw the president’s interest in counterinsurgency as a fad in

which the army should not get caught up. General Taylor later recalled the army's reaction to Kennedy's program as "something we have to satisfy. But not much heart went into the work" (quoted in Krepinevich 1986, 37).

A deep-seated conventional mindset caused the senior army leadership to maintain the attitude that the capabilities required to fight a conventional war were adequate to prosecute a counterinsurgency campaign. The conception of counterinsurgency as a doctrine aimed at denying the enemy access to the population was foreign to them. The army's style of war requires offensive tactics making full use of the wide array of military assets that can be brought to bear on an enemy. Throughout the Vietnam era, the army thought primarily in traditional terms, using resources aggressively on a scale appropriate to total war, but unsuited to that particular conflict (Cohen 1984, 170). Rather than focusing on the political threat posed by insurgents, the army concentrated on the requirements of previous conflicts: the destruction of regular and guerrilla forces. After Vietnam, the army intensified its conventional focus, allowing low-intensity capabilities that had developed to diminish in the 1970s (Koren 1988, 64).

This case study seems to validate the version of organization theory extant in military studies and international relations and typified by Posen's work. However, since the major cause of change in that literature is civilian intervention in military affairs, we must look further for an explanation of what happened in the early 1960s. If ever there was a civilian intervention that should have effected change, surely it is Kennedy's direct, personal, and earnest attempt. In the next chapter, I suggest that the events of the early 1960s are better interpreted as an incomplete learning cycle. Bureaucratic politics and

standard operating procedures must be included as important factors in an explanation of events in the Vietnam era. But alone, they are not sufficient to explain what occurred.



## Chapter 5 – Learning in Vietnam

### Introduction

Much of the literature on military organizations is not encouraging about the possibility of change. According to the limited amount of organization theory employed in that literature, standard operating procedures and bureaucratic politics prevent military organizations from changing. The only chance for change to occur is when civilian authorities intervene and force change on military services. In the early 1960s, however, this approach was clearly wanting in what was arguably its “most likely case” for success. First, forceful presidential intervention did not bring about meaningful change. Second, its emphasis on external intervention compels it to ignore evidence of attempts at internal change. This kind of evidence calls for consideration of alternative approaches to organizational change

One alternative to explaining organizational change, or the lack thereof, is the learning approach. If the learning approach is correct, we would expect to see elements of a learning cycle, such as the one suggested by March and Olsen or Argyris and Schon, that proceeds from individual beliefs or ideas to individual action and then to organizational action. We would also expect to see the circumstances necessary for learning according to Goldman: desirability, urgency, and possibility. In this conception, the insights of the literature on military studies about standard procedures are not the end of the story; they are obstacles to the completion of a learning cycle. In this chapter, I will outline elements of the army’s interrupted learning cycle in regard to counterinsurgency in Vietnam. We will see instances of learning in which, as learning

theorists suggest, individuals encountered anomalies and attempted to find solutions to organizational problems.

According to Goldman (1997), to initiate a learning cycle, an organization needs to see change as desirable and urgent. Desirability refers to the domestic political incentives motivating actors to examine their approach to problems. Pressure from civilians can trigger a learning cycle by providing the impetus and political incentive for a reevaluation of assumptions. In the case of Vietnam and counterinsurgency, the presence of desirability in the domestic political context is unmistakable. The previous two chapters outlined President Kennedy's fervent personal interest in changing the army's approach to situations like Vietnam. The political desirability of change was high. However, urgency also has to exist in order to begin a learning cycle. In Goldman's construct, urgency is the result of pressures in the international environment. These pressures encourage learning in two ways. First, they aid problem identification by making it clear what needs to be addressed. Second, they increase actor motivation to pay attention to those situations that need to be addressed.

Urgency was a problem for initiating a learning cycle in regards to counterinsurgency in the army. There were many individuals who believed the situation in Vietnam required a counterinsurgency approach that included political, economic, and social elements (see Komer 1986, 4). An early advocate for treating Vietnam as an insurgency rather than a conventional war was Edward Lansdale, an Air Force officer who worked for the CIA for much of his career. He found support in the State Department from officials in the region such as Rufus Phillips and George Tanham who headed the Agency for International Development's rural programs in South Vietnam in

the early 1960s. The British Advisory Mission in Saigon, as we have seen, also supported such an approach. In Washington, State Department officials such as Roger Hilsman, W. Averell Harriman, and Michael Forrestal all argued for a more balanced politico-military approach, some of which was outlined in previous chapters.

Although urgency concerning a new kind of approach in Vietnam existed in both the region and in Washington, this did not affect the army's understanding and result in a more responsive effort. As the previous chapters show, its experience in Korea shaped the army's perspective. There, an insurgency campaign was the prelude to a conventional invasion, so that is what the army prepared for in South Vietnam. When forced to deal with the insurgents, the army treated them as doctrine dictated: that is, as partisans, armed auxiliaries to a conventional military force that should be found, fixed, and destroyed. The senior army leadership was aware of the recommendations of the individuals mentioned above, as they found a vocal champion in President Kennedy. Yet, the generals viewed the conflict in Vietnam as a conventional war. General Lemnitzer wrote to General Taylor in October 1961 to reassure him that the army was on the right track in the region (quoted in Cable 1986, 191-2):

With respect to training the Vietnamese Army for the "wrong war," it seems clear that in recent months the insurgency in South Vietnam has developed far beyond the capacity of police control. All the Vietnamese Army successes this past summer have met Viet Cong opposition in organized battalion strength. Even larger Communist units were involved in the recent Viet Cong successes north of Kontum. This change in the situation has not been fully understood by many US officials.

Therefore, although policymakers stressed the paramount importance of political considerations and the inadequacy of purely military solutions, the army response was quite conventional.

Goldman also emphasizes the importance of the possibility of learning taking place. The possibility of learning is a function of the state of knowledge or the available pool of experience from which the organization can draw. It is also a function of the opportunities for gathering the data necessary to develop a credible knowledge base (Goldman 1997, 46). This is a second area in which the army learning cycle ran into difficulties in the 1960s. The army lacked a body of knowledge which it could apply to an insurgency situation such as Vietnam, and organizational obstacles (including army doctrine) prevented the development of such knowledge. Cable (1986, 279) contends that army doctrine combined two fallacies that helped prevent the organization from adjusting to a novel situation:

The essential synergy was between a belief structure which held the creation of a true, organic insurgency to be impossible and a view of war which held the destruction of the enemy's force in the field or his will and ability to conduct war as the necessary precondition for victory. More specifically, the American view of guerrilla war held that there must be an external sponsoring power supporting and directing the guerrillas. If this support could be interdicted or interrupted, then the insurgency would rapidly collapse. The Americans incorrectly viewed all guerrillas as partisans . . . . In the wake of the Korean War, the American Army was sensitized not simply to the possibility of conventional cross-border invasion, but also to the probability that the first sign of an impending invasion would be partisan activity in the target country.

Yet, despite existing doctrine, the lack of organic knowledge, and the lack of urgency among senior army leaders for developing new approaches in Vietnam, a learning cycle was initiated. The domestic political context and sense of urgency outside the senior army leadership combined with individual experience in Vietnam to stimulate concern about the army approach. In the following section, I outline first the experiences of army personnel that initiated a learning cycle and then the obstacles encountered in that cycle. March and Olsen (1979) and Hedberg (1980) suggest that obstacles to the

completion of a learning cycle include role restraints, standard operating procedures, and organizational capacity to resist change. Their observations were borne out in Vietnam in the early 1960s.

### **Advisors and Learning**

Some American advisors found anomalies in the conventional approach and developed beliefs that challenged the army understanding of the situation. These army officers sent to Vietnam to train and advise the South Vietnamese Army noticed quickly that building up a conventional army and applying conventional military tactics to the insurgency was not working. Several of these advisors recommended a non-conventional approach to the Vietnamese insurgency which echoed the solutions advocated by the Kennedy administration.

In the spring of 1962, General Harkins and the MACV staff in Saigon were making optimistic predictions about the direction of the war. However, several important people in the field were skeptical. They were the senior corps and division advisors in Vietnam, men who included Colonels Wilbur Wilson, Jasper Wilson, Roland Renwanz, and Daniel Porter and Lieutenant Colonels John Paul Vann and Fred Ladd (see Krepinevich 1987, 274). They witnessed the inefficiency of the South Vietnamese Army leadership and the impotence of large-scale maneuvers and paper pacification programs in the face of organized insurgent forces. While these advisors, the nerve endings of the army's organizational body in Vietnam, filed numerous reports contradicting MACV's outlook, few of the reports filtered back to Washington. For example, in an official report from the field, Colonel Daniel Porter, senior advisor to the South Vietnamese Third and Fourth Corps, criticized the ineffectiveness of artillery bombardments that

warned the Viet Cong of attacks and caused numerous civilian casualties (Krepinevich 1986, 81). Similarly, Colonel Wilbur Wilson, who assumed Porter's position in the Third Corps, challenged the weak effort to win over the population, stating that "in as much as population and resources controls are the very essence of counterinsurgency, currently implemented controls are considered to be only marginally effective and tend to confuse the populace . . . and discredit the national government" (quoted in Krepinevich 1986, 82).

In the spring of 1963, MACV issued highlights of the previous year's activities. In his summary, General Harkins claimed the Viet Cong could be defeated that same year. Yet at least five senior army advisors in the field had all submitted strongly worded, negative reports concerning the conduct and direction of the conflict (see Krepinevich 1986, 77). Perhaps the most outspoken of the army advisors was Lieutenant Colonel John P. Vann. Vann was the senior American advisor to the Seventh Division of the South Vietnamese Army where he attempted to implement counterinsurgency tactics more closely aligned with Roger Hilsman's plan than with the army's. He argued against the use of armor and artillery since they were inaccurate and caused more harm to the general population than to the Viet Cong. He tried to get the South Vietnamese to mount small unit and night operations against the Viet Cong, but did not have much success (Bowman 1985, 163). His critiques of the South Vietnamese Army and the implementation of the Strategic Hamlet Program were not promulgated by MACV.

Vann's final report of April 1963 continued to emphasize key areas that needed improvement. He expressed further doubts about the disorganized South Vietnamese management of the hamlet program and criticized the ineffectiveness of South

Vietnamese forces against the Viet Cong—in stark contrast to the glowing reports put out by MACV. Upon his return to the United States, Vann went to the Pentagon expecting the customary advisor debriefing. When he found that no formal debriefing was planned, he gave a presentation to a few friends. After being asked to repeat it for increasingly senior officers, he finally briefed the army's Vice Chief of Staff, General Hamlett.

Hamlett had Vann's presentation placed on General Maxwell Taylor's agenda—he was then Chairman of the JCS. However, on the day of the presentation, after hearing what it might contain, General Taylor cancelled Vann's briefing (see Bowman 1985, 167-8).

The senior leadership apparently preferred to hear optimistic reports about progress in Vietnam.

Vann and a few colleagues attempted to challenge the army's approach to operations in Vietnam. But, as March and Olsen suggest, standard operating procedures and organizational politics kept many from joining them. When difficulties became apparent to most advisors, concern that criticism would reflect on their own performance made it preferable to accept MACV's direction and conclusions (Shafer 1988, 244). The MACV staff ignored and suppressed dissenting reports because they challenged accepted procedures. They much preferred the reports of Colonel Hal McCown whose optimistic reports described successful conventional operations against the Viet Cong and the high number of strategic hamlets constructed. These made it easier to recommend continuing conventional efforts. McCown's reports are unsettling given his second-in-command's version of events: then-Lieutenant Colonel Rowland Renwanz directly contradicted his supervisor's reports, asserting that the South Vietnamese Army was reluctant to participate in combat operations, especially at night. He also questioned the statistics

concerning the hamlet program, observing that American advisors could find only 50 of the 200 fortified hamlets the Vietnamese claimed to have constructed in his area of responsibility. He went on to say that some hamlets, though built, were never occupied. Others were occupied by forced resettlement, with the people abandoning the hamlets as soon as they could (see Krepinevich 1986, 82). Several senior advisors such as Colonel Porter and Lieutenant Colonel Vann left the army after their tour in Vietnam, Vann resigning his commission in protest. Colonel McCown, however, retired years later as a major general. Following approved procedures and fulfilling organizational expectations was rewarded.

Even with MACV's and the army leadership's active resistance to exploring alternative approaches to the Vietnamese problem, individual learning did take place. This is evident not only in the stories of individual advisors, but also in the bulletin published by MAAG and then MACV called "Lessons Learned." In the twenty-six months between late March 1962 and mid-March 1965 (this study's cut-off date for counterinsurgency operations), forty-six editions of the bulletin were produced. MACV disseminated them to its personnel throughout Vietnam and to over fifty military units, schools, and commands worldwide (see *Lessons Learned* 1, 1962). Thirty-five of these forty-six bulletins are available at the Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Most of them deal with combat operations that demonstrate the army's focus on developing a conventional army in South Vietnam. Thirteen are summaries of operations in which the mission was to "kill Viet Cong personnel" and/or "destroy Viet Cong installations." Another eight bulletins examined aspects of these operations topically. They focused on how to use helicopters, artillery, or armored personnel



carriers to kill or destroy Viet Cong forces. Four bulletins warned about Viet Cong tactics such as ambushes and the use of land mines, and another four made recommendations on how to search villages for Viet Cong personnel.

Surprisingly, ten issues of the bulletin made reference to civic action, psychological operations, or other operations that agreed more with the Kennedy administration's version of counterinsurgency than the army's. However, several of these demonstrate where the army's priorities lay. For example, Lessons Learned Number 16 of 19 June 1962 states (Lessons Learned 16 1962, 1):

Although the primary mission of all operations conducted in South Vietnam has been to destroy Viet Cong personnel and installations, there have been other missions assigned as well. Relocation of civilians to areas under firm [government] control, reconnaissance, clearing and holding a province, rescue operations, etc., are examples.

In support of these other missions, the bulletin suggested that since the war in Vietnam "is as much a battle for men's minds as it is a purely military battle," all units must be imbued with a sense of responsibility in the civic action program. An "effective" military civic action program included "individual kindness and respect to the population," "ministering to the sick," and following up military action by reconstructing villages and rounding up livestock. The remainder of the bulletin reminded advisors of the importance of "relentless pursuit" of the Viet Cong, maintaining the "highest order of offensive capability," and exploiting available fire support "to the maximum."

Somewhat less prevalent are lessons that demonstrate some advisors, like Vann, Porter, and Wilson, had discovered the importance and effectiveness of some of those "other" missions. Lessons Learned Number 3 summarized an operation that had the usual mission of killing Viet Cong personnel, but included also the mission of regaining

political control of the area. To this end, unusually for the operations included in the bulletins, the participating units included eight Civic Action Teams and two Psywar Platoons. The point of the bulletin was that sustained operations can "wrest control of an area" from the Viet Cong. In accordance with Roger Hilsman's vision of a counterinsurgency operation, this operation employed "aggressive small unit patrols, combined with Civic Action and Psywar Teams to break Viet Cong control over the local population. The Viet Cong potential was reduced to a level where local sector forces could assume responsibility of the area" (Lessons Learned 3, 1962). Lesson Learned Number 35 advocated the use of "clear and hold" operations over sweep or fix and destroy missions. Also in accordance with Hilsman's conception, the bulletin recommended that ninety percent of the operation be devoted to the constant surveillance of the area by small unit patrols to clear the area of guerrillas. According to the bulletin, this should be followed by a long "holding phase" to deny the area to the Viet Cong and reassure the villagers that they would not be abandoned (Lessons Learned 35, 1964). Hilsman's concern about the use of heavy firepower was echoed in Lessons Learned Number 20. It warned advisors that the indiscriminate use of firepower could not be condoned in counterinsurgency operations. The decision to employ firepower must be governed by "consideration of the effect of firepower on the ultimate requirement to control the population and to win their support." Casualties among civilians "will only serve to strengthen Viet Cong influence over the population with the final result that the fundamental task of separating the guerrilla from the people will be far more difficult" (Lessons Learned 20 1962, 1).

The bulletin demonstrates that individuals did learn in Vietnam, but it also demonstrates the difficulty in turning individual beliefs, lessons, and actions into organizational action given MACV priorities. Without the widespread use of the Kennedy administration's counterinsurgency concepts, no organizational consensus could be developed around them and they could not be institutionalized in doctrine and training programs. The lessons that individual advisors learned and employed were lost in the overall momentum of the MACV and army approach to the conflict. As Hedberg (1980, 11) suggests, the organization's capacity to resist change exceeded individuals' capacities to instigate change. There was, however, one instance of fairly widespread learning—in the Special Forces operations in Vietnam. Even in this case, in which a sophisticated counterinsurgency approach was employed, organizational resistance to new ideas prevented the spread of the approach outside the Special Forces and even reversed Special Forces learning by pushing them into conventional operations.

### **Special Forces**

Army Special Forces troops had been in Vietnam since the mid-1950s, training the South Vietnamese Army for unconventional warfare techniques (see Generous 1985, 449; Kelly 1991). In accordance with army doctrine, they taught the South Vietnamese about organizing guerrilla and partisan forces in the north and executing covert operations against the communist regime. The operation had enjoyed only limited success. The attitude of the Kennedy administration promised an intensified effort in the unconventional area. When the administration announced its first plans for the military, the army, navy, and air force combined were scheduled for an increase of only 13,000 men. However, 3,000 of these were planned for the army's Special Forces, a number

which tripled the size of the force. Emphasis on research and development applicable to special warfare was increased in the spring of 1961 (Norman & Spore 1962, 30). As the curriculum and class size at the Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg continued to grow over the next year, the Special Forces doubled again to 9,000.

The Kennedy administration also planned to develop the expertise of the Special Forces. Their concentration on offensive unconventional warfare would be expanded to include counterinsurgency operations. Kennedy believed that, once trained in counterinsurgency warfare, the Special Forces could check Communist wars of national liberation. The emphasis would not be on large commitments of troops, but on Special Forces teams working with the armies and people of threatened countries. Accordingly, the Special Forces were trained in guerrilla and counter guerrilla warfare, psychological warfare, community organization, preventive medicine, and construction techniques (Weigley 1977, 457).

Up until 1961, the government of South Vietnam and the MAAG had placed primary emphasis on developing the South Vietnamese regular military forces. However, the CIA initiated several programs in late 1961 to extend South Vietnamese governmental control over contested areas, thus increasing the kind of counterinsurgency efforts advocated by the Kennedy administration. Special Forces detachments provided the manpower for one of these CIA programs, which became known as Area Development programs or the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) program (Kelly 1991, 6). In October 1961, a CIA operative and a Special Forces medic negotiated an agreement to work with villages of the Rhade tribe (CIDG, 7). In December 1961, Special Forces detachments working for the CIA began working in the villages in several

areas. Central to the program were the civic action projects which ranged from construction and agriculture to medical care. They conducted psychological operations to develop popular support for the South Vietnamese government, and trained and armed the villagers so they could defend themselves. In just over a year, the Special Forces extended the program to nearly 900 villages (Stanton 1985, 57).

At this time, knowledge of the Special Forces success was limited, but some of their techniques were brought to light in a small article in the semi-official journal *Army*. In a collection of quotes from Special Forces personnel in Vietnam, officers pointed out the keys to successful counterinsurgency operations. They asserted that successful counterinsurgency operations require isolating guerrillas from villages affording them underground support. Government must win the respect and confidence of the villagers and then teach them to defend themselves. These officers disparaged merely reacting to attacks, arguing that only a positive program of land reform, crop improvement, and market access could solve the central problems (Nuggets 1962, 40).

Initially, Special Forces troops concentrated on implementing these ideas. But a parallel, though less significant, aspect of the program was the training of a strike force that would act as a kind of mobile reserve for a group of villages. These strike forces received more training than the villagers involved in the self-defense program, and it was their capabilities that attracted the attention of the army. Senior army commanders were suspicious of Special Forces' participation in the area development aspect of the CIDG program. General Harold Johnson, the Army Chief of Staff from 1964-1968 later expressed his "horror" that an organization "supposedly highly mobile, disdainful of fixed installations, innovative . . . was building fortifications out of the Middle Ages"

(quoted in Sandler 1994, 65). Therefore, plans to expand the program raised concerns within the army about the use of its personnel. General Taylor, in particular, felt that the Special Forces were being used "improperly" (see Krepinevich 1986, 71). In 1962, the army reached an agreement with the CIA under which control of the Special Forces units and the CIDG program were transferred to the Defense Department and MACV. The public rationale was that the success and expansion of the program had made it an overt, not covert, mission. However, it soon became apparent that the army intended to divert the Special Forces to support operations that supported a more conventional approach.

Between July 1962 and July 1963, Operation Switchback gave control of the Special Forces units to MACV. MACV's plans involved using Special Forces troops and their newly trained strike forces to attack Viet Cong base camps and interdict infiltration routes to support the large-scale operations of the South Vietnamese Army. The CIDG program was integrated into the strategic hamlet program and the troops integrated into the regular force structure. Thus, the Special Forces' role in the CIDG program can be divided into three periods: from November 1961 to September 1962 when the CIA was responsible for the CIDG program; from September 1962 to July 1963 during which responsibility for operations was gradually turned over to MACV and the army; and from July 1963 to the spring of 1965 when the conventional American buildup began, during which MACV bore the full responsibility for the CIDG program. Throughout these three periods, expansion and a changing emphasis in missions characterized the Special Forces effort (Kelly 1991, 15).

Under the direction of the CIA, the program was mainly a civic action mission in which the goals were to raise the living standard of the people, develop their identity with

and their loyalty to the South Vietnamese government, and help them provide for their own defense. But as MACV took over, area development and civic action became less important. The declassified Special Forces history criticizes the “conventionalization” of the Special Forces effort (CIDG, 11-15). In August 1963, the army staff sent a cable to MACV outlining the army’s position on the role of the Special Forces in Vietnam. It emphasized the army’s preference “to see Special Forces personnel used in conjunction with active and offensive operations, as opposed to support of static training activities” (quoted in Krepinevich 1986, 72). After this, the primary mission of the Special Forces became offensive operations. In regard to their relationship with the South Vietnamese villagers, the focus turned to the development of the paramilitary forces, concentrating on the development of strike force troops which would conduct border surveillance and attack the enemy in his own territory. The villages became bases for offensive operations as the Special Forces were tasked to intensify counterinsurgency warfare and train “Viet Cong hunters” (Kelly 1991, 34). The army thus took control of an operation that effectively emphasized pacification and population security, and reoriented it towards the traditional army conception of the Special Forces role: offensive guerrilla missions in support of conventional operations. The learning cycle was obstructed as organizational resistance prevented individual and small-unit actions from being accepted in the wider organization.

### **Case Summary**

Facing an insurgency in South Vietnam, initial American policy was to create a Vietnamese internal security capability. In practice, this became distorted into building a conventional Vietnamese army. That this occurred despite high-level policy directives

shows the strength of the institutional pressures. The initial policy direction given the MAAG emphasized internal security as the principal mission. But under a series of MAAG and MACV commanders with conventional backgrounds, the army in Vietnam concentrated instead on preparing the army of South Vietnam for what it regarded as the most serious threat: an invasion across the demilitarized zone. Even though policy directives continued to reemphasize the internal security mission, it was lost in the army's main effort, which reflected existing army doctrine more than the actual threat. The army tended to make policy conform in practice to that with which it was most familiar—to play out its standard organizational repertoire (Komer 1986, 17). The fact that army doctrine, tactics, equipment, and organization were designed primarily for European contingencies involving intensive conventional conflict made adjustments to conditions in Vietnam difficult.

So far, this accords with the literature on military studies' use of organization theory. This literature might argue that the army did not change its approach in Vietnam because it could not—standard procedures dictated its response. But this case study shows events and actions in Vietnam that do not fit neatly into that view. The point here is not that the extant literature cannot explain what happened in Vietnam, since its explanation does “work.” The real problem is that this is case in which the traditional explanation's major agent of change—civilian intervention—fails to bring about change. The traditional approach to explaining how change in military organizations occurs is found wanting in its “most likely” case. What is needed is an approach that is able to reflect the larger story, one which can incorporate both the attempts at challenging and changing the army's approach and the obstacles to learning and change.



Combining a learning cycle model and Goldman's contextual factors allows us to subsume the insights of traditional theories in a more comprehensive approach. Learning cycle models can incorporate several of the insights of traditional approaches as obstacles to the completion of learning cycles and successful change. These obstacles are not just explanations for why change does not occur, but are barriers to learning and change that may or may not be overcome. Whether they are overcome or not depends on Goldman's contextual factors. Her approach looks first for a favorable conjunction of desirability, urgency, and possibility. Not finding it decreases the opportunity for learning and change.

In the case of the early 1960s, such a learning approach gives a more satisfactory explanation of events than traditional approaches. When looking at counterinsurgency and Vietnam, traditional approaches correctly emphasize the importance of standard operating procedures and bureaucratic politics in resisting change. However, they have difficulty accounting for President Kennedy's lack of success in effecting change through his personal intervention. A learning approach such as the one employed in this study views those events as an incomplete learning cycle. It suggests that a learning cycle would not be completed due to the lack of the necessary contextual factors. While the domestic political environment was favorable for learning and change, the army's interpretation of the international environment and its state of knowledge militated against learning. Many policymakers interpreted international events as demanding a counterinsurgency approach, but the army interpreted them as requiring a conventional one. The possibility of learning was constrained first by a lack of experience in the army with counterinsurgency, and second by the organizational constraints put on the advisors

and Special Forces personnel who were developing viable knowledge about counterinsurgency.

In this chapter, we have seen that individual learning and even small-unit learning occurred, but that obstacles prevented it from influencing the organization as a whole. In the case of counterinsurgency, the army successfully placed obstacles between individual learning and organizational learning and change, thus preventing meaningful change in its doctrine and educational and training programs. The army insulated itself against its own advisors' reports of failure. This allowed for continuity in the approach to the conflict. Feedback indicating success was accepted; reports portraying failure were ignored. External criticism also had to be countered. But since MACV was the predominant source of information about the conflict, the army was able to counter any thesis questioning its operations (Krepinevich 1986, 56). The army also ensured that the successful efforts of the Special Forces would not be used to justify changing its approach by taking control of their operations and assigning them conventional missions. After serving in Vietnam, an army officer produced a monograph published by the Rand Corporation in which he summarized the army's attitude toward change (Jenkins 1970, 3):


Of course, there have been changes in our weapons and troop delivery capabilities during the past few years, but these changes were made to enable our forces to do more of what they were already doing or to do it faster, without questioning the validity of what was being done in the first place. I recall the remark made by one senior American officer in Saigon who said, "I'll be damned if I permit the United States Army, its institutions, its doctrine, and its traditions to be destroyed just to win this lousy war."

The army did take some account of counterinsurgency in the 1960s. But adjustments in doctrine and training came up against "unchangeable laws" when the

question of combat tactics arose (Blaufarb 1977, 288). Minor concessions to counterinsurgency did not alter the belief that the primary role of military force was to find and destroy the enemy rather than protect the population and separate the insurgents from their base of support. Offensive operations and the full use of available firepower were mandated in doctrinal publications and taught in army schools. As the army withdrew from Vietnam, it slipped into a more familiar posture as the 1973 Arab-Israeli War refocused attention on conventional, high technology war in Europe. A final example of the army's resistance to the counterinsurgency learning cycle is found in a quote by General Donn Starry, commander of the army's Training and Doctrine Command in the early 1970s. He observed that after every war, armies set out to figure out how they might have fought it better. But after Vietnam "there was an even stronger determination to avoid that pitfall, and this time to look ahead, not back" (quoted in Lovell 1987, 129).

Viewed as an incomplete learning cycle, the army's response to counterinsurgency allows for greater insight (see Figure 2 and Table 4 below). Obstacles to learning and change prevented the completion of a learning cycle: standard operating procedures prevented widespread learning in Vietnam, and bureaucratic politics prevented the diffusion of the learning that did take place. Applying a learning cycle model, we can see organizational resistance and standard operating procedures more accurately as obstacles to learning and adaptation. More importantly, we can discover instances in which change did occur with greater hopes of explaining them.

## Learning Cycle



**Figure 2 – Vietnam Learning Cycle**

**Table 4 – Vietnam Learning Cycle Summary**

Learning Cycle Element	Comments	Present in 1960s?	Counterinsurgency
Desirability of Learning	Favorable domestic political context.	Yes	Kennedy's interest.
Urgency for Learning	Interpretation of international events.	?	Different interpretations: insurgency vs. conventional conflict
Possibility of Learning	Existence or development of new knowledge.	?	Knowledge existed, but not in army. Role constraints & SOPs prevented development of knowledge.
Individual Belief	Individuals see anomalies in organizational approach.	Yes	Vann et al see lack of progress or inappropriate approach.
Individual Action	New knowledge tested.	Yes	CIDG program.
Organizational Action	Consensus developed about new knowledge; new knowledge institutionalized.	No	New knowledge suppressed. Rather than being institutionalized, Special Forces mission was "conventionalized." Army doctrine, education, & training only modified superficially.

## **Chapter 6 - Operation Provide Comfort**

### **Introduction**

The American and United Nations operations in northern Iraq and Somalia have had a profound effect on the foreign policy and military doctrine of the United States. The following two chapters review the events surrounding those interventions, using them as examples of the several peace operations that dominated American foreign and military policy in the early and mid-1990s. Analysis of the learning cycles and military doctrine, education, and training follows in chapters eight and nine.

### **Background**

Repression of the Kurdish people of Iraq predates the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War.<sup>1</sup> Following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I, the 1920 Treaty of Sevres provided the Kurds with the prospect of an independent Kurdish state. But the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne superceded this by dividing Kurdish territory among Turkey, Iraq, and Iran. Since then, the Kurds have often engaged in insurrections against the Iraqi (as well as the Turkish and Iranian) government. Sustained periods of armed rebellion against Baghdad during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s were only briefly punctuated by agreements and peace plans that granted some measure of autonomy to the Kurdish region of Iraq. The agreements were never implemented to the satisfaction of the Kurds and hostilities escalated until Saddam Hussein's regime launched campaigns designed to repress and remove northern Iraq's Kurdish population. Starting in 1985, the Iraqi government engaged in a systematic program of destruction of Kurdish towns and villages which reached its height during the 1988 "Anfal"

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<sup>1</sup> For full treatments of the Kurdish situation, see Ghareeb 1981, Middle East Watch 1990, and Gunter 1992.




Figure 3 – Map of Iraq

campaign.<sup>2</sup> During this particularly brutal episode, the Iraqi army destroyed thousands of Kurdish villages, forced hundreds of thousands of Kurds to flee from their homes, and killed tens of thousands of Kurds, including the unhappy population of the town of Halabja almost all of whom were killed by chemical weapons.<sup>3</sup> The memory of this Anfal campaign was a key factor in the massive refugee flight in 1991. As a result of another armed revolt in the aftermath of the Gulf War, the Iraqi Kurds were again targets of Saddam Hussein's regime.

President George Bush suspended Operation Desert Storm (intended to drive Iraqi forces from Kuwait and reduce the military threat Iraq posed to its neighbors) at midnight on 27 February 1991. The expulsion of the Iraqi army from Kuwait and the concomitant attacks on Iraq proper by American-led coalition forces caused temporary chaos in Iraq. Both rebel Kurdish groups in northern Iraq and Shi'ite opposition forces in southern Iraq saw this as an opportunity to throw off the repressive dictatorship of Saddam Hussein, especially as Bush had urged them to rise up against the Ba'ath regime (Reuters 1991a). In early March, both groups engaged in spontaneous popular uprisings and, despite their lack of organization and resources, initially had considerable success in taking control of cities and territory. The Kurdish position in northern Iraq was bolstered as Saddam Hussein's forces first concentrated on the Shi'ite challenge in the south, and between 5 March and 20 March 1991, Kurdish groups took control of the key towns of Sulaymania, Irbil, and Dohuk, as well as others (Abd al-Jabbar 1992, 11). But these initial successes

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<sup>2</sup> The word Anfal means "spoils of war." The name is significant due to its origin in the 8th sura (chapter) of the Qur'an. The key is that defining the Kurds as spoils of war essentially meant that they were objects, not humans, and therefore not subject to the normal protections and considerations given to fellow-Muslims or even opponents in battle.

<sup>3</sup> The estimates for the number of villages destroyed, refugees, and casualties vary considerably, but all are horrific. See Middle East Watch 1990, Makiya 1993, and Human Rights Watch 1995.


were short-lived, and the Iraqi army regained control of southern and then northern Iraq by late March. The brutal assault on armed rebels and civilians alike, and fear of another slaughter led to a mass exodus. Out of an estimated population of three to four million Kurds in northern Iraq, some two million refugees fled towards Turkey and Iran (Adelman 1992, 7; Gunter 1994, 107).

### **The Crisis**

During the last days of March 1991, hundreds of thousands of Iraqi Kurds began making their way towards the Turkish and Iranian borders. Trying to escape to Iran in the face of an advancing Iraqi army, over a million Kurdish refugees, many of whom were inhabitants of Sulaymania, Kirkuk, and Irbil, headed east. The story of the Kurds in Iran—the majority of the refugees—is largely untold, mainly because the international community focused on the situation on the Turkish border. Some argue that the plight of the group near the Turkish border was greater due to more inclement weather conditions, millions of land mines, and the refusal of the Turks to grant entry. The Iranian government, on the other hand, allowed refugees to enter the country where, in collaboration with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), it furnished assistance to them (see Weiss 1999, 51).

Most of the inhabitants of the western towns of Dohuk and Zakho, estimated between 400,000 – 500,000, moved north towards Turkey. Although they had started in vehicles, the flood of refugees quickly overloaded the road network and the Kurds were forced to abandon their vehicles and continue on foot. A combination of minefields and the Iraqi army forced them eastward and away from the main border crossing between Zakho and Silopi in Turkey. Turkish border guards stopped them in the mountain passes





**Figure 4 – Map of Turkish-Iraqi Border**

of the border region. Still harboring the remnants of the 80,000 Kurdish refugees who had fled the Anfal in 1988, Turkey closed its borders to this new influx of Kurds on 3 April (Alemdar 1991).<sup>4</sup> The mountains offered sanctuary from Iraqi forces, but late winter weather at altitudes 8000 feet above sea level and the lack of food and clean water soon threatened the Kurds as much as their enemies. Stranded between the Iraqi army and an inhospitable Turkey, the Kurds awaited their fate in the mountain passes that led to the Turkish border posts.

There were eight major concentrations of Kurdish refugees along the 250-mile border area between Turkey and Iraq. They ranged in size from less than 10,000 to nearly 120,000 refugees (Brown 1995, 85). These areas were later called “camps.” However, no facilities existed at any of these population concentrations. No shelter existed except makeshift tents consisting of blankets or sheets of plastic. There were few

<sup>4</sup> Some 20-30,000 “economic guests” remained in Turkey under close supervision from the 1988 crisis. See Haberman 1991; Rudd 1993, 110; Gunter 1994, 107.

sources of food beyond what had been carried from their homes. While streams flowed in some "camps," they were quickly polluted as a result of inadequate sanitation. This in turn led to many cases of diarrhea, more inadequate sanitation, and eventually to mass dysentery. Diarrheal disease and dehydration accounted for most of the deaths among young children. Initial estimates were that between 500-1000 Kurds were dying each day (Freedman & Boren 1992, 48; Brown 1995, 1-2).

The Turkish government initially ordered its border guards to prevent the refugees from entering Turkey, but also to provide assistance if they could. However, these were spartan outposts and had little to offer the thousands of people now inundating them. The Turkish Red Crescent and local inhabitants also made efforts to provide emergency relief to the refugees. But constrained by the requirement to restrict entry into Turkey, their limited resources, the remote location, and the number of victims, these early efforts were completely overwhelmed by the magnitude of the crisis.

### **Initial Actions**

Three initial responses to the developments in northern Iraq deserve examination: in Western Europe, at the UN, and in the US. The European response was prompted by Turkish President Turgut Ozal who appeared on British television on 4 April 1991 to ask for the European countries' help in dealing with the refugee crisis. He called for a UN Security Council meeting to discuss the situation and recommended that Europe accept at least half of the refugees making their way to Turkey or, preferably, that the allied coalition intervene to guarantee the safety of the Kurds inside Iraq—thus stopping the flow of refugees (Alemdar 1991; Thomson 1991). These suggestions were initially ignored or dismissed; British Prime Minister John Major argued that there was no

international authority to interfere within the borders of Iraq (Moncrieff 1991a). But pressure quickly mounted on Major to do something beyond sending relief supplies to Turkey (see Jakobsen 1996, 208). As a result, at a European Community (EC) summit on 8 April, he proposed a plan similar to Ozal's idea. The EC leaders approved the plan which called for an international force to create safe havens in northern Iraq which would encourage the Kurds to quit the mountains and eventually return to their homes (Gardner & Littlejohns 1991; Riding 1991). French and British leaders took the plan to the UN Security Council and for the next week requested American support and approval.

The legal basis for Major's suggestion was UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 688. The Security Council had adopted 688 on 5 April 1991—the second of the initial three reactions. That resolution did several things: First, it condemned Iraq's repression of its civilian population, including most recently the Kurdish population. Second, it characterized the consequences of that repression—"a massive flow of refugees towards and across international frontiers" and "cross border incursions"—as a threat to international peace and security. Third, it demanded that Iraq stop the repression. Fourth, it expressed hope for an open dialogue to "ensure that the human and political rights of all Iraqi citizens are respected." Fifth, it insisted that Iraq allow international humanitarian organizations immediate access to those needing assistance. Sixth, it requested the Secretary General to pursue humanitarian efforts in Iraq, using all resources to respond to the needs of the displaced Iraqis, and demanded that Iraq cooperate with the secretary-general. Finally, it appealed to member states and to humanitarian organizations to contribute to humanitarian relief efforts (UNSCR 688 1991). However, the resolution did not address how these hopes and demands would be

implemented. It did not expressly authorize the use of force to protect Kurds or Shi'ites from Saddam Hussein. More than a resolution would be needed to bring relief to the Kurdish refugees in the mountains, and much more to get them out of the mountains.

### **The Operation**

Before the ink was dry on UNSCR 688, in the third initial response to the crisis, the United States began what would become the largest relief operation conducted by its military since the Berlin Airlift. Operation Provide Comfort began as an un presupposing relief effort designed to keep the United States out of the internal affairs of Iraq, but in stages it quickly expanded due to both international and operational pressures. The first step was to create Joint Task Force (JTF) Provide Comfort in order to support humanitarian relief operations. After consulting with the French and British, President Bush decided on a humanitarian mission, stating that "we will do what we can to help them without getting bogged down in a ground-force action in Iraq" (Kranish 1991). He warned the government of Iraq not to interfere with this humanitarian effort, and declared that no Iraqi aircraft of any kind would be allowed to fly north of the thirty-sixth parallel until further notice (Moncrieff 1991b).

Early on 6 April, components of Special Operations Command Europe were put on alert and ordered to prepare to deploy immediately to the region. Air Force Major General James L. Jamerson was appointed as the first commander of the task force since the early indications were that it would be largely an Air Force operation. The immediate plan was for planes of the Thirty-ninth Special Operations Wing based in England and Germany to airdrop relief supplies as soon as possible to the Kurds in the mountains along the southern Turkish border. Less than twenty-four hours after the initial alert, two

C-130 aircraft dropped the initial cargo of blankets and troop rations over Iraq. At the same time, a headquarters element was being established at Incirlik Air Base, near Adana in southern Turkey. Operation Provide Comfort was underway. The political guidance was simply to assist the refugees. The tentative plan was to parachute supplies to the Kurds for ten days. There was no operations plan available to activate for such an operation, nor was there any formal doctrine for humanitarian assistance. The joint task force went to Turkey with warfighting skills they had to adapt quickly to a mission (Rudd 1993, 117).

This initial relief effort delivered much-needed supplies to the refugees when there was no other way of reaching them: 32,000 pounds on the first day and, joined by British and French aircraft, nearly 2,000,000 pounds by the end of the first week (Weiss 1999, 53). Eventually planes from Canada and Italy joined the airdrop effort, and countries from all corners of the globe flew supplies into Turkey to be delivered to the refugees. Besides getting supplies to the refugees, the airdrop operation also had the beneficial effect of freeing them from the threat of attack from Iraqi air assets. American fighter planes based at Incirlik aggressively patrolled the area north of the thirty-sixth parallel in keeping with President Bush's restriction of Iraqi air activity.

If there was any hope that the situation could be stabilized and resolved through an airdrop operation, that hope was soon dashed. Feeding a half million refugees by parachute drops might have done the job, given a steady commitment of airpower, favorable weather, and rapid reaction by the receiving parties. However, it would have taken 340 tons a day to deliver less than a pound and a half of food to each Kurd in the camps. Even this minimal level of sustenance would have done nothing to solve the

growing problems of exposure, disease, and lack of security from Iraqi attack on the ground. Besides the logistical difficulties of delivering supplies to the area, there were perhaps even greater problems with the mode of delivery. There was little contact with the Kurds in the mountains. What little feedback there was indicated the airdrops were reaching them, but many of the bundles were damaged upon landing due to the rugged terrain. Many of the items broke upon impact and were unusable, especially the vitally important water supplies. Airdropped shipments also fell into minefields and concentrations of refugees causing both immediate and potential casualties. Early assessments of the effectiveness of the operation were not optimistic about its chances for success. On 9 April US Secretary of State James Baker visited the Turkish-Iraqi border and confirmed that the parachute deliveries were not effective (Bolger 1995, 236-7).

The first expansion of Provide Comfort immediately followed Baker's observations, but it still fell short of the EC's call for Kurdish safe havens, due to American concerns about a long-term presence in Iraq and the use of such safe havens by Kurdish rebels (Stromseth 1993, 89). The expanded operation was renamed Combined Joint Task Force Provide Comfort to reflect growing international involvement. Jamerson received orders to continue providing immediate relief, but also to stabilize the population in place and build a distribution infrastructure for continuous logistic support. This could not be done from the air alone.

With Washington's approval, Jamerson deployed army Special Forces troops directly to the Kurdish camps as Humanitarian Service Support Detachments (HSSDs) to allay Turkish concerns about Special Forces operations in their territory. The HSSDs organized the refugees and established a distribution system for food and water, provided

medical assistance, and distributed tents for shelter (Boysen 1992, 8; Weiss 1999, 53).

With a plan to move US troops into Iraqi territory, on 10 April the White House repeated its warning to Iraq concerning operating any aircraft in northern Iraq, and added the stipulation that Iraq could not engage in any military action—ground or air—north of the thirty-sixth parallel (Sciolino 1991).

Army Brigadier General Richard W. Potter, until then the commanding general of Special Operations Command—Europe (SOCEUR), was put in charge of the camp operations. At his disposal, he had a battalion of the Tenth Special Forces Group (SFG), most of which he deployed to the border area on 13 April (Brown 1995, 5). With the new task of organizing the camps to receive assistance, he requested the rest of the Tenth SFG deploy to Turkey immediately with augmentation of additional medics, civil affairs, psychological operations, and communications personnel (Rudd 1993, 132).<sup>5</sup> While there was no guiding army or Special Forces doctrine for humanitarian assistance operations, Special Forces troops were the best suited to the mission. Lightly equipped, air-deployable, and self-reliant, they were specially trained to work and live with indigenous populations in remote areas during sustained independent field operations. Their immediate task was to organize the refugee camps, receive and assist supply distribution, and act as liaison between the Kurds and other elements of the task force (Brown 1995, 4-5).

Even as the Special Forces teams reached the camps, it became apparent that a relief effort restricted to the border area would not solve the crisis. Discovering that moving the Kurds out of the mountains was essential, the task force commanders

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<sup>5</sup> The 10<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group consists of about 1000 soldiers arranged in 3 battalions plus headquarters and support companies. Each battalion consists of 18 12-man teams.

communicated this up the chain of command (Rudd 1993, 219-220). Because they could not move further into Turkey, the refugees had to go back into Iraq to areas where relief could be provided more efficiently. This added to the pressure from Congress, the EC, and especially the British government, which continued to mount on President Bush to support some sort of safe haven plan. As late as 13 April he still maintained that he did not want to involve a single member of the armed forces in a long-running civil war (Freedman & Karsh 1993, 424). However, on 16 April, there was an abrupt about-turn and the EC safe havens plan was adopted (Bush 1991b):

Following consultations with Prime Minister Major, President Mitterand, President Ozal of Turkey, Chancellor Kohl and this morning, UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, I am announcing an expanded, a greatly expanded and more ambitious relief effort. The approach is quite simple: if we cannot get adequate food, medicine, clothing, and shelter to the Kurds living in the mountains along the Turkish-Iraq border, we must encourage the Kurds to move to areas in northern Iraq where the geography facilitates, rather than frustrates, such a large-scale relief effort.

Consistent with United Nations Security Council Resolution 688 and working closely with the United Nations and other international organizations and our European partners, I have directed the US military to begin immediately to establish several encampments in northern Iraq where relief supplies for these refugees will be made available in large quantities and distributed in an orderly way. Adequate security will be provided at these temporary sites by US, British, and French air and ground forces, again consistent with United Nations Security Council Resolution 688. We continue to expect the government of Iraq not to interfere in any way with this latest relief effort.

President Bush thus again expanded the purview of Operation Provide Comfort.

Army Lieutenant General John M. Shalikashvili assumed command of the combined task force on 17 April 1991 and Jamerson became his deputy (Brown 1995, 7). The change of command reflected both the increased size of the operation and the change in emphasis from airdrop to ground operations. Combined Task Force Provide Comfort's initial objective was to provide immediate emergency relief to dislocated Kurdish civilians in



the border area between Turkey and Iraq. This situation stabilized relatively quickly and refugee survival needs were met, but it was clear the effort could not continue indefinitely.

The new focus was to erect temporary facilities in the lowlands so the displaced civilians could move to a more accessible location (Brown 1995, 52). Provide Comfort thus encompassed two main operations: provide immediate relief and secure an area to which the Kurds could return. These operations were divided between the centerpieces of the combined task force. Task Force Alpha, consisting mainly of the Tenth SFG and Thirty-ninth Special Operations Wing, had the mission of contacting and caring for the Kurds, and then moving them south when possible. Task Force Bravo, made up of a variety of elite NATO infantry battalions, was to carve out a secure zone in northern Iraq so the Kurds could go home. These two operations were supported by three other organizations: a combined air force that supplied both mobility and firepower; a combined support command that handled all logistics; and a civil affairs command, which orchestrated all ties to the Turks, the UN relief agencies, the non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the Kurdish leaders (Bolger 1995, 245). By mid-May 1991, Operation Provide Comfort would include over 22,000 troops. Just over half of them were from the United States, with smaller contingents from 12 other countries: Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom.

### *Task Force Alpha*

General Potter established Task Force Alpha's headquarters in the Turkish border town of Silopi. His concept of operations included three primary elements. First was the

provision of immediate relief through airdrops and then by helicopter delivery and truck convoy. Second, the Special Forces teams established and assisted in the maintenance of the infrastructure of the early camps and, finally, managed the transfer to transit camps in Task Force Bravo's area of operations in northern Iraq.

Eventually, most of the food, water, and supplies delivered to the mountain camps were moved by truck, but the coalition's military airlift effort provided the bulk of the early relief. This airlift effort delivered supplies quickly and saved many lives. But it was not always efficient; only a portion of the dropped supplies reached the refugees undamaged. Once the Special Forces teams were on the ground and a sufficient number of helicopters were deployed to the region, the parachute drops were discontinued in favor of more efficient helicopter delivery. Even the heliborne delivery had its problems. There was an initial phase during which the Kurds rushed the helicopters making deliveries, often causing riots and injuries. The Special Forces teams quickly established delivery sites away from the population centers which allowed for more effective control of the supplies (Rudd 1993, 211-212). By the end of April, all three Tenth SFG battalions had entered the area, expanding the network of Special Forces teams to the east.

In each of the several camps to which these twelve-man teams deployed, they confronted a similar scenario. They found a variety of organizations conducting decentralized relief efforts. Turkish border guards, the Turkish Red Crescent, Red Cross contingents, Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), UNICEF, and the International Rescue Committee all had some presence in the camps as early as the first part of April. But the numbers of refugees were beyond the scope of the available personnel and supplies. The

efforts of these relief agencies had to be integrated. Eventually, as many as forty-five different civilian groups participated in the relief effort. None of them proved capable of providing a broad assessment of the situation nor of providing a control network to coordinate the overall effort. The Red Crescent established a coordination task force, but it lacked the capacity and authority to control the disparate relief organizations. None of these agencies possessed the transportation assets necessary to maintain the movement of the massive amounts of relief supplies into mountainous areas. Thus, even if the Special Forces teams were not the first to arrive in the camps, they provided the coordination, control and logistics network necessary to provide relief. They established landing zones, managed the arrival of heliborne supplies, and established distribution points. They employed their engineering, medical, communication and civil affairs expertise as a “first aid” step in the response to the refugee crisis. Many of the NGOs reacted negatively to the presence of uniformed military personnel. They may have appreciated the assets the coalition could offer, but did not want to fall under military control.

In every camp where NGOs and the military served, there was resistance to the military. Only after the NGOs observed how effectively the Special Forces teams adapted their skills to the environment did they begin to cooperate. Winning the NGOs over required rapport. The Special Forces personnel avoided an authoritarian style with the NGOs and resorted to a soft-sell approach demonstrating their finesse at coordinating the movement of supplies to the camps and their ability to calm and organize the refugees. Special Forces access to military helicopters for the movement of supplies and the evacuation of the most seriously sick or injured gave the soldiers an important advantage in their relationship with NGOs which had virtually no transportation assets,

much less helicopters (see Rudd 1993, 196-7). Eventually, cooperation for the common good of the refugees emerged. Even then, while the NGOs might have appreciated the logistical capacity of the military, they were less happy about the hierarchy implied by command and control efforts. This potentially difficult relationship was handled on an ad hoc basis in the mountain camps, and with a new institutional arrangement within Iraq and at the headquarters in Turkey—the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC)—which will be described in more detail in later chapters.

### *Task Force Bravo*

Joint Task Force Bravo (JTF-B) concentrated on operations within Iraq, south of the border region. Its concept of operations was to secure the general area, build transit camps within Iraq, receive and care for refugees, return the refugees to their homes, transition relief operations to civilian organizations, and to withdraw from Iraq. To accomplish these objectives, it first had to secure territory occupied by Iraqi troops and police. On 19 April, Shalikashvili met with Iraqi officers in the town of Zakho in northern Iraq ostensibly to prevent inadvertent clashes between coalition forces and Iraq. But the message to the Iraqi officers was clear: Allied forces would enter Iraq the next day to secure a zone centered on the town of Zakho. Shalikashvili told them to withdraw twenty miles from Zakho in all directions and that the task force reserved the right to destroy any Iraqi aircraft of any type not given allied clearance in the area (Bolger 1995, 252). The next day Task Force Bravo entered Iraq under the command of army Major General Jay Garner.

General Shalikashvili initially planned to establish ten refugee “transit” camps in the Zakho area. The transit camps were created close to the city of Zakho, so that the

municipal infrastructure could be extended and so that refugees from Zakho could return home.<sup>6</sup> Task force personnel would also man the Zakho hospital and establish a water treatment and distribution facility. Each camp would house 20,000-25,000 refugees. The planning effort was conducted by civil affairs officers assisted by a team from the United States Agency for International Development's (USAID) Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART). This team entered Iraq with JTF-B on 20 April. That day they erected the first tents of what would become a 4000-tent camp requiring eleven 6,000 gallon water tanks, 960 enclosed latrines, and six miles of graded roads with lighting (Rudd 1993, 328-9). Just a week later, the first Kurdish refugees left the mountains for the camp.

The first camp was eventually completed in early May and construction started on the second, but due to a change in plans, only three camps were completed. The camps processed nearly a quarter million Kurds en route to their homes. Army Reserve civil affairs specialists acted as mayors for the massive facilities. Camps were organized to ease distribution problems, enhance sanitation, increase Kurdish administrative participation, and facilitate turnover of the relief effort to civilian control. From the outset, Task Force Bravo was designed to integrate civilian relief agencies into the support, organization, and administration of the camps. The Kurds were also expected to assist in the planning, construction, administration, and sustainment of the camps (Brown 1995, 52). For example, the assistance of Kurdish men was specifically requested for camp construction. This not only facilitated the construction effort, but it allowed the

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<sup>6</sup> The population of Zakho was estimated at about 150,000—almost all of whom evacuated during the crisis.

Kurds to determine the security of the Zakho. The men determined for themselves the safety of the camps, and many returned with their families (Weiss 1999, 56).

News of the liberation of Zakho thus reached the mountains and some Kurds began moving back into Iraq at April's end. Many of the first refugees arrived from the nearby mountain camps; most of them were from the Zakho area and it was not difficult for them to return. Refugees in the camps further east needed greater assistance as they moved out of the mountains, and the coalition made extensive arrangements to help them. Task Force Alpha received orders to close down the mountain camps, open a series of way-stations on the routes out of the mountains, and begin a campaign to convince the Kurds to return to Iraq (Brown 1995, 76). To support the movement of several hundred thousand refugees, Task Force Alpha established way stations on the routes out of the mountains to Zakho. They constructed shelters, latrines and other facilities, delivered food and water, and provided security for the convoys. The coalition also provided fuel and mechanical assistance to get the vehicles back on the road and contracted buses and trucks to transport other refugees (Boysen 1992, 15).

At first, most of the refugees did not move out of the mountains. Many who did were from the Zakho area. Interestingly to the task force, upon return many went straight to their previous homes, regardless of condition, avoiding the coalition camps. Meanwhile, the Special Forces teams in the mountain camps learned that over a third of the refugees in the mountains were from the provincial capital of Dohuk, which before the war had a population of over 200,000. The coalition's ultimate objective was to return the refugees to their homes, and the camps around Zakho were very expensive to

operate.<sup>7</sup> Therefore, the task force leadership determined that if they could secure Dohuk, they could reduce the number of camps that would have to be built, get the refugees home sooner, and preclude the necessity for winterized camps (Rudd 1993, 340; Weiss 1995, 56).

Thus, on 2 May, Task Force Bravo began expanding the security zone into other parts of Iraq. Forces first worked eastward to the Iranian border by moving on the northern towns of Sirsenk and Suri which were taken by 6 May. On 4 May, they began the final expansion of the security zone by moving into positions around Dohuk, the regional capital. The Iraqi forces in and around the town and the symbolic importance of the city presented a considerable challenge to Task Force Bravo. While there was some consideration given to fighting their way in, General Shalikashvili eventually negotiated a solution on 20 May. Dohuk was declared an “open” city and limited coalition humanitarian, civil affairs, and logistics teams were allowed in the city along with unlimited civilian relief workers and UN civilians. Coalition forces held positions north of the city while the Iraqis removed to positions south of the city (Brown 1995, 84). Task Force Bravo clean-up teams entered Dohuk to clear mines, and repair electrical and water systems.

The delay in opening Dohuk had caused problems around Zakho. The refugees left the mountains, but were forced to remain at Zakho. With only one camp completed and two more under construction, the way-stations on the routes from the mountains and the Zakho area were overwhelmed by the flow of refugees. The first camp reached its planned capacity of 20,000 on 10 May—before it was officially completed. With

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<sup>7</sup> The engineers' assessment was that building a camp cost almost \$20 million. The initial plan had been to build ten of them as well as provide food, water, and other supplies.

nowhere to go, the camp population grew to at least 40,000, and as many as 50-60,000 refugees may have crammed into the camp (see Shackelford 1995, 202). Once Dohuk was opened, refugees began to return. Within a few days, soldiers manning checkpoints leading into the city counted 6,000-8,000 refugees returning each day (Rudd 1993, 352).

Once the security zone was expanded to its limit, and the Kurds began making their way back into the towns, the mission of Task Force Bravo changed. It shifted from a dynamic situation which required constant offensive maneuver to evict the Iraqis from the expanding security zone to a more static peacekeeping mission (Abizaid 1993, 14). By the end of May, Task Force Bravo had completed its task in the mountains and was preparing to redeploy. Task Force Bravo had received over 400,000 refugees from the mountains and either returned them to their homes or temporarily settled them in refugee camps.

### **Denouement**

With the Kurds back in northern Iraq, the task force leadership turned their attention to extracting the coalition forces. Relief operations would continue, but did not have to be conducted by military forces once the situation stabilized. The UNHCR, and its associated NGOs, took control of the first coalition camp near Zakho on 27 May and assumed responsibility for all relief operations in northern Iraq on 7 June 1991. On the same day, Task Force Alpha began to redeploy and by mid-June Task Force Bravo had begun a slow withdrawal from the security zone that was completed by mid-July (Boysen 1992, 15-16).

The impressive benefits from Operation Provide Comfort can most clearly be seen in the near total repatriation and the decline in mortality following the coalition



intervention in northern Iraq. A decrease in mortality rates is probably the best available method for determining whether an outside intervention has helped alleviate civilian suffering. Emergency mortality rates indicate how much mortality has increased as a result of a complex emergency. The normal mortality rate is 0.65 per 10,000 per day for Iraq, but one report indicated a rate four to ten times greater than that at the outset of the crisis. Experts on humanitarian crises consider a situation an emergency when the rate reaches 1.5 times the norm. By the end of April 1991, the mortality rate had decreased dramatically to between 1.5 and two times the norm, a decrease from 400-1,000 to some 50 deaths per day—still an emergency. The rates continued to decline throughout May and by the summer rates had dropped below prewar levels (Weiss 1999, 59-60).

The original objectives for Operation Provide Comfort were to stop the dying and suffering in the mountains, resettle the population at temporary sites, and return the population to their homes. The coalition achieved all three objectives. Task Force Alpha, assisted by many NGOs, stopped the dying and suffering in the mountains. Task Force Bravo created a security zone in northern Iraq and built the temporary camps. Together, they moved the refugees from the mountains to the temporary sites. Task Force Bravo, assisted by the UNHCR and NGOs, then rebuilt the civil infrastructure and created an environment that enabled most of the refugees to return to their homes. From an operational standpoint, the coalition achieved all its objectives despite the lack of notice, planning, or preparation. Inevitably, even when such an operation is deemed a success, the lack of preparation will be a focus of attention. The after action reports, lessons learned summaries, and post-crisis assessments contributed to several

developments in the areas of doctrine and training, to which we will turn in chapters eight and nine.

Another consequence of the operation was its effect on the international "mood" regarding humanitarian intervention. The original impetus for the safe haven policy had been a sense of obligation, reinforced by media coverage, to a minority in a wretched condition as a result of actions taken by a common enemy. Stemming from this sense of obligation, Operation Provide Comfort produced a new context for discussion about intervention which was reflected in a 24 April 1991 statement by UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar (quoted in Lyons & Mastanduno 1995):

The right to intervene has been given renewed relevance by recent political events . . . . We are clearly witnessing what is probably an irresistible shift in public attitudes towards the belief that the defense of the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail over frontiers and legal documents.

Other leaders used this episode to question traditional notions of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs.<sup>8</sup> At their July 1991 London summit, the Group of Seven, after citing the exceptional action taken to support the Kurds, urged the UN and its affiliated agencies to be ready to consider similar action in the future if circumstances required it (Freedman & Boren 1992, 82). Thus, some viewed Operation Provide Comfort as a global turning point in humanitarian intervention, in which statist non-

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<sup>8</sup> For example, in an 8 May 1991 address to the Council on Foreign Relations, Thomas Pickering, the US Ambassador to the UN, said: "At the legal and political level the response of the international community to the humanitarian crisis in Iraq has broken new ground. The doctrine of nonintervention in the internal affairs of a state is a fundamental principle of international conduct. Yet in the case of Iraq's treatment of its Kurdish minority, the international community came firmly to the view that the nonintervention doctrine could not shield genocidal and other practices which were themselves prohibited by international law and treaties. While the world has seen the sovereign exercise of butchery before, this is the first time that a significant number of governments have rejected a state's right to do so and acted using military forces to prevent it by providing humanitarian assistance and protection directly to the victims. The response to the plight of the Kurds suggests a shift in world opinion toward a rebalancing of the claims of sovereignty and those of extreme humanitarian need. This is good news since it means we are moving closer to deterring genocide and aiding its victims" (quoted in Gardner 1992).

intervention norms were giving way to a new international consensus that minimum humanitarian standards be enforced by the international community (see Weiss and Campbell 1991, Cooper and Berdal 1993, Stedman 1993, Weiss and Chopra 1995). Others were not nearly as optimistic (see Mayall 1993; Roberts 1993), but the humanitarian sentiment reverberated throughout the international community and policy circles in the United States.

The immediate effect of Operation Provide Comfort on the US military was negligible; the lessons and implications of the operation had to be digested. But the international context of optimism about humanitarian intervention certainly affected the American military, leading as it did to Operation Restore Hope in Somalia where many of the operational lessons and implications of peace operations would be reinforced.

## **Chapter 7 – Operation Restore Hope**

### **The Crisis and Background to the Operation**

In 1960, the former colonies of British Somaliland and Italian Somalia united as the independent country of Somalia. Although it lacked any natural resources of value, the new state quickly became a pawn in the East-West conflict because of its location on the Horn of Africa, close to strategic sea-lanes and the Middle East. Siad Barre took power in a military coup in 1969 and began a relationship with the Soviet Union that lasted until 1977. The Somali dictator then expelled Soviet advisors because of Soviet support for Ethiopia in a border dispute. He began a relationship with the United States in 1980, allowing its navy to use the port of Berbera in exchange for American arms and financial aid. During most of the 1980s, Somalia was one of the largest recipients of American aid in Africa. As East-West relations began to thaw, however, Congress drastically cut aid to Somalia in the late 1980s. Without American guns and money, Barre's dictatorship became vulnerable to rebel forces.<sup>1</sup>

As heavy fighting broke out in the capital of Mogadishu in January 1991, the United States abandoned its former client, evacuating its embassy, as well as those of ten other nations. Later that month, Barre fled the country after 21 years of dictatorship, leaving Somalia without a government. While the northern part of the country declared its independence, the southern part was engulfed in a civil war as different clans and factions struggled to gain control. At the end of January, one faction proclaimed an interim government headed by Ali Mahdi Mohammed as President, a move which was immediately challenged by General Mohammed Farah Aideed, chairman of a rival

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<sup>1</sup> For background on Somalia, see Clark 1993, Makinda 1993, Adan 1994, Samatar, 1994, Lyons and Samatar 1995, Durch 1996.

faction. This political rivalry had already broken into open warfare, and early in 1991 the two sides fought each other to a standstill. Fighting was heaviest in the capital city of Mogadishu and in the area near the Jubba and Shabeelle Rivers (roughly between Mogadishu and Kismayo), which contained Somalia's richest agricultural land. The fighting and looting divided the capital, destroyed most of its infrastructure and also much of Somalia's food crops. An ill-timed drought further lessened production. Thus, by late 1991, the combination of drought and civil war had seriously disrupted the country's food production.

Continued heavy fighting led the United Nations to evacuate the junior officials that were left in their offices in November of 1991—most senior staff members had departed early in 1991 (Clark 1993, 218). While some junior staff members later returned, the lack of relief experts contributed to the miscalculation of the severity of the massive famine that was developing (Cusimano 1995, 3). This miscalculation was compounded by the fact that the attention of the international community was focused on other humanitarian crises in northern Iraq, Bangladesh, and the former Yugoslavia. In the United States, the crisis did not get much attention not only because of the other crises, but also because of confusion in the State Department. When the embassy in Mogadishu was evacuated, the Foreign Service officers working on Somalia were reassigned, leaving a vacuum of information and attention. Thus, for much of 1991, the international presence in Somalia was limited to a few persevering NGOs: World Vision, Medecins Sans Frontiers (MSF), CARE, Save the Children-UK, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

In January 1992, Boutros Boutros-Ghali began his term as Secretary General of the United Nations. He was interested in a more activist UN role, particularly in regard to the problems in Africa. He helped promote a series of Security Council resolutions that gradually increased the United Nations' role in providing humanitarian relief, encouraging a cease-fire, and monitoring political progress in Somalia. However, these resolutions are most notable for their lack of resolve and are unmistakable evidence of the Security Council's reluctance to focus on Somalia. UNSCR 733 of 23 January 1992 called upon all parties to increase humanitarian assistance to the people of Somalia and to seek a cessation of hostilities (UNSCR 733). In this case, the American delegation insisted on changing the wording of the resolution from "ensuring a commitment to the cessation of hostilities" to "seeking" such a commitment (Clark 1993, 221). A few weeks later, in March 1992, a United Nations sponsored cease-fire between the forces of Ali Mahdi and Mohammed Aideed made the resumption of humanitarian relief possible. UNSCR 746 called upon all parties to abide by the cease-fire, but specified no measures to achieve that goal. However, the resolution and the cease fire dramatically increased the number of relief agencies working in Somalia to about fifty, thus increasing the amount of information coming out of the country (Weiss, 1999, 79).

Reports of over a million displaced Somalis and a worsening famine led to scrutiny by the media and the international community. Fighting and looting by various factions became an important factor in the political economy of the militia and greatly reduced the effectiveness of aid deliveries. Factions levied heavy taxes on cargoes, took direct cuts of 10-20% of incoming aid, and charged exorbitantly for providing relief agencies with armed escorts to "protect" food deliveries which they often also looted

(Lewis & Mayall 1996, 108). On 24 April, UNSCR 751 established the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I) with a mandate to protect humanitarian assistance. It authorized the deployment of 50 observers who eventually arrived in July, and “in principle” authorized a security force of 500 which did not deploy until early September 1992 (Clark 1993, 221). This number was expanded by ensuing resolutions to 3500, but conditions in Somalia prevented their full deployment (see UNSCR 767 & 775).

Conditions in Washington also prevented the UN from dealing with the crisis more forcefully. Opposition to more ambitious operations stemmed from three considerations (see Clark 1993, 226; Cusimano 1995, 4-5). First, because President Bush was accused of displaying a lack of interest in domestic issues during the lead-up to a general election, his administration was unwilling to become involved in a foreign crisis. The Bush administration was also opposed to further peace operations due to voter and congressional concerns with costs. Finally, despite recent experience in northern Iraq and Bangladesh, the American military resisted involvement in a humanitarian mission. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee regarding humanitarian intervention in Bosnia, senior military leaders argued that the neutral role of distributing humanitarian relief was in conflict with the combatant role of using force to overcome resistance such as a force might encounter in a civil war. Humanitarian aid missions require the consent of the local parties because those distributing the aid are exposed to attacks. Overcoming resistance, even in order to distribute aid, immediately leads to the troops being perceived as taking sides in the conflict. The repercussion of losing their neutral status led to another military concern—that the small size of most relief missions did not give troops an overwhelming advantage in forces.

## **Initial Actions**

Unsurprisingly, the resulting half-measures of the international community did not have much effect on the situation in Somalia. By the summer of 1992, the death count had passed the 200,000 mark. The ICRC was estimating that 1.5 million Somalis were in imminent danger of starving, and up to one-third of Somalia's 6.7 million people would die before the end of the year if relief did not arrive (Rowe 1992). USAID estimated that one quarter of Somali children under five had already died (Oberdorfer 1992a). Visits to the area by Smith Hempstone, the American Ambassador to Kenya, and Senator Nancy Kassebaum increased media attention on the crisis. The resulting State Department cables and media reports describing the desperate conditions, combined with UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali's criticism of the Security Council's lack of interest in African crises, eventually got the attention of the highest levels of the Bush administration (see Hempstone 1992; Rowe 1992, Tyler 1992). Apparently, President Bush was especially influenced by Hempstone's cable and directed the State Department to develop a plan to deal with the situation (see Perlez 1992a). The result was Operation Provide Relief, announced in mid-August 1992 and begun later that month. Bush increased food donations and ordered military aircraft to deliver donated food and NGO supplies to the Somali-Kenya border, and into Somalia if possible (Oberdorfer 1992a).

Organized by United States Central Command (CENTCOM), the mission was to provide military assistance in support of emergency humanitarian relief to Kenya and Somalia (Allard 1995a, 14). Provide Relief consisted of between 600 and 800 personnel, staging out of Mombasa, Kenya, with an air strength of three C-141B Starlifters and a varying number (8-14) of C-130E Hercules. A platoon of army military police secured



the headquarters and flight line in Mombasa, and Special Forces teams provided a standby security force. The first air sorties began on 28 August with deliveries of tons of rice, beans, and cooking oil. An average of 20 flights per day continued through the end of the year, eventually totaling nearly 2,500 flights and delivering 28,000 tons of relief supplies (see Allard 1995a, 15; Bolger 1995, 276-9; Weiss 1999, 80). But this operation did not have much impact on the famine. First, it did not increase the amount of food being delivered since it only replaced civilian flights. More importantly, the military would deliver food to airports, but beyond that had no influence on what happened to the food. The clan militias took charge of most of the items within hours of its delivery.

Throughout the fall of 1992, the security situation in Somalia continued to deteriorate. The strategy of flooding Somalia with airlifted food, which had been championed by a variety of influential NGOs, was grounded by security threats as gunfire turned back the relief planes. The assumption behind the airlifts was that even if looting diverted some food, increasing the food shipments into Somalia would increase the amount of food that got through to the starving and would remove the incentive to fight over the no-longer scarce commodity. Instead, increased food shipments increased the violence, as gunmen competed for larger treasures. Thus, the problem became, not getting food to Somalia, but safely distributing it to the country's needy population. Indeed, food was rotting in the port of Mogadishu because of the inability to get the food past the gunmen.

The key problem was Somalia's political and military chaos. Central government authority had ceased to exist. The country had broken up into a series of clan fiefdoms controlled by rival warlords. Getting food shipments to various parts of the country

required bribing roving militias so that food could pass through their territories. Often, the warlords tried to seize the food for their militia's use or for sale on the black market, or simply to deny it to their enemies. In addition, the civil war had taken a severe toll on the country's roads and bridges, and the ports and the major airport in Mogadishu were often shut down as a result of violence.

By late fall of 1992 it was obvious that the famine was reaching catastrophic proportions. Although the volume of food entering the country had risen from 20,000 to 37,000 metric tons per month between September and November, the amount of donated food reaching those in need had declined from 60 to 20 percent due to militia activity (Binder 1992; Natsios 1994, 135). The United Nations World Food Program was forced to stop relief shipments as Somali factions shelled the ships carrying them (Binder 1992). Experts from the United States Centers for Disease Control found areas in which the mortality rates due to famine were among the highest ever documented in the world. Their report estimated that approximately 75% of the children under 5 years of age in and around the town of Baidoa had already died of starvation, and 40% of the overall population had perished (Oberdorfer 1992b; Brown 1993). However, although Operation Provide Relief was failing to alleviate the famine, it had created a more activist American approach to the crisis. In the fall of 1992, the questions being discussed were no longer whether action should be taken in Somalia, but rather what further action should be taken to improve the situation.

During the second week of November, President Bush instructed his senior advisors to prepare a set of policy options for dealing with the crisis, indicating that he wanted to put an end to the famine (Oberdorfer 1992c; Coll 1997, 4). Three options were

developed for the president. The first called for placing 3,500 UN troops in Mogadishu to protect relief supplies, but restricted the United States' role to logistical and financial support. Those who wanted to limit the American role favored this option, but it was seen by most as a weak response given the current involvement. The second option called for the United States to help organize a robust coalition of up to 15,000 troops under UN leadership. The American contribution would include sealift capabilities, communications equipment, and noncombat logistical troops, but no ground troops. This option was favored by many in the interagency meetings since it provided a force large enough to alter conditions in Somalia, but presented only minor risks to American soldiers. The third option was for the United States to volunteer to lead and provide the bulk of the troops for a UN-authorized force. Under this option, the United States would supply enough combat troops to control Mogadishu and most of the other major towns in southern Somalia. Such important officials as National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Colin Powell favored this option. They had been reluctant to support American involvement, but if involvement came, they argued for leading and conducting it with overwhelming force.

The three options were presented to the president on 27 November 1992, and he selected the most ambitious option of an American-led intervention which would be known as Operation Restore Hope. Operation orders went out to General Joseph Hoar, commander of CENTCOM, and Secretary of State Eagleburger went to the United Nations to encourage the Security Council to pass an authorizing resolution (Binder 1992). The Council adopted UNSCR 794 on 3 December 1992. In it, the Security

Council recognized the unique situation in Somalia and declared that it fell under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. It determined that “the magnitude of the human tragedy” caused by the conflict and the obstacles being created to “the distribution of humanitarian assistance constituted a threat to international peace and security.” Further, the Council authorized member states to use all necessary means to create a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance in a Unified Task Force (UNITAF) (UNSCR 794). The next day, Bush publicly announced his plans for Operation Restore Hope (Bush 1992):

First, we will create a secure environment in the hardest-hit parts of Somalia so that food can move from ships overland to the people in the countryside now devastated by starvation. And second, once we have created that secure environment, we will withdraw our troops, handing the security mission back to a regular UN peacekeeping force. Our mission has a limited objective, to open the supply routes, to get the food moving, and to prepare the way for a UN peacekeeping force to keep it moving. This operation is not open-ended. We will not stay one day longer than is absolutely necessary. And let me be very clear: our mission is humanitarian, but we will not tolerate armed gangs ripping off their own people, condemning them to death by starvation. General Hoar and his troops have the authority to take whatever military action is necessary to safeguard the lives of our troops and the lives of Somalia’s people.

While the Security Council action was both unprecedented and unspecific, two things are quite clear from the presidential statement above: the limited, apolitical aims of the operation, and the alacrity with which the United States would attempt to hand over the task to the UN. Differences quickly surfaced between Secretary General Boutros-Ghali and President Bush over the mandate of the forces and the time frame envisioned for the operations. Boutros-Ghali and his staff knew only too well from ongoing experience in Cambodia and the former Yugoslavia that the United Nations could not forge the sort of operation that would be necessary to keep order in Somalia. It had

neither the command and control structure nor the operating doctrine necessary to execute the type of peace enforcement operation authorized by UNSCR 794. To reduce the organization's risk in Somalia, Boutros-Ghali wanted a broader UNITAF mandate to disarm Somali militias. Only then would a follow-on operation have any chance of maintaining order in the country (Durch 1996, 321-2). Thus, the United States focused on achieving basic security, while the UN pushed for disarming the militias to achieve real stability. On December 11, Boutros-Ghali sent a letter to President Bush arguing the mission needed to be expanded to include a disarmament component and the training of a police force (see Sciolino 1992), but Bush refused. He wrote back to Boutros-Ghali emphasizing that "the mission of the coalition is limited and specific: to create security conditions which will permit the feeding of the starving Somali people and allow the transfer of these security functions to the UN peacekeeping force" (quoted in Hirsch & Oakley 1995, 103).

The principal point of contention was the scope of disarmament. What constituted "a secure environment for humanitarian relief"? Did it mean, restrictively, to protect corridors for specific deliveries of assistance to end the famine? Or more broadly, did it mean creating generally secure conditions in which the UN could freely operate? In the latter case, the United States would have had to alter the environment of anarchy in Somalia, breaking the vicious cycle of violence and famine, and addressing the root cause of anarchy through a process of national reconciliation and political reconstitution. The United States had been prepared to respond to the symptom of famine; it was not prepared to pacify Somalia. Boutros-Ghali argued that the coalition should not withdraw before controlling heavy weapons and disarming lawless gangs. The Bush administration

refused to endanger prospects of a speedy withdrawal with “mission creep.”

Administration officials knew that Somalia’s famine was largely man-made, and that without real peace and new political institutions the country might fall back into chaos when international forces departed. At the same time, officials recognized that Somalia’s problems had no easy solutions and hesitated to involve the United States in a quagmire.

This concern was compounded by the fact that a new President would be entering office in a few weeks. Embarking on a long-term strategy was not appropriate. To solve this dilemma, the administration adopted a two-stage plan that limited its responsibilities. In the first stage, American troops would lead efforts to stabilize the security environment and resume the flow of humanitarian aid. In the second stage, a broader UN operation would rebuild social, economic, and political institutions. Therefore, the Bush administration called for the UN to deploy a force strong enough to accomplish those tasks. This was to overestimate the capacity of the UN and its ability to manage or finance such a force. This early controversy had several implications. First, and most important for this treatment, it indicated there would be some confusion over what the mission of the American operation would be—an important consideration for an area in which doctrine would be developing. Second, it indicated that, perhaps caught up in the post-Cold War and post-Gulf War enthusiasm for UN operations, the Bush administration had unrealistic expectations that the UN could replace it. This mistake was fatal for UNOSOM II and for the American forces working with it, which would be drawn more deeply into Somalia under a much more complex mandate. (Chopra et al 1995, 26).

As this dispute was unfolding, the execution order went out from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to CENTCOM. It told General Hoar that Operation Restore Hope was expected

to “conduct joint and combined military operations in Somalia, under UN auspices, to secure major airports and sea ports, ground routes, and major relief centers; provide a secure environment; disarm, as necessary, forces which interfere with humanitarian relief operations; and protect and assist UN and nongovernmental humanitarian relief operations.”<sup>2</sup> A stronger statement on disarmament had been part of the execution order until the last minute, when it was dropped at the insistence of General Hoar (see Sommer 1994, 34). He argued that tasks diluting the command’s focus from ensuring the distribution of relief supplies to the at-risk population should not be included. In particular, disarmament was excluded from the mission because it was neither realistically achievable nor a prerequisite for the core mission of providing a secure environment for relief operations. Selective “disarming as necessary” became an implied task which led to the cantonment of heavy weapons and gave UNITAF the ability to conduct weapons sweeps (Hoar 1993, 58). General Hoar also restricted the operation to the southern districts of Somalia, which were the most troubled by disorder and hunger. Thus, he approved the following mission statement for Operation Restore Hope (quoted in Freeman 1993, 64):

When directed by the National Command Authorities, CINCCENT will conduct joint and combined military operations in Somalia to secure the major air and sea ports, key installations and food distribution points, to provide open and free passage of relief supplies, to provide security for convoys and relief organization operations and assist UN/NGOs in providing humanitarian relief under UN auspices. Upon establishing a secure environment for uninterrupted relief operations, USCINCENT terminates and transfers relief operations to UN peacekeeping forces.

On 2 December 1992, The First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) came under CENTCOM operational control. The next day, General Hoar appointed its commander,

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<sup>2</sup> CJCS msg 1823Z5Dec92, Execute Order, quoted in Shackelford 1995, 307-8.

Lieutenant General Robert Johnston, USMC, to command Joint Task Force Somalia, later renamed Combined Task Force Somalia to reflect the role of allied nations, and finally also called Unified Task Force (UNITAF) reflecting UN wishes. Johnston's forces would consist of his own I MEF and most of army Major General Steven Arnold's Tenth Mountain Division (Light Infantry).

**UNITAF: 9 December 1992-4 May 1993.**

Johnston designed a UNITAF operational plan which divided its task into four phases (Durch 1996, 322).<sup>3</sup> In the first phase, the Joint Task Force (JTF) would take control of Mogadishu and establish an operational and logistical base there. The plan allowed three weeks for completion of this phase; in fact, it was finished in one week. Next, UNITAF operations would be extended into the rest of southern Somalia in order to start relief efforts there. Johnston divided the area into nine sectors surrounding major towns that would serve as distribution points. UNITAF called these "humanitarian relief sectors" (HRS) rather than military sectors to emphasize the nature of the operation (Dworken 1995, 15). Johnston allowed 30 days for the second phase of the plan; it took 12. The third phase entailed consolidating control in the relief sectors by gaining control of airfields and roads, thus completing the relief and security network. The plan specified no timetable for this phase, but it was considered complete roughly two months into the mission. The final phase would be the transition to UN forces, considered complete when American forces had been relieved of their responsibilities. The plan estimated 240 days from initial UNITAF deployment to complete the handover; officially, it occurred at the 146-day mark.

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<sup>3</sup> The following account of the execution of Operation Restore Hope is compiled from Freeman et al 1993, Bolger 1995, Dworken 1995, Slim & Visman 1995, Durch 1996, and Oakley 1997.



**Table 5 – Phases of Operation Restore Hope**

Phase	Actual Dates	Objective
I	9-16 December 1992	Initial deployment into Somalia; secure airfield and seaport at Mogadishu
II	17-28 December 1992	Expand operations beyond Mogadishu and secure humanitarian assistance distribution sites
III	29 December 1992 – 17 February 1993	Expand operations beyond the distribution sites into the more remote regions
IV	18 February – 4 May 1993	Transition and hand-off to UN

Prior to the introduction of American forces, the Department of State established a United States Liaison Office (USLO) in Mogadishu to provide a link between the United States, UN agencies, and the various political factions in Somalia. Special Envoy Robert Oakley, a former ambassador to Somalia, arrived in Mogadishu on 7 December 1992 to head the USLO. Early feedback from USLO indicated concern over anticipated Somali opposition to the operation. Oakley met with the major Somali political and military leaders and convinced them to cooperate with the United States and UNITAF rather than oppose them—a precedent that would be followed as the operation continued.

*Phase One (9-16 December 1992)*

The Joint Task Force Somalia Plan of 6 December 1992 stated (quoted in Zvijac & McGrady 1994, 40):

The objective of Phase I is to establish a base of operations and logistics in Mogadishu; to gain control over the flow of humanitarian relief supplies into and through the city; and to introduce other UN forces throughout the country . . . Phase I is considered complete when security in Mogadishu is sufficient to permit unimpeded JTF operations and JTF forces have assumed the interior relief distribution site security in Baidoa.

The first goal was to gain control of the air and sea entry sites around Mogadishu. With this base, UNITAF could gain control over the flow of relief supplies, introduce other UN

forces, and secure the outlying city of Baidoa—site of some of the worst conditions. On 9 December, Special Operations Forces landed near the port of Mogadishu. 1,400 United State Marines followed them on landing craft and helicopters and quickly took control of the port, airfield and the American Embassy compound, which became the UNITAF headquarters.

Lieutenant General Johnston came ashore on 10 December to oversee the buildup of an American task force that would soon number 16,000 in Somalia with another 10,000 offshore or in Kenya. Canadian and French troops started arriving shortly thereafter, being the first of a twenty-one-country allied force which eventually totaled 13,000 including sizable contingents from Australia, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, France, Italy, Morocco, and Pakistan.

UNITAF established a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) on 11 December, collocated with the already-established Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) run by the United Nations humanitarian affairs coordinator (Seiple 1996, 97). It was there that the military and representatives from the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) coordinated military-humanitarian activities with NGO representatives. The Mogadishu CMOC would be the national focal point of NGO/military coordination, but similar HOC/CMOC operations were set up in each of the task force's sectors.

On 12 December, Special Envoy Oakley made preparations for the first move out of Mogadishu. He met with representatives of the Somali community in Baidoa to notify them of the impending arrival of a military force and to defuse any potential resistance. Oakley assured local leaders that the troops were coming as friends to help Somalia save




Figure 5 – Map of Southern Somalia

itself, not to impose any particular form of settlement (Oakley 1993, 49). He also warned them of the consequences of resisting the arrival of the troops. On 13 December, army air assault troops took the airfield at Baledogle, which set the stage for American Marines and French forces to move into Baidoa on 15 December. This action completed Phase I. Shortly afterwards, relief convoys began to enter the town, untroubled by militia gunmen for the first time in two years. This set the pattern for all HRS occupations: Oakley would meet with community representatives to discuss the intent and character of the military forces that would follow him. Soon thereafter, the military would arrive to a peaceful welcome, and then relief efforts would get underway (see also Oberdorfer 1992d; 1992e; Hoar 1993).

*Phase Two (17-28 December 1992)*

Lieutenant General Johnston's Joint Task Force Plan set out the following goals for the second phase of Operation Restore Hope (quoted in Zvijac & McGrady 1994, 45):

The objective of Phase II is the expansion of JTF operations to provide security at the major interior relief distribution sites to include Gialalassi, Bardera, Beledweyn, Oddur, and others as required . . . Phase II is considered complete when desired interior relief distribution sites are secure from interference and JTF forces are ready to begin convoy security operations.

Johnston wanted to expand operations to additional ports and airfields, and expand security in the interior through relief convoy escort and by securing the food distribution sites. Through the rest of December UNITAF expanded the number of sectors it controlled. American forces and Belgian troops took Kismayo on 20 December and Bardera on 23 December. French and Italian troops moved into Oddur and Gialalassi on 25 and 27 December respectively. United States Army Tenth Mountain Division soldiers and Canadian forces launched an air assault on 28 December to take Beledweyn. In each

case, relief convoys began bringing in food and other supplies just as soon as the military had occupied the towns. Once Gialalassi and Beledweyn were secure, the task force leadership declared Phase II complete.

With security forces established in the major population centers, significant quantities of food, medical equipment and medicines could be distributed throughout the country. On the medical side, supply operations supported and re-equipped 32 hospitals, 81 clinics, and 103 vaccination units operating throughout the country. Surgical wards, open to the entire population, were also established. Increased food distribution resulted in a marked improvement in nutrition. In the areas most affected by the famine, the malnutrition rate dropped considerably, from between forty to sixty percent to between eleven to thirty-eight percent. In other regions, this rate came close to zero. The mortality rate also dropped significantly (Trintignac 1999).

During this second phase, American military units began to expand beyond their focus on security. Army engineers and navy Seabee units began building and improving roads in all the HRSs. They also constructed airfields to handle C-130 and helicopter operations and built base camps for UNITAF in Mogadishu and in each relief sector. By 1 March 1993, 7,000 UNITAF engineers had built or improved some 2,500 kilometers of roads, nine airfields, and 15 helicopter landing pads. In addition, military engineers dug fourteen wells, repaired bridges, schools, and clinics (see Arnold 1993, 26; Kennedy 1997, 17).

Toward the end of the second phase, on 26 December, a previously negotiated security agreement went into effect. Somali factions withdrew their "technicals," the heavily armed paramilitary forces that patrolled the streets of Mogadishu in pickup

trucks, in accordance with UNITAF orders to get all illegal weapons off the streets. A radio station and newspaper established by UNITAF explained the situation to the Somalis. By 5 January 1993, the technicals were off the streets and security was good enough that both President Bush and UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali were able to visit the operation.

*Phase Three (29 December 1992-17 February 1993).*

Operation Restore Hope's Somalia Plan established the following goals for the third phase (quoted in Zvijac & McGrady 1994, 50):

The objective of Phase III is the expansion of JTF operations to additional ports and airfields, the expansion of interior relief security through relief convoy security operations and possibly the creation of additional interior relief distribution sites . . . . Phase III is considered complete when sufficient control over the relief distribution network has been established to allow for the delivery of enough food to arrest the famine, to break the cycle of looting, and UNOSOM forces are ready to relieve JTF forces in zone.

Accordingly, UNITAF forces began distributing relief supplies to smaller towns along the main supply routes that connected the major population centers.

It was during this phase that the HRS system was put into effect. Certain military units took responsibility for a particular region and established a CMOC to coordinate with the HOC there. American military forces also began conducting civic action missions during this period. American troops began clearing streets and restoring water supplies. Army forces in Kismayo began a program to reestablish the police force in that city. They also coordinated a medical assessment of five villages in the area. This gave the NGOs a better understanding of the type of assistance required there. Meanwhile, in Mogadishu, planning began to establish feeding centers to be run by the various NGOs and Somali women. Additionally, UNITAF, the USLO, and the Somali joint security

committee were making plans to reestablish a police force in Mogadishu and exploring ways to calm the political climate, while involving Somalis in the running of their own affairs.

These were local initiatives undertaken by the organizations in Somalia because the UN Headquarters, CENTCOM, and the State Department were all reluctant to get involved, fearing legal problems and "mission creep" implicit in initiatives undertaken outside the original plan. CENTCOM finally acquiesced to the police initiatives as economy-of-force measures (Freeman et al 1993, 67). By February, thirty-five feeding stations were operating in Mogadishu, feeding one million persons per week. A new 300-man Somali police force protected these feeding stations backed up by UNITAF units from various countries. The plan was to eventually deploy some 3,500 police in Mogadishu (Chopra et al 1995, 38). Special Envoy Oakley observed then that the city was calm and no guns were visible on the streets (Oakley & Tucker 1997).

Beginning in January, individual UN member states' military contingents began to take over responsibility for general security and relief protection in particular zones. On 16 January, Australian units relieved the Marines in Baidoa, and Moroccan troops replaced army forces in Baledogle. Two days later the first American combat unit rotated out of Somalia and United States force levels began to decline from their peak of over 20,000. A further reduction in the American military presence occurred when Marine combat engineers and the amphibious ship, *Tripoli*, which had initiated the landing on 9 December, departed during the last week of February. This brought the number of American troops in the region to 16,000, a number that would continue to decline.

In mid-February, General Johnston declared the third phase completed, with UNITAF ready to hand over control to a UN force whenever the latter would be ready to take over. Humanitarian operations were proceeding in all parts of the country, death from famine had disappeared, port and airfield operations were improved, as were roads and regular convoys for relief operations. The intensive, widespread factional fighting had given way to isolated clashes. Several observers characterized the coordination between NGOs and UNITAF as “good enough,” if uneasy. Several factors contributed to this lack of complete comfort in the military-NGO relationship—a topic we will return to in following chapters. Cultural differences between the two communities and the contrast between the highly organized military forces and the disparate NGOs played a role. More importantly for the mission, however, were the differences of view over the use of armed Somalis by NGOs as guards and the continuing scattered violence and looting which UNITAF could not prevent completely. While conflict around aid convoys and feeding centers had decreased during Restore Hope, violence began to flare in areas beyond UNITAF control in early 1993. During this period, targets changed and attacks were no longer focused on food convoys, but aimed at higher-value items like vehicles and cash. UNICEF, ICRC, and MSF premises were attacked and robbed. The attacks were often linked to disputes over Somali employment within aid agencies, and to an increasing Somali resentment of UNITAF operations (Slim & Visman 1995, 157). The related issues of this continuing violence and disarmament also contributed to problems in conducting the changeover from an American operation to a UN mission.



*Phase Four (18 February – 4 May 1993)*

Before Operation Restore Hope began, General Johnston conceived a simple objective for its final phase (quoted in Zvijac & McGrady 1994, 59):

The objective of Phase IV is to transition from a US-led to a UN-controlled effort . . . Phase IV is considered complete when US forces are relieved of responsibility.

The final phase was also the longest phase, due to the differences in American and UN interpretation of the objective of the operation. The December 1992 correspondence between President Bush and Secretary General Boutros-Ghali had not produced an agreement. As the operation proceeded, Boutros-Ghali established the UN's position on the terms for effecting a UN takeover of the operation. In a 15 February speech, Boutros-Ghali stated that the American mission of establishing a secure environment would not be complete without (1) movement toward a political settlement among Somalia's warring factions, (2) disarmament of heavy weapons and bandits, (3) extension of operations into northern Somalia, and (4) movement toward establishment of a police force (Zvijac & McGrady 1994, 60). The Bush administration publicly rejected this broad interpretation. However, despite the uncertainties caused by this disagreement, UNITAF continued planning for a transition.

The prospective commander of the UN operation which would become UNOSOM II was a Turkish Army lieutenant general. When General Bir arrived in Somalia on 8 March, he received headquarters space collocated with General Johnston's headquarters to promote a seamless transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM. During April, the core of an international military staff from countries contributing forces to UNOSOM II arrived in Mogadishu to conduct a handoff of responsibilities from

UNITAF staff officers. The UNOSOM II and UNITAF Current Operations Centers were also collocated to facilitate the turnover. At the same time, American forces in the HRSs handed over security operations to international forces remaining as part of UNOSOM II (see Table 6). On 23 April, the Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, notified the UN Secretary General that the UNITAF mission was completed and that the United States was prepared to relinquish control of military operations to the UN (Hines 1994, 36).

Boutros-Ghali was reluctant, however, to agree to the transition as long as details of American support to UNOSOM II were still being worked out. During consultations, the United States agreed to contribute logistics and headquarters command and staff support as part of the force committed to UNOSOM II. In addition, the United States agreed to provide intelligence and communications support through an element under American control. Finally, the Americans agreed to provide a “quick reaction force” to respond to emergencies exceeding the capability of UNOSOM II (Hines 1994, 37). With this agreement in place, the UNITAF mission ended on 4 May 1993 with a brief change of command ceremony in which General Johnston turned over command to General Bir. Army Major General Thomas Montgomery assumed command of approximately 5,000 American forces remaining in the area of operations. These included logistics support personnel, the quick reaction force, and a small headquarters and intelligence staff.

## **UNOSOM II**

On 26 March 1993, the UN Security Council had adopted Resolution 814 which authorized a new UN force of 28,000 troops to take over from UNITAF. But the 28,000 troops authorized for UNOSOM II never materialized—by 28 May less than 20,000 were present. Thus, with a smaller force, UNOSOM II attempted to undertake an expanded

**Table 6 - Ultimate coalition control of the Humanitarian Relief Sectors**

HRS	Nation	Date of transition	Comments
Mogadishu	Pakistan	26 April 1993	Control of portions of the city had transitioned earlier
Baidoa	Australia	2 March 1993	Australian forces had been in effective control since 16 January
Baledogle	Morocco	1 March 1993	Moroccan forces had been in effective control since 16 January
Bardera	Botswana	17 April 1993	
Beledweyn	Italy	4 May 1993	Assumed control from Canadian forces
Gialalassi	Italy	27 December 1992	
Kismayo	Belgium	5 March 1993	Belgian forces had been in effective control since 26 December
Oddur	France	25 December 1992	
Marka	Pakistan	28 April 1993	

Source: Zvijac & McGrady 1994, 62.

and more complex task than UNITAF had ever contemplated. UNSCR 794 had committed UNITAF to establishing a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations. Under UNSCR 814, UNOSOM II was intended to “assume responsibility for the consolidation, expansion, and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia.” The resolution also included a policing or peace enforcement role under which Somalis found to be breaching international humanitarian law would be held individually accountable (UNSCR 814).

Throughout May, resentment at the continuing lack of Somali involvement in UNOSOM’s policy- and decision-making continued to grow. Anti-UN demonstrations increased, as did clashes with clan militias (Slim & Visman 1995, 159). The mission was radically changed on 4 June 1993, when a group of Pakistani soldiers in search of weapons was attacked by Aideed’s forces. Twenty-three were killed and another nine taken hostage. This attack galvanized the international community, leading to the 6 June UNSCR 837 calling for investigation and the arrest and prosecution of those responsible

for the attack. The Clinton Administration sent a contingent of Army Rangers to capture Aideed, placing a \$20,000 bounty on his head. Most international NGOs evacuated to Kenya, anticipating large-scale retaliatory action. From 4 June onwards, military strategies took precedence over political reconstruction or humanitarian assistance programs (Slim & Visman 1995, 163).

For the next five months, there was a series of attacks and engagements between UN forces and Somali factions, most notably those of Aideed. Efforts to capture him continued through the summer and fall, making Mogadishu an increasingly dangerous place for UN and American forces. On 3 October 1993, in a raid on a hotel in Mogadishu, 18 American soldiers were killed and one was taken hostage. Four days later, President Clinton announced that all American forces would be withdrawn by 31 March 1994.

### **Conclusion**

Operation Restore Hope began in early December 1992 with an initial welcome for the American-led intervention force. As UNITAF units began to redeploy in the spring of 1993, they could look back on accomplishments similar to those of Operation Provide Comfort. The specter of starvation had been lifted. The Somali people were being fed, schools had been reopened, and crops were being planted. UNITAF engineers had accomplished enough infrastructure improvement to allow full access by relief workers. By early February 1993, UNITAF had accomplished its assigned mission. At times, it had gone beyond its assigned mission by carrying out limited activities designed to enhance prospects for long-term security (e.g., the establishment of police forces and limited efforts at disarmament). The intervention had a positive impact on the security

situation and allowed the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance. However, the success of this operation was overshadowed by the disaster of UNOSOM II, which demonstrated the complex difficulties inherent in peace operations. The Clinton administration temporarily backed away from its aggressive position on participation in such operations. However, as we will see in the following chapters, the army took the lessons of Operation Provide Comfort and Operation Restore Hope and changed its doctrine and training programs.

## Chapter 8 – Learning in the 1990s

### Introduction

As we have seen, much of the literature on military studies discounts the prospect of change in military organizations because of the strength of standard operating procedures and bureaucratic politics. However, the experience of the United States Army in the various missions of the early 1990s has brought about significant change in the area of OOTW in general and peace operations in particular. The following chapters employ a learning theory model to outline, first, how these changes developed and then to document what changes have occurred. As learning theorists suggest, we can identify elements of a learning cycle that proceeds from individual ideas to individual action and then to organizational action. While bureaucratic politics and standard operating procedures often produce obstacles to the completion of learning cycles, Goldman's (1997) work suggests that there are circumstances in which organizations can overcome those obstacles. In this instance, standard operating procedures actually contributed to the learning cycle process.

In this chapter, I begin with a discussion of the circumstances Goldman deems necessary for completing a learning cycle: urgency, desirability, and possibility. In the discussion of the possibility for learning I introduce the army "lessons learned" system—a recent institutional development which had the unintended consequence of contributing to organizational learning about peace operations.<sup>1</sup> As the army developed its lessons learned system, it established processes that required organizational responses to problems encountered during operations. I present examples of learning in the operations

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<sup>1</sup> See March 1988 for a discussion of the potential for unintended consequences of organizational processes.

of the early 1990s in which individuals encountered anomalies and implemented solutions to organizational problems, or recommended solutions that found their way into army doctrine and training. Finally, I review instances of organizational resistance, demonstrating that obstacles to learning have to be considered in learning cycles. The next chapter documents the changes in military doctrine, training, and education resulting from this learning process, and the continuing resistance to that change.

In order to initiate a learning cycle, an organization needs learning and change to be desirable and urgent. Desirability refers to the domestic political incentives motivating actors to examine their approach to problems, while urgency results from pressures in the international environment. During the early 1960s, the desirability of learning and change was high, but the urgency of changes in army operations was hotly debated. In contrast, the 1990s produced both a clear sense of the desirability and urgency for learning and change in army operations.

### **Urgency**

Some sense of organizational urgency has to exist in order to begin a learning cycle. This urgency is the result of pressures in the international environment. These pressures encourage learning in two ways. First, they clarify problem identification. Second, they increase actor motivation to address problem situations. In the early and mid-1990s, the urgency of learning and change stemmed from the frequency of peace operations and the fact that they were peace operations, not combat missions. In comparison to counterinsurgency, learning about peace operations was easier. Whereas the army could plausibly argue that the conflict in Vietnam was a conventional conflict requiring a conventional response, it could not make that case in northern Iraq, Somalia,

Rwanda, or Haiti. In some ways, the army and the Kennedy administration conducted a debate over what kind of conflict was going on in Vietnam in the early 1960s. While the Kennedy administration focused on political, social, and economic factors, the army executed a strategy designed for conventional military combat. Since the Vietnam conflict exhibited instances of conventional combat, the army could contend that a conventional response was warranted. It could not make a similar argument in the early 1990s. While the potential for the application of firepower existed, it was only a part of the missions that focused on extracting the Kurds from the mountains of northern Iraq or coordinating relief in Somalia.

Further, the army developed a sense of urgency about changing due to the nature of the international environment. The end of the Cold War coincided with a dramatic rise in the number of "complex humanitarian emergencies." These crises are characterized largely by man-made situations in which government has been contested or non-existent. The resulting conflicts produce mass population movements, the rise in death rates from starvation and epidemics, widespread violence and atrocities, and macroeconomic collapse. The responses to these emergencies differ from traditional relief responses to natural disasters because of their complexity and deadliness. The requirement for a different kind of response increased the frequency of military involvement in peace operations. Perhaps if there had been just one or two crises, the need to adjust doctrine and training might never have arisen, but there were many more. Major peace operations in the first half of the 1990s included Operation Provide Comfort which began in April 1991 and was closely followed by Operation Sea Angel in Bangladesh in May. Not long afterwards, the United States launched Operation Restore Hope in Somalia which ran



from December 1992 until May 1993. Operation Continue Hope saw American forces participating in UNOSOM II through 1993, until May 1994. In 1994, Operation Support Hope had troops in Rwanda from July to September and Operation Uphold Democracy began in Haiti, and ran until late March 1995. Always in the background was the potential of a major operation in the Balkans, which eventually occurred with Operation Joint Endeavor in late 1995. Its successor in implementing the Dayton Agreements, Operation Joint Guard, continued in the year 2000. Coincidental to these major operations, the military also undertook many smaller OOTW operations. Linn (1994, 37) counts eighteen during 1991-1993, while Pirnie and Francisco (1998, 91-100) list thirty-six humanitarian airlift operations and thirty-two other OOTW missions during 1991-1996. The nearly constant demand on the military helped to produce a need to address these types of operations. As we will see, the experiences and lessons learned, especially in the major operations, led directly to changes in doctrine, education, and training programs in the army.

### **Desirability**

The desirability of learning and change in the military is a product of pressure from civilian political authorities. They can trigger a learning cycle by providing the impetus and political incentive for a reevaluation of doctrine and procedure. In the 1990s, presidential leadership and developments in post-Cold War national security policy played an important role in the initiation of military learning. President Bush's interest in the military effectively conducting OOTW or peace operations is perhaps best evidenced by his ordering the military to execute Operations Provide Comfort and Restore Hope. Bush also displayed a quickly developing interest in widening the

military's scope of expertise, making learning and change more desirable. While his 1991 national security strategy statement contains no mention of peace operations, humanitarian assistance, or any similar concept (see White House 1991), by the time he left office, Bush was advocating use of the military for a wide variety of purposes.

The mood of optimism surrounding UN operations after the Gulf raised questions within the Bush administration about whether and how the United States should expand its participation in UN peace operations (Daalder 1996, 37). An important event was a 31 January 1992 UN Security Council meeting of the heads of state and government, the topic of which was the status of UN peacekeeping. At the close of that session, the Security Council asked the Secretary General to provide a report to the Council on ways to improve the UN peacekeeping process. In July 1992, Boutros Boutros-Ghali submitted his report, *An Agenda for Peace*. It proposed an ambitious agenda for the world organization, built around the missions of preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peace making, and peace enforcement. The report even urged member states to negotiate special agreements with the UN to make military forces available to the Security Council on a permanent basis, as called for under Article 43 of the UN Charter (Boutros-Ghali 1992).

With this report in the public eye and with observers and commentators calling for new ways to use the military in the post-Cold War world, the Bush administration turned its attention to the topic (see Shuger 1992; Snider & Taylor 1992). In early August, President Bush established a National Security Council (NSC) working group to review the nature and extent of American participation in peace operations. The goal of the review was to develop a response to *An Agenda for Peace* in time for the President's

speech to the UN General Assembly in the fall (Terry 1994, 119). In that 21 September 1992 speech, Bush expressed the results of the rapid review of American policy and its implications for the military. He stated that the United States was ready to do its part to strengthen world peace by strengthening international peacekeeping by working with the UN to employ American lift, logistics, communications and intelligence capabilities to support peacekeeping operations (Friedman 1992). Further, the military was expected to make adjustments (Reuters 1992):

I welcome the Secretary General's call for a new agenda to strengthen the United Nations ability to prevent, contain and resolve conflict across the globe. And today, I call upon all members to join me in taking bold steps to advance that agenda . . . I have directed the United States Secretary of Defense to place a new emphasis on peacekeeping. Because of peacekeeping's growing importance for the United States military, we will emphasize training of combat, engineering and logistical units for the full range of peacekeeping and humanitarian activities. I have further directed the establishment of a permanent peacekeeping curriculum in United States military schools.

Following President Bush's speech, the administration continued its review of policy regarding UN peacekeeping, a review which culminated, after some debate, in National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 74. The debate revolved around the extent of American participation in the full range of UN operations. While it was generally agreed that the United States could not sustain the Cold War posture of nonparticipation, there was not agreement on how to proceed. State Department and UN officials argued for full participation to bolster the credibility of both the UN and the United States, while others were adamantly opposed to full participation. Opposition centered in the Joint Chiefs of Staff around General Colin Powell, whose opposition we will explore in more detail later in this chapter. As a result of this disagreement, NSDD 74 was devoted to the main elements of President Bush's September speech: the strengthening of the UN's

peacekeeping capability. It remained vague about American participation, only endorsing the use of American military forces if their unique capabilities were necessary for the success of the mission (see Daalder 1996, 39).

With the defeat of President Bush in the November 1992 election, the peace operations policy process came to an end, leaving it to the next administration to further develop an approach to the issue. But in a short space of time, President Bush had moved security and military policy from complete disregard of the topic. NSDD 74 represented a first step in committing the United States to support peace operations. The 1992 National Military Strategy allowed that “our forces must be prepared to provide humanitarian aid” and “to engage in conflict in order to assist and protect those in need” (JCS 1992, 15). Just before he left office, President Bush made two further pushes for military learning and change. In one of his last addresses as President, he touched on the appropriate use of military force while addressing the cadets at West Point (Waters 1993):

The need to use force arose in the wake of the Gulf War when we came to the aid of the peoples of both northern and southern Iraq, and more recently, I determined that only the use of force could stem this human tragedy in Somalia. The United States should not stand by with so many lives at stake and when a limited deployment of US forces, buttressed by the forces of other countries and acting under the full authority of the United Nations, could make an immediate and dramatic difference and do so without excessive levels of risk and cost. Operations Provide Comfort and Southern Watch in Iraq and then Operation Restore Hope in Somalia all bear witness to the wisdom of selected use of force for selective purposes.

More importantly for the military, President Bush’s January 1993 national security strategy document, which drives the national military strategy and military doctrine stated (White House 1993, 7):

In concert with others, the United States must renew its efforts to improve the recent effectiveness of the UN. As was demonstrated in the Gulf War and in subsequent crises, we now have the opportunity to make the UN a key instrument of collective security. The US should do its part to strengthen UN conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacemaking capabilities by . . . taking an active role in the full spectrum of UN peacekeeping and humanitarian relief planning and support.

The Clinton administration demonstrated its interest in a military capable of executing peace operations in several ways. First, it ordered the military to execute a succession of such missions in Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Before issuing these orders, President Clinton began his own review of peace operations policy soon after taking office. His approach would further contribute to the desirability of military learning and change. Many members of the new administration viewed both peace operations and the UN in a positive light. During the presidential campaign, Clinton had supported a more interventionist policy to help restore democracy in Haiti and reverse the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. He had also urged exploration of the idea to create a rapid deployment force that could be used for purposes beyond traditional peacekeeping, such as standing guard at the borders of countries threatened by aggression, preventing mass violence against civilian populations, providing humanitarian relief, and combating terrorism (see Daalder 1994, 2).

Members of Clinton's administration publicly advocated a strategy of "assertive multilateralism," which combined the need for American engagement and leadership with the imperative for multilateralism (see Terry 1994, 120). In their view, a central element of this strategy was the strengthening of the UN's capability to execute peace operations and American commitment to them. The early success of Operation Restore Hope reinforced their predisposition to expand both UN operations and the American role

in them. Consequently, we find Secretary of State Warren Christopher testifying about a new approach for American foreign policy (Christopher 1993, 281):

Our budget also places a new emphasis on promoting multinational peace-keeping and peace-making. The end of the Cold War has . . . opened up new possibilities for international cooperation. Our task is to harness that cooperation to contain, and far more importantly, to prevent conflict . . . International peace-keeping—especially by the UN—can and must play a critical role. Capabilities must be enhanced to permit prompt, effective, preventive action. We in the United States must be ready to do our part.

Similarly, Clinton appointees in the Department of Defense demonstrated their readiness to do their part by creating a new position for an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Democracy within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and a new directorate for peacekeeping. Frank Wisner, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, stated that peacekeeping “will no longer be an ancillary portion of the thinking of the Department of Defense; it will lie right at the core of our activities in the Office of the Secretary and the Uniformed Armed Forces . . . Looking particularly at peace enforcement, we see a critical task as organizing the DOD so that it can effectively participate in decisionmaking about peacekeeping and peace enforcement, and respond when the President orders us to contribute resources or forces to an operation” (Wisner 1993, 12-15). It was clear that the new administration saw peace operations as a core activity for the military.

Shortly after the Clinton administration entered office, the NSC drafted a Presidential Review Directive (PRD) calling for an interagency review of the entire spectrum of peace operations. The purpose of PRD-13, signed by President Clinton in early February 1993, was to formulate a plan for the strengthening of UN peacekeeping and the expansion of American participation. Its mandate was to examine American

participation in multilateral operations involving peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, and peace enforcement. Several months later, a draft Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) emerged, endorsing peace operations as an essential element of United States security policy. However, the escalating violence in Somalia in the summer and fall of 1993 delayed the release of this PDD, and the loss of eighteen American soldiers in October produced rethinking within the administration.

On 26 October 1993, Defense Secretary Aspin urged a complete revision of the PDD draft. He suggested that senior policymakers go back to the drawing board with it and send it to the Deputies Committee for redrafting. Aspin's request reflected the unease among senior military officers about involving US forces in both nation-building exercises and the kinds of police action that had failed in Somalia. The Pentagon's position was that American forces were not suited for these roles and that their participation would dull their fighting edge (Daalder 1994, 16). When Clinton finally signed PDD-25 on 3 May 1994, it was not as ambitious as many in the administration had hoped. It recognized the general importance of multilateral peace operations for American policy as a "useful tool," but presented a number of criteria which signaled reluctance about American participation. Further, reflecting the wishes of the military leadership, it emphasized that the primary role of American military forces was to be prepared to fight and win wars.

Despite these qualifications placed on American participation in peace operations, PDD-25 still demonstrated the Clinton administration's interest in the military's developing its capability to execute peace operations (White House 1994a):

UN and other multilateral peace operations will at times offer the best way to prevent, contain, or resolve conflicts that could otherwise be more costly and deadly . . . . Thus, establishment of a capability to conduct multilateral peace operations is part of our National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy.

Today, [peace operations] also include more complex and sometimes more robust uses of military resources to achieve a range of political and humanitarian objectives. The post-Cold War world has also witnessed the emergence of peace enforcement operations involving the threat or use of force . . . . The Armed Services will include appropriate peacekeeping/emergency humanitarian assistance training in DOD training programs. Training US forces to fight and decisively win wars will, however, continue to be the highest training priority.

Clinton administration policy documents continued to emphasize the role of peace operations. The 1994 National Security Strategy listed peace operations as one of three major ways that the military contributes to advancing American interests, along with dealing with major regional contingencies and countering weapons of mass destruction (White House 1994b, 7). The thirty-page document devoted a section to peace operations, calling them “an important component” of American strategy that are sometimes the best way to prevent, contain, or resolve conflicts. The section concluded with the proviso that the primary mission of the military is not peace operations; it is to deter and, if necessary, to fight and win conflicts (White House 1994b, 13-14).

Clinton’s introduction to the following year’s strategy document emphasized the importance of a military capable of undertaking a variety of missions (White House 1995a, ii):

Time after time in the last year, our troops demonstrated their current readiness and strength: helping to save hundreds of thousands of lives in Rwanda; moving with lightning speed to head off another Iraqi threat to Kuwait; and giving freedom and democracy back to the people of Haiti. I am committed to ensuring that this military capability is not compromised.



The updated document repeated the earlier version's inclusion of peace operations as a key task for the military, as well as the provisos concerning the primary mission of the armed forces. It added a discussion of national interests that could merit the use of the armed forces, including humanitarian catastrophes that could require a military response (White House 1995a, 12). The section on peace operations reiterated the need to prepare the armed forces to engage in such missions, and added the conclusion that "the US views peace operations as a means to support our national security strategy, not as a strategy unto itself" (White House 1995a, 16-17).

The Clinton administration's 1995 *National Military Strategy* also affirmed the use of the military in peace operations. The previous version, published in early 1992, had cited deterrence as the primary purpose underlying American military strategy. The 1995 edition marked the first time the recurring document emphasized peace operations. It outlined a more active strategy of flexible and selective engagement in which the armed forces would fight wars, deter aggression, and sustain peace. While deterring a nuclear attack and preparing to fight and win the nation's wars remained higher priorities, the document pointed out that with tens of thousands of American troops engaged in a variety of non-combat activities, peacetime engagement had become another primary military task (Graham 1995).

The peace operations theme in the Clinton administration's approach to the military continued in the later 1990s (see Perry 1996; JCS 1997a; White House 1998). An effort to reform the approach of the executive branch as a whole towards peace operations and other contingencies reinforced this direct influence on the military. In 1995, the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces had pointed out that

several emerging mission areas demanded attention from the Federal Government generally, not just from the Department of Defense: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, information warfare, peace operations, and OOTW (CORM 1995, ES-4). In May 1997, the Clinton administration published PDD-56, "Managing Complex Contingency Operations." With this initiative, the administration planned to coordinate the civilian and military components of response efforts through integrated planning and effective management. PDD-56 required the formation of an Executive Committee to supervise the management of American participation in complex contingency operations, the development of integrated political-military plans, and after-action reports following operations. Most significantly for the military, it required an annual interagency training program for which the National Defense University and the Army War College assumed the military responsibility (White House 1997). With PDD-56 in place, the military was not just being encouraged to adopt peace operations, it was tasked with managing the training of other agencies for those situations. As a result of these policy changes and directives, civilian authorities provided the incentive for a reevaluation of military doctrine. Much as the Kennedy administration did in the 1960s, the Bush and Clinton administrations made learning and change "desirable."

### **Possibility**

While urgency and desirability are important for initiating an organizational learning cycle, it is the possibility of learning that determines whether it will complete that cycle. The possibility of learning is a function of the state of knowledge or the available experience from which the organization can draw. It is also a function of the opportunities for gathering the data necessary to develop a knowledge base (Goldman

1997, 46). While the army entered the 1990s with little available experience in peace operations, it had several opportunities to develop a knowledge base—opportunities I will examine in following sections. In this section, I outline a factor that enhanced the possibility for learning and change in the 1990s: the army lessons learned system. This institutional development had the ironic effect of turning standard operating procedures from an obstacle to change into a force for change.

For most of the army's existence, no organized lesson learning took place. This is not to say that commanders did not learn from experience. They did, but informally. Although in its simplest sense military lesson learning applies experience to improve performance, the modern process is complex and above all, institutional. Organizational procedures now guide the process under the supervision and administration of designated executive agents, and both the procedures and responsibilities are formally prescribed. While informal lesson learning programs were developed in World War I and World War II, it was not until the Korean War that procedures and responsibilities were codified. Even the formalized systems of the Korean War and the Vietnam conflict did not survive beyond the particular war that gave it life (Vetock 1988, 6).

Vietnam's operational experiences produced an unprecedented outpouring of lessons. The two main military commands there, Military Assistance Command-Vietnam (MACV) and United States Army-Vietnam (USARV), as well as the Department of the Army in Washington all produced, reproduced, and distributed material gathered from the region. However, there were several problems with these lessons. First, most of these "lessons" rarely directly confronted established army doctrine. Recurring assurances appeared throughout the literature that the fundamentals of current combat

doctrine remained sound. Second, while commanders in Vietnam received a continual source of current ideas, these could be implemented or ignored, because the literature was informative, not directive. Although lessons were plentiful, they were not necessarily learned. Third, the rest of the army ignored lessons coming out of Vietnam. As we have seen in previous chapters, the institution often simply did not accept the lessons emanating from within its own ranks. Finally, like lessons learned programs of the past, the process did not survive the conflict. As early as 1970, both MACV and USARV had relegated the selection and distribution of lessons to minor status (Vetock 1998, 114). The end of the war in Vietnam meant the end of the wartime system of lesson learning. The procedures and system for collecting and distributing lessons simply faded away in disuse and disappeared in the structural change and doctrinal realignment that followed the war. As a result of these several problems, one pair of observers lamented the state of lesson learning in the Vietnam era (Enthoven & Smith 1971, 306-8):

There was no systematic analysis in Vietnam of the allocation of resources to the different missions of the war and no systematic analysis of the effectiveness and costs of alternative military operations. US military operations in Southeast Asia have been notable for a lack of systematic learning from experience.

In 1973, the army created Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and in doing so created an ideal institution for operating a centralized lesson learning system. However, the initial focus of the command was training and, according to a former commander, the TRADOC staff was “weak on conceptual work” (Starry 1983, 25). This weak spot led him to create a doctrinal development staff under a deputy chief of staff for doctrine. This officer was responsible for “identifying the need for change and for describing the conceptual framework of the change itself” (Starry 1983, 25). To assist

him in identifying the need for change, in 1985 TRADOC established the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) at Fort Leavenworth. At first, CALL focused on deriving lessons from unit experiences at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California. But the success of the National Training Center in developing army heavy forces led to the creation of other combat training centers: the Joint Readiness Training Center for light forces now at Fort Polk, Louisiana, and the Combat Maneuver Training Center at Hohenfels, Germany. The focus of CALL grew as the combat training center concept grew and evolved and as actual operations pointed to the need for operational lessons. As a result of contingencies in the 1980s, CALL developed a Wartime Army Lessons Learned Program so that CALL could also collect lessons from anywhere the army executed a combat mission or contingency operation (Sloane 1993).

Today, CALL produces after-action reports for each operation or major exercise and collects, stores, and disseminates lessons to the active and reserve components of the army. The center, which normally sends its own team to an operation, documents events and provides specific recommendations for improvement. It is through its observations and recommendations that command and control procedures, planning and staff supervision techniques, organizational structures, and other functions are improved and enhanced (Hardesty & Ellis 1997, 17).

Furthermore, importantly for the purposes of this study, CALL lessons and reports are important elements in instigating the development of new doctrine for the army. TRADOC listed the reasons for revising or writing new doctrinal publications as (Abbott 1998): policy changes, such as new national security or national military strategy documents, or new presidential decision directives; after-action reports from exercises;

lessons learned on real world operations; changes in other doctrinal publications; senior leadership guidance; directed consolidation of publications, or routine reviews. In 1989, Army Regulation (AR) 11-33 instituted CALL's contribution to the development of doctrine. It established the lessons learned program as a system for "the collection, analysis, dissemination, and implementation of combat, training, and materiel testing experiences with associated combat relevant lessons learned into Department of the Army doctrine, organization, research, development, acquisition, training, planning, and other appropriate activities" (AR 11-33 1989, 1.1).

The regulation required CALL to collect observations from operations and exercises, and required army commands to forward after-action reports to CALL. It required CALL to analyze these data and recommend changes to army "doctrine, training, organization, materiel, and leadership" (AR 11-33, 1.5). The affected army commands and schools review these recommendation which TRADOC then integrates into an issues resolution process such as the TRADOC Remedial Action Process, the Army Remedial Action Process, or the Joint Remedial Action Process. Within these processes, staff agencies compare issues to existing action-items and, if they are not redundant, send them to the appropriate service or command for action (CALL 1993, ii). Within the army, for example, the various branch schools are the proponents of doctrine for their branch, the Combined Arms Command at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is the proponent for FM 100-5, *Operations*, and the Peacekeeping Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, is the proponent for FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*. AR 11-33 further requires proponent agencies to change doctrine, training, organization, materiel, and leadership based on appropriate lessons learned.

While imperfect, the army's lesson learned program won praise from official observers as the most effective program within the armed services. A 1995 Government Accounting Office (GAO) report criticized the Joint Staff and all services, except the army, for poor use of lessons learned. The report identified the army as "the only service that analyzes lessons learned information to identify recurring weaknesses" which "can be addressed through changes to such areas as doctrine, training and education, tactics, leadership, and materiel (GAO 1995, 10, 21). The report identified weaknesses within the army program, but even these weaknesses highlight the important point that lessons learned are being used to influence changes in doctrine (GAO 1995, 31):

Primary users of Army lessons learned information are the Training and Doctrine command's 18 schools, which develop training programs for Army personnel in their military specialties and tactical units. These schools are ultimately responsible for using lessons learned information to modify training and doctrine. Even though officials at several schools told us that they used lessons learned information to develop training plans and to update doctrine, they said that they did not keep track of how training and doctrine were modified based on this information.

Still under improvement during the mid- and late 1990s (see TRADOC Reg 11-13 1996; AR 350-28 1997), the lessons learned program in the early 1990s was viable enough to tie operations, lessons, and doctrine together during a period of doctrinal innovation (Allard 1995b, 108), and thus enhance the possibility for army learning and change. Whereas standard operating procedures are often impediments to change, by requiring army commands and schools to respond to lessons from operations and exercises, the lessons learned program made at least the investigation of change a standard operating procedure.

## Learning in the 1990s

Given the favorable conjunction of domestic desirability, international urgency, and organizational possibility, we would expect to find instances of individual learning leading to organizational learning and change. In this section, I will examine instances of individuals encountering and dealing with anomalies, or making recommendations about how to deal with them. In the next chapter, I will outline the changes in doctrine, education and training that resulted from these instances of learning. Although I highlight the experiences of several individuals who contributed personally and directly to the learning process, one effect of the institutionalization of the lessons learned system is that it often renders observations anonymous. Therefore, it is not always possible to name the individuals involved in the initial learning situation.

This section examines three interrelated areas in which learning took place in Operations Provide Comfort and Restore Hope: doctrine, operational integration, and medical operations. Military personnel involved in those operations produced dozens of after-action reports and lessons learned reports containing thousands of observations, recommendations, and “lessons learned.” These run the gamut from the broad questions of doctrinal philosophy to operational minutiae (e.g. the need for steerable antennas during convoy movements or the optimal structure for postal companies).

### *Learning about Doctrine and Training*

Operations Provide Comfort and Restore Hope stimulated significant discussion and innovation in doctrine and training within the army, the details of which I explore in the next chapter. In this section, I review the reports and opinions of army leaders and other observers regarding the closely linked topics of doctrine and training. Some of



these present ideas about what should or should not be done by the army; others simply call for something to be done. The next section on operational coordination and integration deals with specific solutions to problems encountered during the missions.

Operation Provide Comfort was fundamentally a military undertaking, dominated by military forces. But its primary tasks were emergency relief in a remote region, establishing a security zone, and moving and settling refugees in that zone. Only the second task was purely in the domain of traditional military operations. The military forces participating in Operation Provide Comfort had to adapt their combat skills to the mission. We should not be surprised, then, to find that the most common "lesson learned," observation, or complaint was that there was no doctrine to support the conduct of an operation like Provide Comfort.

Observers on the ground during the operation noticed that because of the hasty nature of the operation and lack of long-range goals, commanders in the area had to establish their own procedures. Implied tasks had to be deduced from the sketchy directions of senior military and political leadership and solutions worked out in the middle of operations (Brown 1995, 56). As related in chapter six, the units and soldiers who deployed to Turkey and northern Iraq in early 1991 encountered considerable challenges during Provide Comfort. They deployed on short notice, with little preparation and virtually no planning. They had no formal doctrine, no prepared contingency plans, nor training specifically for humanitarian assistance operations. So each formation had to hit the ground running, developing plans as they went. They applied their combat training to assess the situation, establish the command and control required to manage the flow of relief supplies, build shelters and transit camps, and

provide security for the operation in a potentially hostile area. Several unnamed officers interviewed during the operation by a representative of the Center for Military History suggested that if they were going to undertake humanitarian assistance operations in the future they needed to develop doctrine for it, with supporting publications (Rudd 1993, 381). While the lack of a formal doctrine for humanitarian or peace operations did not prohibit leaders and soldiers from adapting to the situation in the mountains of northern Iraq, Rudd's observation of the mission led him to point out that leaders and soldiers would perform better with access to formal doctrine than without it (Rudd 1993, 439-440).

As a result of these sorts of field notes, after-action reports consisting of hundreds of pages of observations and recommendations would include as their most significant finding the fact that there was no military doctrine that could have been applied in the operation. For example, the Special Forces' report stated (USAJFKSWCS 1992, 7, 50):

There currently is no doctrine nor guidance to support the conduct of Humanitarian Assistance operations. Operation Provide Comfort was conducted using current doctrine, adjusted to meet the requirements on the ground. Doctrine, or at a minimum, published guidance must be formulated to support future operations . . . Neither Joint Service nor US Army doctrine exist for refugee-type operations. Provide Comfort demonstrated a need for a doctrinal publication to provide guidance to commanders and staffs delineating planning factors, responsibilities, and methods.

While this report would not have circulated much beyond the Special Forces community on its own merits, the army's lessons learned system ensured that it would receive wider attention. The observations quoted above were repeated almost verbatim in the first CALL report on the operation (see CALL 1992, 18), which was prefaced by the

following statement by General William Nash, Deputy Commander for Training at the Combined Arms Command (Nash 1992):

The remarkable changes in Eastern Europe have signaled the beginning of a dynamic period for the Armed Forces and especially for the US Army. With the ever-increasing problems in the Third World, contingency operations will gain emphasis. These changes will impact upon every member of the Total Force and require a review of doctrine to ensure our preparedness for future operations, especially humanitarian assistance operations.

Similarly, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance after-action report listed the “major lesson learned” from Operation Provide Comfort as the need for military doctrine for complex international emergencies and humanitarian relief efforts (OFDA 1991, iii, 15).

Without any warning or guiding doctrine, most of the units that participated in Operation Provide Comfort did not have the opportunity to prepare specifically for that type of operation. Many who deployed would have appreciated an opportunity to conduct specialized training, but as we will see, not all army leaders involved believed it was essential. For example, General Garner, commander of Task Force Bravo, saw the training conducted in northern Iraq as compatible with wartime tasks. During General Colin Powell’s visit to the region, Garner had each unit discuss the conventional training value of the operation in their briefings (Rudd 1993, 397).

However, Lieutenant Colonel John Abizaid, who commanded an infantry battalion during the operation, expressed a somewhat different opinion in a *Military Review* article entitled “Lessons for Peacekeepers.” His battalion had some warning before deploying to Turkey, and during that period they analyzed the likely missions and developed a crash predeployment training program. It focused on regular military tasks such as countermine operations and checkpoint drills, and added a technique he called a

“flying checkpoint,” especially designed for operations in northern Iraq. In this maneuver, mobile units would move forward to key intersections in areas where armed Iraqis or Kurdish guerrilla fighters were known to operate and set up a hasty roadblock to disrupt unauthorized or unwanted military activity. A limited number of soldiers were designated to detain and search intruders while a sizable element stayed in fortified positions overlooking the checkpoint, with mobile forces available as reinforcements. Abizaid’s experience with predeployment training and peace operations led him to conclusions somewhat at odds with his superior officers (Abizaid 1993, 19):

Preparations to be better prepared for the practical concerns of peacekeeping: First, we need to understand that peacekeeping is dangerous, stressful duty that requires highly disciplined, well-educated soldiers who understand the mission. This requires updating the doctrinal literature and getting it out to the field and the study of peacekeeping “campaigns” in our schools. We can also increase our understanding by establishing peacekeeping missions at the beginning or end of training center scenarios. We must never lose sight of the fact that every unit assigned peacekeeping duties must be able to fight. Well-trained combat units will always makes the most effective peacekeepers. But there is nothing to keep us from giving our leaders tougher rules of engagement and challenging them with realistic, ambiguous situations in training where decisions have to be made about the use of force.

The discussion over how the army should approach peace operations continued in the after-action reports from Operation Restore Hope in Somalia.

The army deployed to Somalia with little new doctrine. The few months since Operation Provide Comfort had not been enough time for much to happen in the slow-moving world of army doctrine. However, the army had begun to draft OOTW concepts into its most important doctrinal manual, FM 100-5, *Operations*.<sup>2</sup> A preliminary draft of the pertinent sections was available to army forces as part of a special publication

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<sup>2</sup> See chapter nine for a full discussion.

prepared by CALL (see CALL 1993b). The introduction of new doctrinal concepts stimulated further discussion of doctrine in after-action reports. From one perspective, Operation Restore Hope was not unlike a classic amphibious assault where troops deploy ashore and then secure various key locations. There were many elements of the operation that might be captured by “traditional” military missions and tasks, but there were also elements that were quite distinct from the traditional arena of military doctrine.

In his division’s after-action report and subsequent articles, Major General Steven Arnold, the commander of army forces in Somalia, emphatically stated that “units that are trained for war are prepared to conduct OOTW. Our warfighting doctrine works and only minor adjustments need to be made for these operations” (Arnold & Stahl 1993, 25; Tenth Mountain 1993, 27). He argued that combat maneuver missions were the key elements of Operation Restore Hope, with army units at all levels conducting operations that they were trained to conduct: air assault operations, search and attack, mounted and dismounted patrolling, and establishing checkpoints. He concluded one article by saying that he thought army doctrine was “about right,” with only minor adjustments needed for peace operations. The army needs to be versatile enough to adapt to any situation, which requires staying trained and ready for combat (Arnold & Stahl 1993, 25).

However, at other times, Major General Arnold took note of the inherent difficulties of OOTW and their differences from conventional operations (see Arnold 1993, 31-2). For example, he pointed to the need to add three concepts to his usual operational concepts of command and control, intelligence, fire support, maneuver, mobility, and combat support. In Somalia, he had to add force protection, external coordination, and information dissemination in order to deal with the complexities of

OOTW. The authors of CALL's main report on Operation Restore Hope were also of two minds about the state of doctrine. The section on doctrine first claimed that current training doctrine adequately supported OOTW since these operations required the same small unit tactics, techniques and procedures and control measures needed to effectively conduct security operations, patrolling, reconnaissance, operational security, and night operations. Another paragraph argued that emerging doctrine as reflected in the draft FM 100-5 was "properly focused." The only adjustment deemed necessary was that leaders should "adjust the mindset" of soldiers in executing OOTW. But just a few sentences later, the report concluded that "the army does need improved operational doctrine that addresses humanitarian, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement operations" (CALL 1993a, 13). This confusion is at least partially clarified by the discussion of training in the various post-mission reports.

In his reports and articles, Major General Arnold treated training issues similarly to doctrinal issues. His general observation was that while OOTW operations and peace operations may become large issues for the army in the future, realistic combat training prepared his division well for Operation Restore Hope and should provide well for any future operations (Tenth Mountain 1993, i). However, similar to his statements on doctrine, he qualified his training recommendations in certain areas.

He began by observing that individual and small-unit training prepared soldiers well for the kinds of missions encountered in Somalia. At the squad, platoon, company and even battalion levels, units conducted specific tasks that they were prepared to accomplish because of standard battle-focused training: patrolling, reconnaissance and surveillance, defense, attack, providing convoy security, operating checkpoints and

roadblocks, and conducting searches. Similarly, unit staffs at all levels performed all of the tasks inherent in commanding, controlling, sustaining, and employing their units in field operations. He reasoned, therefore, that army training programs already prepared soldiers to perform the tasks needed in peace operations (Arnold & Stahl 1993, 21-22).

It is interesting to note, however, that before deploying to Somalia, Major General Arnold insisted on intensified training and preparation for his division. Even though the Tenth Mountain had only recently participated in disaster relief operations in Florida after Hurricane Andrew, Arnold brought in Lieutenant Colonel Abizaid to help his troops better understand OOTW in general and appropriate checkpoint techniques in particular. He also brought in experts to discuss Somali culture and history (see Arnold 1993, 27; Bolger 1995, 289). Further, based on his division's experience, he identified several areas in which special training was required for the effective conduct of peace operations. Two of these were negotiations and the rules of engagement (ROE).

Major General Arnold's reports and articles described how the wide area of army operations in Somalia and the small number of State Department personnel required army officers to conduct negotiations with little political guidance. Army officers unexpectedly found themselves assisting village elders establishing councils and organizing security forces, communicating with warring faction leaders and establishing dialogues between factions, as well as establishing processes for disarmament (Tenth Mountain 1993, 13). Arnold also described ROE training as critical. Given the variety of combat and non-combat situations that army forces encountered, it was imperative that soldiers understood the ROE. They all had ROE cards and situational training exercises and vignettes continued throughout the operation (Tenth Mountain 1993, 14).

Arnold's concluding thoughts on training add nuance to his general observation that combat training would be sufficient for peace operations (Arnold & Stahl 1993, 22-3; see also Arnold 1993, 34-5):

Issues that were highlighted in recent peace operations should start to make their way into our institutional training programs. Leader development programs at noncommissioned officer schools and at officer professional courses should begin to address such topics as negotiating skills, cultural considerations, and managing rules of engagement. A sense of the complexity of OOTW should be introduced at combat training centers and in other training exercises. However, none of these suggestions can be allowed to detract from the principle purpose for which the Army exists and trains. Army soldiers and units must maintain their warfighting ethic and focus on combat-oriented skills.

Specific training in operations other than war should be focused at the staff and senior leader level. Leader training is needed to focus on such requirements as negotiations, UN operations, integration of all services and coalition forces, interagency operations, and operating with NGOs . . . . Predeployment training should include situational training exercises focusing on rules of engagement for all forces. Theater-specific training will be required to identify cultural issues, dangers unique to the region, other participants in the operation (military and civilian), and the types of operations that may be conducted.

Arnold's observations and recommendations were largely echoed by the other major after-action reports from CALL and the Montgomery Board which was established to review the entire Somalia experience.

CALL reports focused on recommendations for particular modifications to training programs. They called for a new focus on peace operations-specific skills. Many of these are police skills well-known by military police forces, but that needed to be extended to the force as a whole, such as searching detainees, riot control, and the use of riot control equipment. CALL products also recommended the increased use of situational training exercises, especially for ROE training, since they can vary by operation and situation (CALL 1993a; CALL 1993b).



Major General Thomas Montgomery commanded army forces in Somalia during UNOSOM II, after which the army assigned him to produce an after-action report on the entire Somali experience. He divided his recommendations for army training into two areas: regular training and predeployment training. Regarding regular training, he stated that officer and noncommissioned officer training and professional development programs should include training and education on OOTW. He realized this was an addition to an "already burdened" education system, and urged that it not be done at the expense of training on warfighting skills, but called it essential to prepare better for future operations. Arguing that both individual and collective training was needed to sustain a basic level of capabilities to execute OOTW missions, he recommended training designed specifically to address doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures involved in OOTW operations should be introduced at all levels of military education (Montgomery 1994, 68). He deemed negotiating skills important enough to recommend that they also be addressed at army professional education schools (Allard 1995, 72). Finally, he recommended enhancing individual and unit predeployment training by identifying minimum requirements for a particular operation or region, but certainly including ROE and local culture (Montgomery 1994, 71).

As we will see in chapter nine, what emerged from these lessons and observations regarding the appropriate doctrine and training for OOTW and peace operations was a training emphasis on regular combat skills for soldiers, combined with special predeployment training before peace operations to develop special skills, and enhanced peace operations education for officers. In the doctrinal arena, significant developments occurred to bring peace operations into the mainstream of army thinking.

*Learning about Integration and Coordination*

Perhaps the most significant lessons that came out of Operations Provide Comfort and Restore Hope revolved around the concept of the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC). It is difficult to overestimate the importance of this concept since its development represents the acknowledgement that the military is a participant in peace operations, but just one of several. As the United States military gained experience in large peace operations, one coordinating organization recurred across every operation since Provide Comfort. This is the CMOC, an entity developed by military officers in northern Iraq and Turkey to coordinate military and non-governmental organization (NGO) activities. While Civil Affairs officers in the army have always had the task of liaison with local authorities, the need for a CMOC had never arisen. When the army became involved in complex emergencies and the resulting peace operations in the 1990s, the need to interact and coordinate with NGOs quickly became apparent. NGOs are normally operating before American forces arrive in theater and remain after the military redeploy. They provide expertise, supplies and services which contribute to the overall mission. However, two general characteristics of NGOs raise problems for coordinating operations with the military. First, there are many NGOs and, second, they operate differently than the military.

Although the counts vary, it is estimated that some 28 NGOs participated in providing aid and services during Provide Comfort, a number that grew to 78 in Somalia, 170 in Rwanda, and over 400 in Bosnia and Haiti (Davidson et al 1996, chapter 3). The sheer numbers indicate the potential problems in integrating operations, but these are compounded by the inherent differences between humanitarian organizations and the

military (see Walker 1992; Findlay 1998, 128). The military emphasizes structure, hierarchy, discipline, and command and control. Informal, improvisational, egalitarian and consensual styles frequently characterize humanitarian organizations. Military units are materially and financially self-sufficient and logistically independent, while their humanitarian colleagues in peace operations are acutely aware of their dependence on donations and substantial material support.

On the other hand, the military requires massive logistical enterprises to operate in the field, while many NGOs can operate in conditions the military would never contemplate. Some NGOs have long experience in certain countries and close ties with the local populace, while military contingents often arrive without the correct maps and are required to forge relationships with an intimidated and suspicious population. The military emphasizes the establishment of a secure environment using their military capabilities, while NGOs see relations with the local populace as their best guarantee of safety. NGOs have different time horizons than the military. Humanitarian organizations tend to take a long-term view of the needs of a given population. The need to sustain long-lasting relationships with the local populace and authorities is a priority. For the military, a quick fix, often driven by a time-limited mandate, is the focus. The military is ready to use the sheer weight of its presence and the threat of force to achieve objectives, while humanitarian agencies are necessarily limited to painstaking cooperative efforts.

These differences often produced negative perceptions about the two types of organization, further complicating the task of coordinating activities. Many in the military viewed NGOs as disorganized, inefficient, incompetent, over-educated, self-righteous and anti-military. On the other side, NGO personnel often wanted to avoid

contact with dominating, bureaucratic, inflexible, overzealous killers. This personal contempt was often mixed with concern that relief agencies' status as neutral actors would be jeopardized by relations with the military (see Dworken 1993, 37-40; Taw 1997, 20-27).

Operation Provide Comfort was a watershed event in military-NGO relationships because it marked the first time that, despite different methods and motivations, they worked so closely together in pursuit of a common goal. There were three areas in which military units and NGOs interacted: in the rear of the operations in Turkey, in the mountain camps on the Turkish-Iraqi border, and in the transit camps in Iraq. In the mountain camps on the border, there was no time to set up formal organizations to assist in coordination. There were simply meetings between the soldiers and NGO personnel because meetings were necessary. Mutual stereotypes and initial tensions were overcome in the effort to stop the suffering of the Kurds. At the camp near Isikveren in Turkey, as NGOs arrived they were invited to attend a meeting held at 10:00am every morning. At first, it was mainly an exchange of introductory and location information. It developed into an exchange of information that allowed a comprehensive situation assessment in the camp. The synthesized information allowed all parties to track what was needed to stabilize the situation. The result was ad hoc coordination as organizations with particular expertise volunteered to take on appropriate tasks (Seiple 1996, 40-41).

In the rear, coordination was more formalized. At the headquarters at Incirlik, Turkey, army Brigadier General Donald Campbell established what would become a CMOC and became the senior coalition representative to the civilian groups, coordinating relief operations with them and with the UN, and providing formal briefings for the

combined task force commander (Rudd 1993, 280; Duff 1998, 16). Subordinate task forces also operated CMOCs. Closer to the operational area in Diyarbakir, army Lieutenant Colonel John Petrella assumed the task of NGO collaboration and coordination on 17 April 1991. Diyarbakir was the Turkish town nearest to the mountain passes holding the Kurdish refugees. As such, it was the initial staging point in Southeastern Turkey and a natural gathering spot for the NGOs. When Petrella arrived, there were no coordination meetings taking place other than NGO personnel talking at their hotels. The Turkish government had given the American embassy team an office building to use in downtown Diyarbakir, where Petrella invited interested participants to regular meetings. The meetings were voluntary and informal: listening to reports from each participant, developing priorities for the next day's activity, and matching the humanitarian expertise of the NGOs and the military logistics and infrastructure with the needs in the field (Seiple 1996, 43-44; Weiss 1999, 54).

In early May, this operation moved to Zakho in northern Iraq. As the first transit camps were completed outside of Zakho and refugees made their way out of the mountains, the need for NGO-military coordination there increased. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) officials and army Lieutenant Colonel Michael Hess went to Diyarbakir and convinced the NGOs to move their operations to Zakho. It was the Zakho CMOC that proved to be the pivotal point of coordination from the military's perspective since it provided for a transition from a mainly military operation to a civilian one. As in other locations, voluntary meetings were held daily. NGOs and Lieutenant Colonel Hess presented reports and unmet needs were divided among organizations. The Zakho CMOC's one mission was to support and facilitate the transition to a civilian-run

operation. In this, it succeeded. By the end of May, CARE took over responsibility for food distribution, other NGOs were taking over the administration of the camps, and by 4 June 1991, the CMOC shut down (Seiple 1996, 50). The NGOs set up their own organization, the NGO Coordinating Committee for Northern Iraq that would ensure refugees were provided appropriate services until indigenous systems could assume responsibility (Duff 1998, 17).

NGO evaluations of Operation Provide Comfort suggest that the relationship between the military and the NGOs was mutually beneficial. The CMOC integrated NGOs into the management of the operation and facilitated their use of military transport and communications capabilities (Shackelford 1995, 212). This new experience with coordination has had a lasting impact on the military by increasing the appreciation of the role of NGOs. One lesson that came out of northern Iraq was the principle of “altruistic self-interest.” In NGO-military coordination, each side had something to offer the other. The NGOs offered expertise and a ticket home; the military offered security, an infrastructure to address the situation, and the logistics to enable the response (Seiple 1996, 60). The military’s after-action reports reflected this overall lesson and called for its institutionalization, one report stating that the importance of the NGO role “in an operation in which the responsibility for the refugees was to be transferred to them cannot be overemphasized” (CALL 1992, 19).

Both the Special Forces and CALL reports recommended several steps in this area (see USAJFKSWCS 1991, 50, 114; CALL 1992, 18-20). First, as noted above, they called for doctrinal publications that would address operations like Provide Comfort. Such doctrine should distinguish purely military situations from those that entail

cooperation with civilian organizations and eventual transfer of control to these organizations. Supporting publications should also familiarize army personnel with NGOs and UN agencies by addressing their capabilities, missions, and the complications they induce for the military. The reports envisioned doctrine that would encourage military planners to integrate NGOs at the outset of an operation so commanders could gain and maintain their support. Integration and coordination would be accomplished via a CMOC staffed with representatives from all agencies. The CMOC would have access to senior staff and be involved in the planning for the transition from military to civilian organizations. The after-action reports further recommended that military training programs should include overviews of the identity, missions, capabilities, and limitations of NGOs. They saw senior leader training, especially, as needing to address the issues and problems involved in the coordination and integration of NGOs in a military operation.

Observers derived similar lessons from Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, but the relationship between the military and NGOs there was not as smooth as in Iraq. One author characterized military-NGO relations in just two words: "good enough" (Dworken 1993, 5). Cooperation was sufficient for both sides to accomplish their missions, but rather than providing a model for how to go about peace operations, several of the lessons coming out of Restore Hope showed what not to do in the future.

At first, it looked as though lessons learned in northern Iraq would help in Somalia. During preparations for deployment, the Director of Operations for UNITAF, Marine Brigadier General Anthony Zinni, directed the formation of a CMOC made up of Marines and army personnel (Kennedy 1997, 101). Zinni had served throughout

Operation Provide Comfort as chief of staff and deputy commander of the combined task force, and continued to serve as deputy commander of the follow-on Operation Provide Comfort II (Brown 1995, 24). Therefore, he was intimately familiar with the benefits of the CMOC model in promoting military-NGO coordination.<sup>3</sup> However, unlike Operation Provide Comfort, in which the military was the first international actor to respond in any significant form, UNITAF was deployed to Somalia in the midst of a well-established NGO presence that had been present, albeit in reduced form, continuously throughout the crisis. UN organizations and NGOs had already established a Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC). Since a coordination center already existed in Mogadishu, the UNITAF CMOC was collocated with the UN facility. The joint task force commander, however, set up his command center at the former American embassy compound. This separated the two facilities by a ten-minute drive. The collocation of the CMOC with the HOC had advantages and disadvantages. On the positive side, the NGOs viewed the physical presence of the CMOC at the HOC as the military's "reaching out" to the humanitarian community—an important first impression since many of the forty-eight NGOs did not know what to expect from the military. The collocation also allowed the important work of coordination and communication to occur; there was no other way of getting information to and from the NGOs (Seiple 1996, 114). On the other hand, the physical separation of the NGO headquarters and the military headquarters inevitably led to miscommunication and misunderstandings.

The HOC as a whole remained under the control of the UN while the CMOC, operating within the HOC was subordinate to the military's joint task force director of

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<sup>3</sup> General Zinni continued to advocate the importance of peace operations and military-NGO cooperation after these operations (see Zinni 1995).



operations. The CMOC director, Marine Colonel Kevin Kennedy, had a staff of about a dozen personnel. He initiated daily coordination meetings with NGOs on 11 December 1992, just two days after the task force came ashore. Thus, from the beginning of the operation, the CMOC was the place where NGOs interacted with the military—sharing information and requesting support. The CMOC staff assisted with military-NGO interactions in five main areas (Dworken 1993, 2):

- Escorting NGO convoys to protect them from looting by Somali factions and bandits.
- Providing security for NGO compounds, offices, and warehouses.
- Assisting the NGOs with humanitarian and civic affairs projects.
- Providing technical assistance in the form of studies to NGOs considering projects.
- Confiscating Somalis' weapons.

In the first four areas, different observers rated the cooperation between the two communities as adequate to good. CMOC personnel received requests for support from NGOs and coordinated them with the various UNITAF components. CMOC personnel also coordinated port access issues, developed a food logistics system for the region, and assisted NGOs with getting transportation on UNITAF aircraft. They acted as official spokespersons for UNITAF, promulgating and explaining UNITAF policy to the NGOs and providing daily briefings on UNITAF operations and the security situation (Davis 1996, 62). The fifth area—weapons confiscation policy—was more contentious, especially in Mogadishu. The joint task force policy of confiscating weapons caused a number of problems for the NGOs and the CMOC.

In many cases, the NGOs hired guards for their personal protection as well as security for warehouses where relief supplies were stored. Additionally, when vehicles were rented in Somalia, they often came with armed drivers. Soldiers manning checkpoints had difficulty differentiating between the guards or were not informed that

these people should receive any special dispensation from the weapons confiscation policy. The CMOC devised an identity card system which allowed the NGOs' guards to bear arms. This system initially failed because there were no pictures on the cards, and they were being freely passed to anyone. Eventually an enforceable policy evolved that was agreeable to the NGOs, but some soldiers did not get the word, and mistakenly confiscated weapons. Others, convinced that most guards became bandits at night, purposely confiscated their weapons (Dworken 1995, 17; Davis 1996, 62). The result was a great deal of frustration on the part of the NGOs and the CMOC, which became the agency responsible for issuing the identification cards and for returning confiscated weapons.

While cooperation between the military and the NGOs was very good at first, the weapons issue quickly soured relations in Mogadishu. Farrell (1995, 205) reports that as early as January, meetings involved bickering over the confiscation policy. By all accounts, the CMOC personnel did everything possible to contribute to a cooperative atmosphere, but their efforts were hindered by the separation of the two headquarters and differing perceptions about the mission of the military force. The official CENTCOM account of Operation Restore Hope perhaps reflects the military headquarters attitude when it states that mission accomplishment was only possible through "tedious" cooperation and coordination (Hines 1994, 43). The complex relationships in Mogadishu also played a role. The Mogadishu CMOC served as both the national coordination center and the Mogadishu center. Security in Mogadishu was the responsibility of the Marines. They viewed the CMOC with some disdain, accusing CMOC personnel of having it easy and lacking the mission focus appropriate for warfighters (see Seiple 1996,

120). This attitude was exacerbated by the fact that the Marine unit had little contact with the NGOs, insulated as it was by the CMOC personnel who were drawn from the headquarters staff. Consequently, while the Marine unit in Mogadishu focused primarily on the security aspects of the mission, the CMOC personnel were more concerned with the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The result was a deteriorating relationship between the two communities, as tensions in operations on the streets of Mogadishu did not match the cooperative attitude within the CMOC.

Evidence from the rest of UNITAF operations in Somalia supports the contention that separated headquarters contributed to problems. In the other eight Humanitarian Relief Sectors, the relationship did not experience the same antagonisms. In these locations, the NGO and military headquarters were collocated, and the CMOC/HOC served as the focal point for all military and humanitarian operations in that sector. Cooperation was further forced upon the NGO and military communities as there were not enough UN and Department of State personnel to man every CMOC/HOC, so military and NGO personnel filled the gaps (Tenth Mountain 1993, 76; Kennedy 1997, 104). Since commanders of the units responsible for a particular sector were in close communication with NGOs through the daily CMOC/HOC meetings, there was less chance for misunderstanding (Dworken 1995, 16).

To summarize CMOC operations in Somalia, the commanders of the joint task force recognized the importance of working with the NGOs. Very early in the planning cycle, they articulated the need for an institutionalized arrangement to bring together the humanitarian and military organizations. Drawing on his experience in Iraq, Brigadier General Zinni organized a CMOC as the centerpiece of military-NGO coordination.

While overall relations between UNITAF and the humanitarian community were reasonably good, there was much room for improvement, and some observers were highly critical of aspects of the CMOC operation. Therefore, we should not be surprised to find that many of the observations, recommendations, and lessons learned from Restore Hope focused on this aspect of the operation.

CENTCOM's accounts noted that the operation was complicated by the fact that the military did not control the relief supplies, the organizations distributing them, or the policies of those organizations. Coordination and cooperation with those organizations were thus essential (Hines 1994, 38). Several other reports commented that the CMOC was one of the most important initiatives of the operation without which problems would have been much greater. They argued that the concept should be captured doctrinally and institutionally for future use in similar operations and held up as the basis for specific operational planning (Arnold & Stahl 1993, 17; Dworken 1993, 44; Kennedy 1994, 114; Allard 1995, 69). The army did recognize the importance of capturing the Somalia experience and took immediate action on this issue. Upon his return from Somalia, Major James Nelson, who served as the operations officer in the Mogadishu CMOC was sent to the Air-Land-Sea Application Center at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia to help write FM 100-23-1, *Multiservice Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance*, which we will review in the following chapter (see Davis 1996, 39).

Observers and participants also echoed lessons from Provide Comfort regarding education and training. CENTCOM's summary document noted that Restore Hope was a different type of military operation that required different kinds of military training (Hines 1994, 42). One senior officer complained that the troops were poorly informed

about the mission and functions of NGOs and their role in relief operations. He noted that "if we can train our troops on the identity and capabilities of the T-72 tank, we certainly can educate them about the missions and functions of NGOs" (Lorenz 1993, 39). The Mogadishu CMOC director also spoke to the need for training, although he added that both military and NGO personnel need training on each other's methods, operations, and capacities (Kennedy 1994, 115).

Critics of the CMOC in Somalia pushed for even more fundamental changes in the military approach. Seiple (1996, 118) charged that in Somalia the CMOC did not live up to its name:

It was not an operations center where people solved problems at the same table. Instead, it had become a liaison center. Despite the best of intentions, the Mogadishu HOC/CMOC was twice removed from reality. Not only did the CMOC have to coordinate with local military forces through the UNITAF staff; decisions made about NGO security were removed away from the NGOs to a faceless chain of command.

He, and others, argued that in a peace operation, the CMOC must be elevated in status and legitimacy within the military culture. The best people should be assigned to it and have unlimited access to the task force commander. If for no other reason than self-interest, the CMOC must become the priority because it represented the military's best chance to design and control its exit strategy through close coordination with the NGOs. It must become the military's "focus of main effort" (Dworken 1993, 44; Seiple 1996, 136).

#### *Learning about Support Issues*

In peace operations, issues not usually regarded as central concerns of the army became more important than they might be during combat operations. Engineering, military police, and medical personnel tended to play a larger role in peace operations.

While not as central to the army as infantry divisions and FM 100-5, the lessons learned regarding medical issues demonstrate the breadth of the effect of peace operations on the institution as a whole. In addition to the observations about peace operations that affected the army's core doctrine and training programs, these operations also had a significant effect on the Army Medical Department (AMEDD). In this section, I touch briefly on these lessons and observations. In the next chapter, I outline some of the AMEDD responses to these experiences.

The AMEDD's wartime mission is to support the operational commander by conserving the fighting strength of the force so that he can accomplish the military mission. Many OOTW missions, especially peace operations such as the two under consideration, entailed broader medical support requirements than combat operations for three main reasons (Davis et al 1996). First, the patient population tended to be much broader, with more diverse treatment needs. In addition to American troops, army medical units were called upon to treat local civilians, refugees, troops of coalition partners, and employees of government agencies, the UN, or NGOs. These patient groups varied more than army troops in their health status, age structure, proportion of females, and type of acute or chronic medical conditions requiring treatment. These differences meant that army medical units were called upon to provide a broader range of services in these operations. In peace operations, the demand for medical services was often closer to what a community hospital would face, compared to a medical hospital in support of combat operations, geared primarily toward trauma and emergency care.

Second, other available medical assets were often non-existent or deficient. The existing medical infrastructure of host nations was not available in Turkey and needed to

be reconstituted in northern Iraq. In Somalia, the infrastructure was insufficient to begin with and had suffered neglect and destruction during the civil war (Allard 1995, 84). Coalition partners' medical assets were also often inadequate for the missions. As a result, the United States felt compelled to compensate for these differences by filling the gaps in the medical system during a particular operation. Finally, most peace operations had a humanitarian component, including public health actions or prevention. In such situations, the army found itself providing medical supplies, community health services, public health education, and even basic equipment to shore up the local medical infrastructure. Situations involving refugees, such as Operation Provide Comfort, required potable water and sanitation, adequate nutrition, and appropriate immunizations (Sharp et al 1994, 388).

These considerations undermined the key assumptions upon which the army's medical support system is founded. That system was designed specifically to support American troops. These troops were further assumed to represent a healthy, young, and predominantly male population. The expectation was that they would have a high level of medical readiness and preventive medical support, minimizing the number of acute and chronic conditions that would require treatment during a mission. Deployable army medical facilities, therefore, prepared primarily for trauma and surgical care (Davis et al 1996). They had minimal quantities of the emergency medications or supplies required by disaster-affected populations, such as oral rehydration salts and pediatric supplies (Sharp et al 1994, 388). In accordance with the system's design and assumptions, the plan during both Operation Provide Comfort and Restore Hope was for the army's medical resources to support American forces. However, because of the basic nature of

peace operations, medical mission creep was inevitable. This gave rise to several observations and lessons learned.

In general, participants and observers noted that, like most branches, the army medical forces were not configured for involvement in peace operations (Rudd 1993, 313; USAJFKSWCS 1992, 8). They recommended medical doctrine and training development for peace operations in general, and made several specific recommendations. For instance, in line with the recommendations reviewed above for the integration of task force personnel and NGO personnel, one report noted that doctrine and training governing the interface between civilian volunteer medical organizations such as Medecins Sans Frontiers and military medical personnel needed to be developed (CALL 1992, 6). Another bemoaned the lack of training in humanitarian situations and urged the army to develop a cadre of health care providers with recent experience or training in emergency relief, preferably in concert with the principal medically oriented NGOs (Sharp et al 1994, 389). Still other reports called for improved medical intelligence that could help medical units prepare for deployment by tracking existing medical facilities and indigenous diseases (Allard 1995, 84). This sort of intelligence should be complemented by readily available information on the medical and cultural suitability of certain supplies. The basic army field ration, for example, was used to feed the Kurds during Operation Provide Comfort. While the religious problem of rations containing pork was perhaps unavoidable in a starvation situation, the medical concern about detrimental results was real. Providing very high calorie food with a high concentration of salt to dehydrated or malnourished people, particularly children, is potentially dangerous (Sharp et al 1994, 388).



Other support units largely repeated the observations, recommendations, and lessons learned by the army medical units. Engineers and military police found their skills and expertise more important and more in demand in peace operations. The army's experience in peace operations which seemed to require more from support units than from combat units raised questions about how it should respond to the lessons of the early 1990s. While individual observations about doctrine and training, problem solving in the CMOC and recommendations about medical preparation stimulated organizational responses, as we will see in the following chapter, they also provoked organizational resistance.

### **Military Opposition to Peace Operations**

Military opposition to the emphasis on peace operations as a military mission, even a secondary one, began as soon as interest in them increased in the early 1990s. Adequately preparing the army for a role in peace operations would require changes in doctrine and training, and lobbying for such changes was problematic for two reasons (Taw & Leicht 1992, 2). First, in a time of budget cuts and army reductions, the army wanted to lose as little conventional combat capability as possible. Therefore, devoting resources to nonconventional capabilities met resistance. Second, the army's performance in the Gulf War demonstrated the efficacy of its traditional combat-oriented approach, rendering the argument for change more difficult to make. Senior officers initially resisted the idea of participation in peace operations but, after these operations became part of national policy, the military leadership turned to warning about the detrimental effects of such operations on military readiness and capability.

Before peace operations became an issue for the Bush administration, it was being debated in military and policy circles. In an October 1991 speech at a Fort Bragg, North Carolina symposium reviewing Operation Provide Comfort, General John Shalikashvili stated (quoted in Rudd 1993, 424):

It is often argued that because the world is changing, we in the military should include preparation for operations like [Provide Comfort] in our training. I think that is wrong. If we train for our primary mission, we will have the skills needed to support something like this.

Other generals echoed this ambivalence about humanitarian missions. In early 1992, Marine Lieutenant General Martin Brandtner, director of operations for the JCS, expressed concern that quick infusions of relief could drag into lengthy and costly commitments. He concluded that while such operations could be expected from time to time, “we don’t seek the mission” (quoted in Schmitt 1992a). Defense analysts also questioned whether the military was the appropriate organization for the humanitarian aspect of peace operations. They feared turning the armed forces into another social services agency (see Schmitt 1992b). Early military resistance to developing its expertise for peace operations was also reflected in the complaints of advocates of such change (Snider & Taylor 1992):

Despite the urgent need for change, efforts since WWII at reshaping US military forces have failed to integrate military capabilities of the separate services to effectively “wage peace.” We must begin serious public discussion of these roles and begin training for such missions before our ineptness at waging peace accidentally precipitates a war. The first—and perhaps most important—step is to overcome the refusal of all the services to prepare for peacekeeping operations. Where are the forces—specially selected, organized, equipped and trained—to conduct such difficult and sensitive military operations? We don’t have them. The claims of service leaders that such missions are “non-military” or that they taint the “warrior ethic” are pure foolishness and ignore the needs of the nation.

Once the Bush administration turned its attention to Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for Peace*, General Colin Powell, then Chairman of the JCS, expressed his opposition to full American participation in UN operations. His view was that the United States should only contribute its "unique" capabilities, while ground forces and equipment could be provided by other countries (Daalder 1996, 38). Powell and other opponents of extensive peacetime military missions were concerned that such missions would undermine the military's warfighting capabilities by draining limited resources into peace operations that were better left to other agencies. Feeding this general opposition to participation in peace operations was the unhappy prospect of deploying American troops to Bosnia in some sort of peace enforcement operation.

During the summer of 1992, military officers and officials repeatedly expressed their concerns about a Bosnia mission, adding to the case against peace operations in general. Pentagon personnel publicly made the case against military intervention in the former Yugoslavia (Gellman 1992a):

Senior Pentagon officers and defense planners said that seizing the airport and distributing relief supplies would be far more complex and costly than is generally understood. Rejecting comparisons to the Persian Gulf War, one Army colonel likened Yugoslavia to "two parts Lebanon and one part Vietnam." The view here, said an official with top-level Pentagon thinking, "is it would be a quagmire."

In interviews with journalists and congressional testimony, they also expressed their more general concern that peace operations and combat operations do not mix. Despite the recent experience in northern Iraq and Bangladesh, doctrine and experience convinced them that they cannot be combatants and relief agents at the same time. Officers saw the neutral role of distributing humanitarian relief in conflict with the combatant role of using force to overcome resistance (see Gellman 1992b; Cusimano 1995, 5). They argued that

humanitarian aid missions require the consent of the local parties because those distributing aid are exposed to attacks. Overcoming resistance, even in order to distribute aid, leads to the soldiers being perceived as taking sides in a conflict. Once this neutral status was lost, the usually small forces deployed to relief missions would be at a tremendous disadvantage.

Then, in the fall of 1992, General Powell made an unprecedented foray into the foreign policy debate while still serving as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In what some called a challenge to the principle of civilian control of the military (see Weigley 1993), Powell publicly opposed intervention in the former Yugoslavia in particular and wars of limited aims in general. On the heels of President Bush's speech to the UN General Assembly in which he promised more American participation in peace operations, and in the midst of a presidential campaign in which then-Governor Bill Clinton was calling for a more active approach to Bosnia, Powell announced his views in a front page article in the *New York Times* and followed this with an op-ed piece in the same paper entitled "Why Generals Get Nervous." In those articles, he questioned limited forms of military intervention claiming that military forces are best used to achieve a decisive victory (see Gordon 1992; Powell 1992).

When the world's attention was drawn to the situation in Somalia, it was only with great reluctance that the senior Pentagon leaders assented to a military mission. They had unsuccessfully resisted involvement in the much smaller airlift operation during the summer of 1992, and had argued against several plans that had been proposed (see Krauss 1992; Oberdorfer 1992c; Menkhaus 1995). The main concern was that a military-backed relief mission could easily become overtly political and long lasting, once troops

came under fire from forces in the country. After the Pentagon leadership had expressed the opinion that an American operation in Somalia was “crazy,” the announcement by Admiral David Jeremiah, vice chairman of the JCS, that the military would not oppose a relief mission surprised most of the participants in the Deputies meeting (Sommer 1994, 30). The military leadership had apparently concluded that only a show of force could guarantee the delivery of relief supplies. One senior military official stated, “The military has been extremely conservative about getting involved in things like this. But how can you stand by and allow mothers and children to become piles of bones without it saying something about your humanity?” (see Krauss 1992).

Military opposition to involvement in peace operations continued when President Clinton took office, and strengthened as the situation in Somalia deteriorated. This continued opposition contributed to restrictive conditions placed on American participation in UN operations in PDD-25. At the same time, however, military resistance to limited interventions and peace operations began to be couched in less obdurate terms. From simple opposition, military leaders turned to differentiating between primary combat mission and secondary OOTW missions. This may have reflected the inevitability of peace operations in the post-Cold War world, or it may have been an indicator of concern within the Pentagon that OOTW would become the primary focus of the armed forces.

During the first days of the Clinton administration, military officials presented Pentagon contingency plans for the Balkans, but rejected them themselves as too risky, too costly, and probably ineffective. They portrayed Bosnia as a “dangerous and messy sinkhole” that could draw in American forces and make their exit problematic.

Additionally, General Shalikashvili, then commander of all American and allied forces in Europe, publicly warned about the difficulties that intervention would bring (see Healy 1993). As violence escalated in Somalia, Powell made another public statement regarding peace operations. This pronouncement left room for peace operations as a secondary military mission. Announcing the conclusions of the Defense Department's "Bottom Up Review" in September 1993 he said (quoted in Daalder 1994, 4):

Let me begin by giving a little bit of a tutorial about what an armed force is all about. Notwithstanding all of the changes that have taken place in the world, notwithstanding the new emphasis on peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace engagement, preventive diplomacy, we have a value system and a culture system within the armed forces of the United States. We have this mission: to fight and win the nation's wars. Because we are able to fight and win the nation's wars, because we are warriors, we are also uniquely able to do some of these other new missions that are coming along—peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, disaster relief—you name it, we can do it. But we never want to do it in such a way that we lose sight of the focus of why you have armed forces—to fight and win the nation's wars.

The October 1993 debacle in Somalia validated some of the military's arguments resisting any role in peace operations. Having cautioned against involvement, some officers took their case to the press. In an article entitled "Many in Military Angry over Clinton's Policies," they expressed their frustration with the State Department and the White House (see Serrano & Pine 1993). The Somalia incident's main effect was to energize opposition to the ambitious draft version of PDD-25 within the Department of Defense. Military officers and officials felt that the draft went too far in committing the United States to UN operations and argued that criteria about American participation should be included. They successfully lobbied for inclusion of criteria similar to the Weinberger Doctrine and the Powell Doctrine, listing conditions under which the United States would or would not participate in a peace operation (see Terry 1994, 122;

Stevenson 1996). As we saw above, the result was a document and a policy that framed peace operations as a part of national strategy, but not the centerpiece of that strategy.

Senior military leaders continued to counsel against engaging in peace operations in both Bosnia (see Gordon 1994 and Williams 1994) and Haiti. State Department officials complained that the Pentagon was throwing up unnecessary roadblocks for a mission to Haiti of which the military leadership was wary (see Sciolino 1993 and Gordon 1993). However, senior officers increasingly turned their attention to pointing out the negative consequences of such participation. Officers interviewed in the press worried that increasingly frequent and complex peace operations cut into combat training time and budgetary resources. They warned that without special appropriations, training would have to be curtailed in order to pay for the unexpected number of interventions (see Schmitt 1994).

Several officers responded negatively to the recommendations for changes in army training to meet the needs of peace operations. The anonymous author of a section of the CALL report on UNOSOM II argued that it was essential for the army to maintain its focus on warfighting and adapt as necessary to meet OOTW requirements. Given increasing operational demands and diminishing resources, units simply could not afford to allow OOTW requirements to "creep into" unit training requirements. His recommendation was to continue the training focus on warfighting capabilities and only conduct OOTW training once a unit was identified for a specific operation (CALL 1994, I-4-6). Lieutenant General Daniel Schroeder, deputy commander of army forces in Europe, commanded American forces during Operation Support Hope in Rwanda in

1994. He expressed a similar philosophy when he disagreed with calls for the army to dedicate a portion of its force to peace operations (quoted in Peters 1994, 42):

The armed forces of the United States should exist to fight and win the nation's wars. There are some unique things that we can bring to bear in a crisis to mitigate that crisis but when you do, you pay a readiness price. I think we need to stay focused on what's the purpose of the armed forces.

This became almost a mantra for the army leadership. As we have seen in the policy documents reviewed above, nearly every section on peace operations began or ended with the phrase: the primary mission of the armed forces is to fight and win the nation's wars. It was the constant refrain of General Shalikashvili in his tenure as Chairman of the JCS. When discussing peace operations in the press, he stated that "we need to be very careful that this does not become our way of life, that we remember that we are first and foremost to fight our nation's wars" (quoted in Komarow 1996). In his introduction to the 1997 National Military Strategy, entitled "A Military Strategy for a New Era," he tried to put the military's tasks in perspective (JCS 1997a):

While fighting and winning two nearly simultaneous wars remains the foremost task, we must also respond to a wide variety of other potential crises. As we take on these diverse missions, it is important to emphasize the Armed Forces' core competence: we fight. That must be the primary consideration in the development and employment of forces.

In sum, in the early 1990s, army leaders usually resisted participation in peace operations, fearing they would become "quagmires" from which the military would have difficulty extricating itself. As peace operations became a part of national foreign and security strategy, they modified their outright opposition to limited interventions. The modified opposition took three forms. First, senior army officers continued to argue against participating in the particular contingencies that arose; whether it was Bosnia, Haiti, Rwanda, or Kosovo, army officers would present the case for not launching an



American military mission. Second, their more general opposition consisted of trying to ensure that peace operations would not become a primary focus for the military. Finally, they continued to point out the negative consequences of such operations for the military. Calling attention to the deleterious effect of peacekeeping and humanitarian relief on military readiness for combat, general officers bolstered their case that the primary mission and training focus of the army should be warfighting.

### **Conclusion**

As we will see in the next chapter, the general opposition to peace operations among senior army leaders did not prevent changes from being made in doctrine, training, and education programs. Traditional explanations of change within military organizations clearly have difficulty fitting for these developments into their conceptions, focusing as they do on the difficulty of change and the necessity of civilian intervention. Learning approaches can account for change more easily with their learning cycle models and contextual factors that stimulate learning and change.

While military leaders were opposing American participation in particular operations during the 1990s, the experiences of army personnel in those operations were contributing to changes in doctrine and training programs. Conspiring against the army's senior leadership was a favorable conjunction of international developments, the domestic political environment, and institutional arrangements within the army. Urgency for learning and change increased as international crises demanded a response from the United States. Presidential interest in making peace operations an element of national strategy enhanced the desirability of change. Finally, the possibility for learning not only developed with increasing experience in peace operations, but was amplified by the

army's own lessons learned program which required the army to respond to operational lessons and recommendations. The lessons regarding doctrinal and training issues, the importance of integration with NGOs, and the increasing importance of support units to peace operations missions (e.g. logisticians, engineers, and medics), resulted in significant changes to doctrine and training programs.

## **Chapter 9 – Doctrine, Education, and Training in the 1990s**

### **Introduction**

As we saw in chapter eight, under the direction of Presidents Bush and Clinton, United States security policy evolved in the post-Cold War environment to encompass a wider range of interests and activities, making learning and change in army doctrine, education, and training politically desirable. At the same time, deployment to and experience in a series of peace operations provided the urgency and opportunity for the army to learn. After-action and lessons learned reports from those operations highlighted areas in doctrine and training where improvement was needed. In this chapter, I review the results of the army's learning process as it updated its most important doctrinal literature and adjusted training and educational programs.

Adjustments to training programs reflected the ongoing debate about the best way to respond to the demand for army participation in peace operations. Some maintained that specific units should be secured and trained solely for peace operations. The combined realities of a downsized army and an expanding number of peacetime engagements undermined this argument. Another argument was that there is no need to consider a separate training strategy for peace operations or OOTW since warfighting skills and procedures are easily modified for those missions. However, an increasing understanding of the differences between peace operations and combat has led most to agree that some kind of specialized OOTW training is necessary. The debate then revolved around different approaches to such training. To this point, the army has taken an approach that expands the capabilities of its fighting forces to accommodate the special challenges of contemporary peace operations (Hardesty & Ellis 1997, 5).

The debate in training methods also reflects the difficulties in doctrinal approaches. The differences in combat training and OOTW training are not dramatic. There are only a few truly different "skills," such as negotiating and military-NGO coordination. Many of the tasks are similar, if not identical: patrolling, searches, convoy operations, checkpoint operations, and so on. The key difference that many have come to recognize is that of attitude. The warrior ethos and the "spirit of the offense that characterizes the American soldier" (FM 100-5 1993, 2-0) does not fit easily into a humanitarian operation. Similarly, a peacekeeper's approach is not appropriate for a combat operation. Attempting to produce doctrine for a military organization engaging in peaceful missions has been a challenge for the army (see Joulwan 1994). This chapter reviews the army's response to this challenge in the areas of doctrine and education and training, noting especially the emphasis on direct responses to lessons from Operations Provide Comfort and Restore Hope. I also consider a counterargument—that the army has not learned from its early-1990s experience and is not changing. Finally, I suggest conclusions from the case study as a whole.

### **Doctrine**

Army operations in northern Iraq and Somalia reflected doctrine as set out in the 1986 version of its basic field manual for operations, FM 100-5 *Operations*. This publication, like most of its predecessors, placed a clear emphasis on seizing the initiative and offensive operations. As a result, the army adopted an aggressive approach in carving out security zones in northern Iraq and establishing control of southern Somalia. In the early 1990s, only doctrine produced for the Special Forces addressed non-combat operations and operations short of war. The only mention of peace operations was a

section on peacekeeping operations in an underused manual on Low Intensity Conflict. As we will see, however, experiences in the peace operations of the 1990s drove some remarkably rapid changes within army doctrine. The integration of OOTW into the 1993 version of the capstone FM 100-5 *Operations* doctrinal publication was especially significant, since it meant that such operations would be brought back into the purview of the army's mainstream conventional forces. In 1994, responding directly to the lessons of Operations Provide Comfort and Restore Hope, the army published two doctrinal publications specifically aimed at peace operations. FM 100-23 *Peace Operations* and its subordinate manual, FM 100-23-1 *Multiservice Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations*, developed the operational concepts set out in FM 100-5 and combined them with experiences from Iraq and Somalia. In this section, I outline the changes to these key manuals as well as developments in other publications.

### *FM 100-5 Operations*

Prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall, army doctrine writers based FM 100-5 *Operations* on offensively oriented battle principles<sup>1</sup> that focused on a potential conflict with Warsaw Pact forces. In the altered international context of the post-Cold War world, the army needed to pay more attention to OOTW. Experience in Panama and the emphasis on peace operations in policy circles drove a significant change in this self-described “keystone” doctrinal publication. The importance of this change cannot be overemphasized. FM 100-5 serves as the basis for all supporting army manuals, their tactics, and training strategies. It heavily influences the army education system, and army doctrine traditionally leads joint doctrine development (McCormick 1997, 3). The 1993

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<sup>1</sup> The principles of war: objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity (FM 100-5 1993, 2-4).

version included a separate chapter devoted to the unique operational principles in the different OOTW categories. The fact that “warfighting” doctrine included an entire chapter on OOTW was significant. The last time this had occurred was thirty years earlier when similar chapters were included in the 1962 version. The 1993 edition upheld the fundamental principle that the army’s primary focus is to fight and win the nation’s wars. However, it recognized that the army would often operate in an OOTW environment—wholly unlike the FM 100-5 versions of the 1970s and 1980s (see FM 100-5 1993, v-vi).

In the 1970s, the army left Vietnam and found itself facing the prospect of significant change. Organizationally, it would have to deal with a smaller, volunteer force. Tactically, the 1973 Arab-Israeli war demonstrated that the modern battlefield had become more lethal, and for many emphasized the need to turn away from the counterinsurgency model of Southeast Asia. Accordingly, the 1976 FM 100-5 focused on firepower in its concept of “active defense.” The 1982 FM 100-5 continued this trend, introducing the AirLand Battle paradigm with its primacy of the offensive and initiative. This manual also presented the notion of an operational level of war—the level linking tactical means with strategic ends. Four years later, the 1986 FM 100-5 sustained the manual’s operational focus. The 1982 and 1986 manuals were a distinct change for normally tactically focused Army doctrine (McCormick 1997, 4). In each of these three editions in the 1970s and 1980s, the focus was on two main types of operations—offensive and defensive, with references to joint or combined operations.

The introduction of the 1993 FM 100-5 marked an era of great change both inside and outside the army. Despite being touted as an operational manual, the 1993 version

adopted a more strategic focus and recast the army's approach to military operations. Fundamental army doctrine was linked to the strategic level of war, occasioning the inclusion of OOTW. The manual's strategic outlook broadened further the operational focus nurtured over the past decade. It extended its content to cover the full range of military operations in keeping with the wide latitude of military actions permitted by a reduced threat environment. The inclusion of a chapter on OOTW into the army's operational doctrine was a conspicuous change from previous manuals, and it included a discussion of peace operations. While OOTW missions are not new for the army and a similar concept had been included in the 1962 FM 100-5, critics charged that the reintroduction of OOTW into a warfighting manual would dilute the purpose of the doctrine. Proponents responded that its inclusion was an appropriate example of doctrine taking direction from national strategy, regardless of the type of activity involved (McCormick 1997, 6).

Accordingly, the 1993 edition described three diverse "environments" in which the army operates: peacetime, conflict, and war (FM 100-5 1993, 2-0). During peacetime, the United States attempts to influence world events through "those actions that routinely occur between nations." Conflict is characterized by "hostilities to secure strategic objectives," and war involves "the use of force in combat operations against an armed enemy." Since the three states are qualitatively different, each requires its own methods and activities (see Table 7). The manual's conception of operations is that during peacetime, political, economic, and informational aspects of national power take primacy, while the military assists in these roles and trains for conflict or war. In

conflict, the military instrument is engaged, but in a subordinate role to political, economic, and informational aspects of power. In war, the military takes precedence.

**Table 7 - Range of Military Operations.**

<b>States of the Environment</b>	<b>Goal</b>	<b>Military Operations</b>	<b>Examples</b>
War	Fight and Win	War	Large-scale combat operations Attack Defend
Conflict	Deter War and Resolve Conflict	Other Than War	Strikes and raids Peace enforcement Support to insurgency Antiterrorism Peacekeeping
Peacetime	Promote Peace	Other Than War	Counterdrug Disaster relief Civil support Peace building Nation assistance

Source: FM 100-5 1993, 2-1.

In addition to the army's usual treatment of the principles of war, the 1993 FM 100-5 also incorporated principles of OOTW: objective, unity of effort, legitimacy, perseverance, restraint, and security. While several of these are similar to the principles of war, the inclusion of legitimacy, perseverance and restraint points out that OOTW missions and roles often transcend the purely military. That these three principles were included highlighted that OOTW and especially peace operations are often multilateral, long-term efforts, which will include "restrictive, detailed, and politically sensitive" ROEs (FM 100-5 1993, 13-4).



Over the past twenty years, FM 100-5's operational life has been four to seven years. The events of the early and mid-1990s dictated revisions to the 1993 FM 100-5, and by mid-1997 doctrine writers at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, circulated the draft of a revised edition. The commanders of TRADOC and the Combined Arms Command had charged them with the task of developing a comprehensive doctrine which incorporated military activities short of war into the body of army operational doctrine. Accordingly, they directed that the term "OOTW" should be replaced by the concepts of support and stability operations (McCormick 1997, 7). The anticipated 1998 edition of FM 100-5 was never published. However, the work continued and a new draft circulated in early 2000 followed the early guidance from senior leadership.

Unlike the 1960s, when counterinsurgency concepts were removed from 100-5 after inclusion in only one edition, OOTW concepts were moving further into the mainstream of army thought—notwithstanding the new labels given the concepts. Whereas previous versions had failed to address OOTW or separated the notions of OOTW and war, the 2000 draft maintained that the army exists to compel, deter, reassure, and support. It asserted that in order to accomplish its assigned missions, army forces conduct four basic categories of operations: offense, defense, stability, and support. OOTW missions were elevated to a status almost equal to offense and defense.

According to one of the authors of the 1998 draft of FM 100-5, offensive operations carry the fight to the enemy. They are the decisive forms of warfare, the commander's ultimate means of imposing his will on the enemy. Defensive operations are those undertaken to cause an enemy attack to fail. Alone, they achieve no decision. They must ultimately be combined with or followed by offensive action. Stability

operations employ army forces to promote and protect American national interests by influencing political, civil, and military environments. The purpose of stability operations is to promote and sustain regional and global stability, thus incorporating almost all of what was referred to as OOTW in the 1993 FM 100-5 edition. Within this category, peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations are listed under the broader terminology of peace operations, which follows the FM 100-23 structure. Finally, support operations employ army forces to assist civil authorities at home or abroad as they respond to humanitarian or other crises by providing essential supplies and services (McCormick 1997, 7-9).

The 2000 FM 100-5 draft maintained that training for war is the primary focus of all army forces and that their primary role is to provide for the common defense. However, the draft emphasized the importance of “full spectrum dominance” which it defined as the ability to control the nature, scope, and tempo of operations in war and OOTW. To achieve full spectrum dominance, it expected army forces to conduct a combination of offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations (Flavin 2000). The draft took a more nuanced view of army operations than previous FM 100-5 versions, as it saw elements of these four types of operations in any contingency. War would be dominated by offensive and defensive operations but still include some elements of stability and support. Peace operations would be dominated by stability operations and potentially support operations, with less emphasis on defense, and much less on offense (see Figure 6).

War		Peace Operations		Humanitarian Assistance	
Offense	Defense	Stability	Support	Support	Stability
Stability	Support	Offense	Defense		Offense
					Defense

Source: Flavin 2000.

**Figure 6 - Nature of Modern Military Operations.**

### *FM 100-23 Peace Operations*

The 1993 edition of FM 100-5 was nearly completed when the increased frequency and complexity of peace operations indicated the need for immediate doctrinal attention. Army doctrine writers began considering the issue in detail after the January 1992 UN Security Council meeting which eventually resulted in Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for Peace* report (Rinaldo 1999). Concept papers, discussions, several drafts and lessons from ongoing operations—particularly Somalia—finally resulted in the publication of FM 100-23 *Peace Operations* in December 1994. Drawing directly from the lessons learned in Operations Provide Comfort and Restore Hope, this new doctrinal manual amplified the OOTW section in FM 100-5 and continued the broadening of the army's post-Cold War doctrine (Boyd 1995, 21). The scope of the manual and the army operations it contemplated were outlined in the introduction (FM 100-23 1994, iv):

*Peace operations* is a new and comprehensive term that covers a wide range of activities. Peace operations create and sustain the conditions necessary for peace to flourish. Peace operations comprise three types of activities: *support to diplomacy* (peacemaking, peace building, and preventive diplomacy), *peacekeeping*, and *peace enforcement*. Peace operations include traditional peacekeeping as well as peace enforcement activities such as protection of humanitarian assistance, establishment of order and stability, enforcement of sanctions, guarantee and denial of movement, establishment of protected zones, and forcible separation of belligerents.

Designed to provide guidance for soldiers and leaders executing the full range of peace operations, FM 100-23 addressed the environment of peace operations, principles and fundamentals of such operations, as well as planning and operational considerations, training, and supporting functions. As a 100-series, or capstone, manual, it served as the foundation for the development of subordinate manuals, training center exercises, training support packages, and service school curricula (FM 100-23 1994, iii).

The first chapter introduced the fundamentals of peace operations. It outlined three major types of operations: support to diplomacy, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. The discussion of the types of activities within these operations highlighted the role of lessons learned in Somalia in the development of doctrine. Support to diplomacy encompassed military activities such as forward presence, security assistance programs, and military-to-military contacts that could further preventive diplomacy or peacemaking initiatives by diplomats. Peacekeeping involved neutral military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute. The category of peace enforcement envisioned the application of military force, after international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions.

Early drafts of FM 100-23 portrayed these three types of operations on a spectrum ranging from lesser to greater amounts of force employed. However, events in the fall of 1993 in Somalia pointed out to the doctrine writers that there are other variables to be considered besides force, specifically consent and impartiality. The loss of the soldiers in Mogadishu prompted redrafting of the manual to capture the lesson that a task force engaged in a peace operation cannot slide back and forth along a spectrum of activities. Once an operation moves from the realm of peacekeeping to peace enforcement, as

occurred in Somalia, impartiality and consent are probably lost (see also Farrell 1995, 208-9). The final version of the manual insisted that the various kinds of peace operations “are not part of a continuum along which a unit can move freely. A broad demarcation separates these operations” (FM 100-23 1994, 12). It followed these statements with a discussion of force, consent, and impartiality—the critical variables for peace operations.

Succeeding chapters outlined the different command, support, and liaison relationships entailed in a variety of peace operations (e.g. unilateral, multilateral, UN, humanitarian assistance, etc.). They reviewed planning considerations such as force protection, legal issues, and media relations, and considered logistical and resource management issues. FM 100-23 also responded to other recommendations and lessons from Operations Provide Comfort and Restore Hope in five appendices. They included several items useful for prospective commanders and staff officers of future peace operations: sample rules of engagement, a sample campaign plan, and nearly thirty pages of text devoted to descriptions of the various organizations that might also participate in a peace operation. They briefly explained the organization, function, and capabilities of various UN agencies, United States Government agencies, and more than a dozen of the major NGOs. It also touched on the need for a CMOC, providing a generalized diagram, but leaving further explanation to tactical publications which we will examine below.

While, in the army taxonomy, humanitarian assistance is not a type of peace operation, FM 100-23 pointed out that it is often closely associated with peace operations. It contained a brief section on humanitarian assistance, but again left detailed

consideration of the topic to its subordinate manual which was under development at the same time.

*FM 100-23-1 HA: Multiservice Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations*

Doctrine writers at the Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, produced FM 100-23-1 in 1994 as a direct result of operations in Iraq, Somalia, and Rwanda, and the impending operation in Haiti added the final impetus for publication. The content of the manual was “heavily influenced” by the lessons learned reports put out by CALL (Modica 2000). As we have seen, after-action reports from both military services and civilian agencies identified the need for expanded procedures to enhance military and civilian interoperability in humanitarian assistance operations. As an implementing manual, subordinate to FM 100-23, this publication concentrated less on overarching concepts and more on tactics, techniques, and procedures (FM 100-23-1 1994, vi).

The manual responded to earlier recommendations by providing common definitions of principles and types of operations associated with humanitarian assistance. It also described the roles and functions of the various services, agencies, and organizations involved with humanitarian assistance at the policy and tactical levels. It provided techniques for coordination between a military joint task force and other organizations—the CMOC, as well as information to assist in planning and executing humanitarian assistance operations. Like FM 100-23, its subordinate manual included appendices dealing with potentially helpful information for task force personnel. They reviewed legal issues, NGO, government and UN agency functions, armed forces insignia for the benefit of civilian readers, and listed lessons learned from previous humanitarian

assistance operations. Its scope made it suitable for both planning and training purposes and its organization facilitated understanding of both political and operational considerations.

The first chapter presented an overview of humanitarian assistance. It defined terms, outlined different types of humanitarian operations, introduced the kinds of environments to expect, reviewed the FM 100-5 OOTW principles, and reminded readers about other factors in humanitarian assistance operations: funding and legal issues, media coverage, force tailoring, and cultural considerations. The second chapter discussed the roles and responsibilities of the principal governmental and military organizations involved in formulating policy responses to humanitarian crises. It presented an overview of entities such as the National Security Council, the Joint Staff, the Department of State, as well as the United Nations and its various agencies, and their relationships. The purpose was to familiarize task force commanders and staffs with the strategic-level organizations and their interactions in order to enhance the coordination process during a humanitarian assistance operation.

Chapter three moved to the operational level, outlining the contributions of the unified commands in shaping the mission statement and desired end state of a humanitarian assistance operation, and assembling a joint task force. It also touched on the other agencies acting at the operational level with which the unified command and the task force would interact: the Agency for International Development's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, the American embassy team, and NGOs. Appropriately for a manual dedicated to tactics and procedures, the longest chapter focused on the tactical level. Chapter four addressed factors for planning and executing a humanitarian

assistance mission, working through the predeployment, deployment, employment and termination phases of an operation. Lessons learned from recent operations contributed especially to this chapter (FM 100-23-1 1994, 4-0). It discussed predeployment factors such as area assessments, rules of engagement, logistics, and the campaign plan, listing thirty factors planners should consider, and using Operation Restore Hope's four-phase campaign plan as a suggested model for future operations.

In the employment section of chapter four, the authors of FM 100-23-1 discussed security, intelligence, and medical considerations, but most of the section dwelt on the critical factor of coordination with NGOs and other agencies. It placed special emphasis on the importance of establishing and maintaining a partnership with governmental organizations, UN agencies, and NGOs. To further that partnership, it encouraged commanders to share a variety of information with those agencies in daily meetings. The need for such partnership was one of the key lessons coming out of the operations of the early 1990s. As the number of NGOs participating in relief operations with the military expanded, the need for coordination became the main requirement for executing effective operations (see Smith 1996, 2). Since Operation Provide Comfort, all operations have fielded some form of CMOC as an adjunct to military command and control organizations. The CMOC has become a necessary element of military operations given the array of supplies and services supplied by NGOs in a peace operation and the unity of effort derived from such a center.

As mentioned earlier, Major James Nelson had served as the operations officer in the Operation Restore Hope CMOC. Upon his return from Somalia, the army detailed him to the Air Land Sea Application Center to assist in the writing of FM 100-23-1. He



had expressed his dissatisfaction with doctrinal publications' treatment of humanitarian operations, specifically with the lack of guidance on coordination with other agencies (see Davis 1996, 31-32). In FM 100-23-1, he attempted to remedy that problem, arguing that coordination with relief agencies "lies at the core of humanitarian assistance operations" since mission success depends on the turnover of responsibilities to the host nation or relief organizations, and close coordination facilitates that process (FM 100-23-1 1994, 4-15). FM 100-23-1 outlined the roles and responsibilities of the CMOC and its personnel, suggested a procedure for dealing with NGO requests for military support, and even proposed how the furniture in a CMOC should be arranged (FM 100-23-1 1994, 4-17). This short section, along with much of the army peace operations manuals as a whole, have influenced a wide range of service and joint publications.

#### *Other Doctrinal Publications*

In order to take into account the changes in FM 100-5, the army modified its overarching doctrinal manual FM 100-1 *The Army*. Describing itself as the army's "cornerstone" document, FM 100-1 defines the "broad and enduring purposes for which the army was established" and expresses the army's "fundamental purpose, roles, responsibilities, and functions" (FM 100-1 1994). Published a year after the 1993 FM 100-5, FM 100-1 anticipated the further integration of OOTW into army operations. Its chapter on the precepts of army operations listed both the principles of war and the principles of OOTW, and its chapter on army operations had only three sections: "The Army: An Instrument of National Power," "The Army in War," and "The Army in Operations Other Than War." While noting that the army's paramount mission is providing for the common defense, FM 100-1 stated (FM 100-1 1994, chapter 5):

The Army supports U.S. foreign policy and interests in peacetime through limited forward deployed presence; combined training exercises; providing security, and nation or humanitarian assistance; and by conducting peace operations. Peace operations will frequently be undertaken in response to United Nations' or other treaty organization's initiatives.

The army's response to its experience in peace operations and the resulting changes in capstone doctrine also reached down the doctrinal hierarchy. A notable example is FM 7-30 *The Infantry Brigade*. The 1995 edition of this manual was particularly important. FMs 7-10 *The Infantry Rifle Company* and 7-20 *The Infantry Battalion* had been published in 1990 and 1992, respectively—too early for the lessons of any of the post-Cold War peace operations to be reflected in them. FM 7-30, therefore, would serve as the key doctrinal guidance for infantry units until they were revised again. In order to meet the needs of infantry units in the new doctrinal environment, FM 7-30 included a twenty-page appendix of densely packed text on OOTW. It reviewed the principles and guidance in FM 100-5, and included specific tactics, procedures, and guidance for infantry units at the tactical level (FM 7-30 1995, H1-20).

While this study focuses on army doctrine, it is worth noting that the concepts developed in army doctrine were incorporated with little amendment into joint doctrinal publications, widening the impact of the lessons from Operations Provide Comfort and Restore Hope. In his introductory note to one joint publication, General Shalikashvili stated that while “we have historically focused on warfighting, our military profession is increasingly changing its focus to a complex array of military operations—other than war” (JCS 1995b). The army took the lead in drafting Joint Publication 3-07 *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War* and its subordinate manual, Joint Publication 3-07.3 *Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Peace Operations*.

They utilized the army's conception of OOTW and peace operations in FMs 100-5, 100-23, and 100-23-1, employing the same structure and applying the same principles. Several joint publications borrowed directly from FM 100-23-1 and its section on military-NGO coordination. Joint Publication 3-07 emphasized the need to coordinate with NGOs using the CMOC as a method of coordination. Joint Publication 3-08 *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations* went into greater depth, suggesting potential functions of the CMOC and outlining its structure and manpower requirements. It also provided a detailed appendix on NGOs, going into greater detail than the army publications.

One final doctrinal document is worth mentioning since its publication and republication demonstrated the concern with peace operations within the military. *The Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations* was a joint publication written for senior officers about to embark on a peace operations as a task force commander. First published in 1995 and again in 1997, its contents are increasingly incorporated into joint doctrinal publications like those reviewed above. When it was originally published, however, it was one of the only resources for a commander and his senior staff that combined emerging doctrine and lessons derived from the recent peace operations. The preface to the first edition remarks that the peace operations of the early 1990s "provided valuable, hard-earned lessons. The *Joint Task Force Commanders Handbook for Peace Operations* is a product of those lessons" (JCS 1995c). The handbook placed great emphasis on the importance of NGOs and operational integration through the CMOC. Reflecting lessons from both early peace operations, it devoted a chapter to civil-military relations which included sections on interagency coordination,

NGOs, and the CMOC. Referring especially to experiences in Operation Restore Hope, it placed in bold type the admonition to the prospective task force commander that the “director of the CMOC must have unlimited access to you,” and encouraged the commander to reinforce a positive attitude toward the NGOs (JCS 1997b, II-7; II-11).

Army doctrine in the 1990s brought OOTW and peace operations into the mainstream of army thinking, but not without a struggle. The delay in the revision of FM 100-5 is evidence of the internal disagreements over the place of peace operations, as is the more public discussion over training for such operations.

### **Training and Education**

The missions in northern Iraq and Somalia provided the impetus and knowledge to expand army doctrine. The army’s training and education strategy also evolved as a result of participating in those peace operations (Hardesty & Ellis 1997). Reviews of army training called for changes to better prepare for peace operations and stimulated a debate over the kind of training necessary. While the debate and developments continue, early initiatives resulted in significant adjustments, which I will review in this section. The army’s professional military education system expanded its curriculum and improved its techniques to teach the operational principles and tactics associated with OOTW and peace operations. In what follows, I will examine the expansion of the courses of instruction at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Branch service schools have incorporated staff, situational, and field training exercises to reinforce the doctrinal principals and tactics associated with their training manuals. This section examines developments at the army’s Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia. It also

reviews developments at the army's combat training centers which have expanded their scenarios to incorporate peace operations, concentrating especially on predeployment training. Before examining these changes, I review the dispute over training for peace operations.

The author of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) after-action report on Operation Restore Hope summarized this debate as follows (Sommer 1994, 89):

While some units and individuals seemed well trained to deal with Somali civilians—indeed, some assisted with important engineering projects, food distribution, and medical care—others, untrained for this type of role, often exacerbated difficult situations. Some military observers question whether the same troops that are trained to “kill people and break things” can be expected to act as sensitive peacekeepers; others believe it is a matter of additional training.

Others saw it as more than a matter of just additional training. General George Joulwan, who commanded both Southern Command and European Command, argued that the required change was more fundamental (Joulwan 1994, 5,10):

The end of the Cold War and diminished military threats have caused adjustments to US military structures, roles and missions . . . . The current challenge to the Army is to understand its roles and functions as it trains forces to participate in operations other than war as part of a larger joint and combined force . . . . The US military now has to focus on worldwide “peacetime engagements” in operations other than war with the same degree of commitment as it prepared to fight and win its combat roles. US soldiers, airmen, sailors, Marines and all leaders now need to focus on the struggle to win the peace and preclude future wars.

As we saw in the previous chapter, the after-action reports and articles written after Operations Provide Comfort and Restore Hope also concluded that at least some additional or specialized training was necessary to prepare soldiers for peace operations

(see also Hardesty & Ellis 1997, vii). However, some challenged this conclusion on the basis that the army should not become distracted from its primary warfighting mission.

The lessons from Iraq and Somalia were reinforced in a smaller operation in the Balkans. When President Clinton sent a few hundred soldiers to participate in a UN operation in Macedonia in the summer of 1993, the Danish commander of the peacekeeping force left no doubt as to his opinion on the necessity for different training. Brigadier General Finn Thomsen required the Americans to undergo several weeks of peacekeeping training and demonstrate they were ready to go into the field before they were allowed to patrol, saying "I'm not going to lose one single life because somebody wants to be a hero" (quoted in Vogel 1993). Thomsen related how a squad of Serbian soldiers had arrested three Swedish peacekeepers when they accidentally crossed the unmarked border. The Swedes had immediately surrendered their weapons and radios. Thomsen stated that this "was a demonstration of the difference between a combat soldier and a peacekeeper. They put their weapons down without arguing. I'm not sure combat soldiers would have done the same thing" (quoted in Vogel 1993). Other officials also expressed uneasiness that combat-trained Americans might be too aggressive for such a delicate peacekeeping operation.

Opposing the calls for peace operations training, were many who saw it as a threat to the "warrior ethos" of the military. A long-time observer of military roles joined them when he argued against the lessons regarding training from Iraq and Somalia (Huntington 1993, 42-3):

The possible nonmilitary roles of the Armed Forces have recently received a good amount of attention. Arguments have been made that the military should be organized and trained in order to perform such roles . . . Such proposals are basically misconceived. The mission of the Armed Forces is

combat, to deter and defeat enemies of the United States. The military must be recruited, organized, trained, and equipped for that purpose alone. Its capabilities can, and should, be used for humanitarian and other civilian activities, but the military should not be organized or prepared or trained to perform such roles. A military force is fundamentally antihumanitarian: its purpose is to kill people in the most efficient way possible. That is why nations have traditionally maintained armies and navies. Should the military perform other roles? Absolutely, and as previously stated they have done so throughout our history. Should these roles define the Armed Forces? Absolutely not. All such roles should be spillover uses of the Armed Forces which can be performed because the services possess the organization, training, and equipment that are only maintained to defend the nation.

The Joint Staff held a similar position, stating that (quoted in DOD 1994, 6):

The prime directive for the military is to fight and win our nation's wars. Combat ready troops can perform lesser missions—the reverse is not true. Creating standby peace operations units or diluting essential warfighting capabilities by over-emphasizing the requirement for emerging nontraditional skills runs counter to the nation's long-term security objectives.


Officials and officers who took this position also pointed out the costs of increased peace operations training requirements. The frequency of deployments, coupled with the expanded training requirements, increased the operational tempo of several units to unparalleled levels. For example, units of the Tenth Mountain Division stationed at Fort Drum, New York, participated in disaster relief operations after Hurricane Andrew in Florida in September 1992. Most of the division then deployed to Somalia in December 1992 for Operations Restore Hope and Continue Hope. Less than six months after returning from more than a year in Somalia, a brigade of the Tenth deployed to Haiti and Operation Uphold Democracy (Taw et al 1998, 35). A 1995 GAO report warned about the negative consequences of overtasking units, saying that the tempo was stressing key military capabilities (GAO 1995b). Not long afterward, a

brigade of the Tenth was deployed to Bosnia in the ongoing implementation of the Dayton Accords. As a result of the near-constant deployments and interrupted training schedules, in 1999 the Tenth was one of two army divisions that received the lowest possible readiness grade and was declared unprepared for war (Graham 1999).

The debate over the appropriate kind of training for peace operations rarely differentiated between types of peace operations or OOTW. A rare exception was a 1993 CALL newsletter which pointed out the differences in training requirements between peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions. It stated that units selected for peacekeeping duty normally require four to six weeks of specialized training and that the unit has to tailor its entire training methodology toward peacekeeping tasks. On the other hand, it stated that the best training for peace enforcement missions was the units regular combat training program, with appropriate modifications for special circumstances such as negotiation skills and language training (CALL 1993c, chapter 5). This differentiation reflects the variety of peace operations army units face. A visual aid produced by the United States Army Peacekeeping Institute illustrates the difficulty of preparing for all types of peace operations, which range from supporting preventive diplomacy to operations that resemble war as they increase in risk and size (see Figure 7).

While the training debate continues, the army settled, at least temporarily, on what could be called compromise measures between the sides in the debate. The army continued to place unit training emphasis on combat missions, with tailored predeployment training for units once selected for a peace operation. However, divisional commanders retain the prerogative to establish training programs for their division as they see fit. In addition, training centers and schools incorporated specialized





Source: Flavin 2000.

**Figure 7 - Range of Peace Operations.**

training into their programs. In short, the army attempted to have the best of both worlds, as reflected in articles and comments on the debate, and in doctrinal manuals.

Colonel Karl Farris, then-director of the Peacekeeping Institute opined that the army “is training to operate in both (peacekeeping and wartime) environments. A well-trained and disciplined military unit is the best foundation for a unit in peace operations. With that, you can adjust to the mission at hand with some additional training” (quoted in Peters 1994, 42). Brigadier General Morris Boyd, then-TRADOC’s deputy chief of staff for doctrine similarly stated (Boyd 1995, 28):

Our training policy will continue to focus on warfighting. Training and preparation for peace operations should not detract from a unit’s readiness to fight and win in combat. In fact, the first and foremost requirement for success in peace operations is the successful application of warfighting skills. When we know we are about to engage in a peace operation, units must execute a tailored training cycle using mobile training teams and training support packages.

At the same time, the Department of Defense's Inspector General concluded that well-trained, disciplined military forces are fundamental prerequisites for effective military participation in peace operations. However, that office further determined that individuals assigned to peace operations needed some degree of additional preparation given the "significantly different areas of knowledge, skill, attitude, and operational environment considerations" (DOD 1994, 19-20).

Doctrinal publications contained similar ambiguous wording that emphasized both the importance of combat training as well as preparation for peace operations. The introductory paragraph to the training appendix in FM 100-23 *Peace Operations* is a study in potential contradictions (FM 100-23 1994, 86)(italics in original):

Training and preparation for peace operations should not detract from a unit's primary mission of training soldiers to fight and win in combat. *The first and foremost requirement for success in peace operations is the successful application of warfighting skills.* Peace operations are not a new mission and should not be treated as a separate task to be added to a unit's mission-essential task list. However, units selected for these duties require time to train and prepare for a significant number of tasks that may be different from their wartime task list. The amount of training required and when the training is given will depend on the particular peace operation mission. However, the philosophy used to determine the *how much* and *when* training questions for operations other than war can be summed up as *just enough* and *just in time*.

Significantly, FM 7-30 *The Infantry Brigade* repeats most of this paragraph in the training section of its OOTW appendix, demonstrating the impact of OOTW and peace operations lessons on the army as a whole. FM 7-30 goes even further, however, following the FM 100-23 training philosophy with this statement (FM 7-30 1995, H-18):

Most facets of normal military operations and training apply to operations other than war, especially personal discipline. Operations other than war require an adjustment of attitude and approach. To accomplish operations other than war, individuals and units need training in various skills and techniques before deployment to change the focus from combat-warriors

to soldiers who may only use force in self-defense. The urgent need to deploy forces often precludes a complete and long training program. However, with prior training, a training program can assist the commanders in preparing for these missions.

To summarize, army doctrine emphasized the primary importance of combat training. It also recognized the necessity for specialized peace operations training and recommended "just in time" predeployment training to meet that requirement. However, it further recognized that short-notice deployments often do not leave time for a full training program. As a result, in somewhat contradictory fashion, it recommended prior training for skills needed in peace operations and OOTW. This ambiguity resulted in different approaches among divisional commanders, but stimulated institutional changes in training programs.

#### *Unit Training*

Commanders of the ten active army divisions have the freedom and responsibility of structuring their division's training programs (see FM 25-100 1988). As we have seen in the previous chapter, Major General Steve Arnold of the Tenth Mountain Division emphasized the primacy of combat training. He believed that standard army training was the best preparation for the several peace operations his division undertook during the 1990s. When tasked with responding to a peace operation, the division provided mission-specific training during the period prior to deployment. General Arnold's predeployment training strategies demonstrated that the division capitalized on lessons learned in each successive peace operation and integrated new doctrinal concepts (Hardesty & Ellis 1997, 22). Before 1992, the Tenth tailored its training to accommodate rapid deployment for combat operations. The individual battalion's training tasks were entirely focused on warfighting. In preparation for deployment to Somalia, however,

battalion staffs focused small-unit training on convoy, checkpoint, and search operations. As noted above, they also brought in personnel with expertise on Somalia and experience in Operation Provide Comfort. When tasked with supporting Operation Uphold Democracy, the division leadership developed a training plan with a series of situational exercises that rehearsed the anticipated tasks in Haiti.

In both cases, however, the short amount of time allowed for the development and implementation of a predeployment training program pointed out the weakness of this approach. Prior to deployment to Somalia, the division had eleven days notice, providing little opportunity for mission-specific training. Prior to deploying to Haiti, the division had six weeks notice, two of which were devoted to mission-specific training. In both cases, preparatory training had a significant combat orientation given the expectation of the need for a forced entry. Therefore, only minimal training on peace operations-specific tasks was accomplished. At least one unit commander argued that such tasks as crowd control and negotiations needed additional emphasis (see GAO 1995c, 24).

General Arnold's counterparts in the First Infantry Division, the First Armored Division and the Twenty-fifth Infantry Division incorporated at least some peace operations training into standard unit training. The major army combat units in Europe—the Third Infantry and the First Armored divisions—incorporated peace operations training as a regular part of their collective training events because of continuing and expected future involvement in such operations. The commanders incorporated peace operations training both at home stations and into rotations at the army's Combat Maneuver Training Center in Germany (see below). The Twenty-fifth Infantry Division commander incorporated some peace operations training in standard unit training because

of anticipated missions and because he believed that by preparing for them in advance, the division could focus on more mission-specific requirements once tasked to respond to a peace operation (see GAO 1995c, 19). As a result of his focus, when the Twenty-fifth was tasked to deploy to Haiti, one of its brigades had just completed a peace enforcement rotation at the Joint Readiness Training Center. This experience provided the basis for a full divisional predeployment training program in preparation for the mission to Haiti.

While individual divisional commanders differ in their approaches to peace operations training, the army's institutional educational and training programs exhibited a more uniform approach to the issue. For unit training, the army has three combat training centers: the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana, and the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) at Hohenfels, Germany. These centers host task forces up to the brigade level for intensive two- to three-week field training exercises. The goal is for every combat arms battalion to go through a rotation at least once every two years. During the course of a rotation, a unit has the opportunity to practice many of its wartime missions against an opposition force permanently assigned to the center. After each operation, after-action reviews are conducted that detail the unit's activities during the mission and highlight causal factors for mission success or failure. Two of these centers have expanded their scenarios to incorporate peace operations.

The JRTC and CMTC undertook major changes as a result of experiences relayed to them in successive post-Cold War peace operations (Hardesty & Ellis 1997, 21). The JRTC was the first to expand its peace operations strategy. Initially, two rotations focused entirely on peace operations. The first, held in November 1993, was based on a

border dispute scenario that required a brigade-sized task force to conduct a forced entry, move to the disputed area, enact a defense, and conduct a night attack. The exercise gave participants the opportunity to cope with an unclear enemy, deal with civilians and refugees in the combat zone, and coordinate activities with the other governmental, nongovernmental, and media organizations in the area of operation. Units had to observe the rules of engagement when separating the belligerents, demilitarizing a buffer zone, and protecting humanitarian relief efforts and the local population. The JRTC now conducts "Mission Readiness Exercises" for units selected for participation in peace operations. These specially tailored exercises provide realistic training that presents an OOTW or peace operations equivalent to the combat training the JRTC normally provides (Dougherty 1995). Units deploying to Haiti and Bosnia have taken advantage of these exercises which have accounted for two out of the ten annual rotations at the JRTC during the mid- and late-1990s (Neyland 2000). These JRTC peace operations exercises have included the participation of representatives from at least five NGOs, providing realistic integration and coordination simulations, as well as promoting military-NGO relations (Boyd 1995, 29; Swannack & Gray 1997, 8).

The CMTC undertook a similar effort to expand the tasks performed there. This center's training model evolved by first including a unit's transition to peace operations after it has participated in a scenario that involves intense conventional operations. Adding realistic elements to such training operations, civilians, displaced persons, and reporters and camera crews appear throughout the battlefield for the entire rotation. These preliminary efforts formed the basis for scenarios that were expanded for the units undergoing predeployment training for peace operation missions in Macedonia and

Bosnia (Hardesty & Ellis 1997, 23). In 1993, the CMTC incorporated a peace operations training module into each of its 21-day rotations. This module, which lasts 2 to 5 days, is mandatory for all army battalions in Europe. The modules test a battalion's ability to accomplish missions in both peacekeeping and peace enforcement situations. Missions included in the module include establishing, operating and reinforcing observation posts and checkpoints, securing convoy operations, and monitoring the separation zone between belligerent parties (GAO 1995c, 18-19). The CMTC also established its own peacekeeping school at which junior officers and noncommissioned officers learn peace operations skills such as negotiation and bargaining (Taw & Peters 1995, 40).

### *Individual Training and Education*

The army's professional military education system has expanded its curriculum and improved its techniques to teach the operational principles and tactics associated with OOTW and peace operations. The branch service schools have incorporated staff, and situational and field training exercises, to reinforce new doctrinal principals and tactics. The courses of instruction at the army's intermediate and senior service schools for officers have undergone similar expansion.

In contrast to the 1960s when counterinsurgency doctrine and training was relegated to the Special Forces and away from the "mainstream" army branches, it is the army's Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, that took the lead in revising its doctrine and instruction to reflect the post-Cold War operational challenges. It adjusted the curriculum in its two key courses to match the OOTW emphasis in FM 7-30 *The Infantry Brigade*. The Basic Course for Infantry Officers focuses primarily on developing platoon leaders' combat skills. The culmination of the sixteen-week course is

a five-day field training exercise, where the officers' tactical knowledge is tested in a simulated combat environment. In addition to conventional operations, the exercise exposes the officers to typical peace operations scenarios involving ROE constraints, urban environments, and negotiations. For most of the mid- to late-1990s, the nineteen-week Advanced Course for Infantry Officers devoted six days to OOTW. The first two days include doctrinal reviews, small-group discussions, and practical exercises involving the various kinds of missions. The next four days are devoted to staff exercises and after-action reviews in which the students, acting as a battalion staff, go through the deliberate planning process for three separate OOTW missions (Hardesty & Ellis 1997, 17-18). In 2000, a new Career Infantry Officer Course replaced the OOTW focus with a SASO (stability and support operations) focus that covered much of the same material, but reflected the draft FM 100-5 terminology.

The Infantry School also undertook a major effort to produce a training support package for stability and support operations: Training Circular 7-98-1: *Stability and Support Operations Training Support Package*. Primarily designed for units scheduled to deploy to a peace operation, it could also be used to supplement regular training programs. The package contained over 900 pages of detailed instructor notes, lesson outlines, and slides to support both classroom and field training. Twenty-three separate lessons covered the different missions and considerations of stability and support operations. The first ten lessons provided a general introduction and formed the basis for more detailed instruction (TC 7-98-1 1997):

1. Principles of Stability and Support Operations
2. Stability and Support Operations Activities
3. Domestic and International Organizations
4. Rules of Engagement Application



5. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
6. Intelligence Analysis
7. Convoy Operations
8. Media Strategy
9. Mission Analysis
10. Antiterrorism Measures for Brigade and Battalion Operations

The package also contained suggestions for grouping the lessons according to the anticipated needs of the operation. For example, if a unit was selected for a peacekeeping operation, the package suggested grouping the first ten lessons of the package with the three lessons on negotiation, checkpoints, and logistics. Suggestions for a peace enforcement operation added seven other lessons. The publication has been employed during CMTC and JRTC rotations and by divisions during home station training.

The developments and change in training programs notwithstanding, many observers contend that peace operations demand education more than training. While combat skills are gained and maintained through practice, peace operations duties are more likely to alter how certain skills are to be applied than to introduce entirely new skills. Peace operations require few skills outside the realm of normal training, but do require a different attitude and a different emphasis (DOD 1994, 15; Builder & Karasik 1995, 51). One study concluded that the most unique requirement of peace operations is for education and exercises that address the tension that neutrality and restraint can engender in combat-trained soldiers placed in volatile and dangerous conditions (Taw et al 1998, 43). To meet the educational and attitudinal requirements of peace operations, the army's intermediate and senior service schools have adjusted their curricula.

The modern Command and General Staff College (CGSC) exists to prepare officers for duty as field grade commanders and principal staff officers at division and higher echelons. Graduates of the forty-week program are expected to be able to

command battalions and brigades in peace and war, train those units to accomplish their assigned missions, serve as staff officers in divisions, corps, or major army or joint headquarters, and manage manpower, equipment and money (CGSC Cir 351-1 1999, 3-3). Not surprisingly, during the 1989-1990 CGSC academic year there was no mention of peace operations or OOTW. The closest reference to those topics was one elective course on low intensity conflict that examined case studies of military interventions in the Philippines, Lebanon, and Grenada, among others (CGSC Cir 351-1 1989, 102).

In the 1994-1995 academic year, the core curriculum devoted some attention to OOTW. All students took a required 36-hour course on OOTW. This accounted for seven percent of the 523 core curriculum hours. In addition, students could select 7 elective "advanced application" courses. The elective course list contained over 100 choices; only 4 of them related to peace operations: "OOTW Research," "OOTW Logistics," "Military Operations Short of War," and "Peace Support Operations" (CGSC Cir 351-1 1994). In succeeding years, the emphasis on OOTW and peace operations gradually increased. The core course on OOTW expanded to 45 hours in the 1996-1997 academic year. In it, officers studied the general concepts and principles of OOTW and examined case studies of Vietnam, Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, Operation Provide Comfort in Iraq, and the 1992 Los Angeles riots. The course included separate sections on humanitarian relief operations, peacekeeping, domestic support operations and counterdrug operations. It also required students to make an oral presentation on one of the types of OOTW (Hardesty & Ellis 1997, 20).

By the 1999-2000 academic year, the CGSC had revised its curriculum, streamlining the number of courses and expanding the required number of elective

courses. The core curriculum dropped from 13 courses and 523 hours to 5 courses and 450 hours. This revised curriculum also more fully integrated OOTW and peace operations. Although the number of hours devoted to the topics in the core curriculum did not change dramatically, the placement of the instruction was significant. They were included in the 130-hour C500 “Fundamentals of Operational Warfighting,” one of the two foundational courses of the core curriculum. C500 focused on joint operations and the last 5 of the 26 lessons concentrated on OOTW and peace operations, accounting for approximately 40 hours of instruction. Additionally, topics covered in earlier lessons were tested in OOTW scenarios and exercises. One of the course requirements was the development, presentation, and defense of an OOTW campaign plan. Another was an evaluation of United States OOTW military doctrine, plans, and operations using humanitarian assistance and peace operations examples. Altogether, the OOTW and peace operations requirements accounted for 25 percent of the C500 course grade (C500 1999). Finally, the elective “advanced application” courses also reflected an increased emphasis on OOTW and peace operations. The CGSC reduced the total number of elective courses to approximately 80, while increasing the number officers were required to take to 12, as well as the number of electives related to OOTW. The 4 elective courses that had existed in 1994-1995 had grown to 10 by 1999 and included “Stability and Support Operations,” “Peace Operations,” “Humanitarian Assistance Operations,” “Case Studies in Peace Operations,” and “The Balkan Quagmire.”

The Army War College (AWC) prepares leaders to assume strategic responsibilities in military and national security organizations, educates students about the employment of landpower, and researches operational and strategic issues (AWC

2000, 1). In recent years, it has increasingly responded to the demand for education in peace operations and OOTW (see Becker 1999). The AWC program lasts for ten months containing 200 academic days. During this time, the faculty prepares officers for senior leadership in four core courses, regional strategic appraisals, a small number of electives (usually four), and a strategic crisis exercise. The core courses,<sup>2</sup> the electives, and the exercise all evolved during the 1990s to integrate peace operations and OOTW.

In the early 1990s, there was no mention of peace operations or OOTW in the curriculum. In 1994, OOTW broke into the curriculum in several areas and set the curricular pattern for the rest of the decade. The course on war, national policy, and strategy included four areas of concentration. The last of these dealt with “the nature and spectrum of conflict in the post-cold war period; current US national military strategy; and the military in the operational continuum, including operations short of war” (AWC Curriculum 1994, 12). The course on implementing national military strategy included two days on OOTW which led directly to a campaign planning exercise involving both regional war and OOTW. The section on OOTW required readings on Operations Provide Comfort and Restore Hope, and the OOTW section of FM 100-5. The introduction to the section stressed the changing role of the military in peacetime operations and the importance of military-NGO relations and interagency coordination (AWC Course 4 1994, 64).

The latter half of the 1990s saw a gradual increase in the amount of time devoted to those topics. Each year, the faculty stresses three to five “special themes” derived

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<sup>2</sup> The names of the core courses varied slightly during the 1990s, but covered the same general topics. In 1992 the courses were “Strategic Leadership,” “War National Policy, and Strategy,” “National Military Requirements and Capabilities,” and “Implementing National Military Strategy” (AWC Curriculum 1992, 4-6).

from contemporary issues in policy and doctrine, and recommendations from the Army Chief of Staff. In 1995, one special theme was peace support operations and the following year a theme was OOTW. By 1996, the faculty had integrated OOTW and peace operations into most facets of the curriculum. The core courses continued to deal with the kinds of conflict in the post-cold war world and the military's operational continuum. They also added a lesson on peace operations that included case studies of various peace operations. The OOTW section of the implementation course expanded to fill the final week of the course. The first half of the week was devoted to discussions of the concepts and principles of army and joint doctrinal publications, the latter half to an OOTW contingency exercise. Notably, the course outline pointed out that OOTW often require a different attitude than combat operations (AWC Course 4 1998, 109):

Readying forces for MOOTW requires building on the primary purpose of the Armed Forces—to fight and win the nation's wars. For most types of MOOTW, military personnel adapt their warfighting skills to the situation. However, for some MOOTW, such as humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations, warfighting skills are not always appropriate. Therefore, to be effective in these types of MOOTW, a mindset other than traditional warfighting is required.

The two-week, end-of-course strategic exercise also evolved to incorporate an OOTW scenario. In 1996, the exercise was based on a global scenario involving simultaneous military conflicts in Bosnia, northern Africa, and southwest Asia; a noncombatant evacuation mission in Hong Kong; military-diplomatic interventions in a Spratly Islands dispute; a border dispute among Bolivia, Peru, and Chile that required a peace operation; and natural disasters in the United States. In the 2000 academic year exercise, the multiple crises remained, but the exercise focused on a northern Africa scenario in which an OOTW situation developed into a theater war.

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The AWC curriculum also included three elective courses that covered important components of peace operations. Responding to several after-action report items, a course on negotiations aimed to improve officers' negotiation skills. "Collective Security and Peacekeeping" covered the basic concepts and principles of peace operations as they have changed over the years. Finally, "Operational Issues in Peace Operations" focused on the military, political, and humanitarian dimensions of peace operations, the various relationships with other agencies and organizations, rules of engagement, and multinational planning considerations (Hardesty & Ellis 1997, 21).

The difference between CGSC and AWC curricula in the 1960s and the 1990s was stark. In the 1960s, external pressure forced counterinsurgency into the curricula and the schools fabricated compliance with directives from the Pentagon and the White House. The faculties eased counterinsurgency out of the curricula in short order. In the 1990s, curricular emphasis on OOTW and peace operations has gradually increased. More importantly, they have been integrated with the rest of the course offerings, and OOTW exercises and scenarios are intrinsic parts of the curricula in which officers apply skills learned throughout the programs. While political direction existed in this process, the role of the army's experience in peace operations has also played a key role. This experience also led to developments in areas outside the primary educational and training institutions.

#### *Miscellaneous Training Institutions*

In 1993, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Gordon Sullivan, established the United States Army Peacekeeping Institute (PKI) as part of the Center for Strategic Leadership at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Sullivan believed that the army needed an

organization devoted to the study of peace operations at the strategic and higher operational levels. He gave it the tasks of providing support to combatant commanders planning or engaging in peace operations, serving as an information agency for senior army leaders, providing instruction to AWC students, and establishing affiliations with academic institutions and think tanks in order to further research efforts (Flavin 2000).

Accordingly, PKI adopted the following mission statement (PKI 2000):

The mission of the Peacekeeping Institute is to study and confer on the strategic and operational implications of peace operations in support of the senior leadership of the Army, the Army War College, and the combatant commanders through the use of studies, conferences, simulations, operational support, instruction, exercises and gaming.

A small organization, often working under manning and funding constraints, PKI filled the first years of its existence with a variety of functions. In addition to its charter missions, PKI also became responsible for conducting the United States Government interagency training required by PDD-56 and hosting an annual peace operations seminar for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At lower levels, PKI produced exportable training packages for units selected for peace operations duty and became the proponent for FM 100-23 *Peace Operations* (PKI 2000). The existence of PKI has been important in maintaining a dialogue with the international peacekeeping and humanitarian communities by providing them with a place/personnel to contact. These military-NGO relationships have also been furthered through the establishment of special centers.

As a direct result of the events in northern Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda, the Army Medical Department established the Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance at Tripler Army Medical Center in Hawaii in 1994. Its founding purpose was to act as a bridge between participants in relief missions and act as

a facilitating body capable of conducting integrated civil-military programs in education, training, and research related to complex emergencies. Officially a partnership between the army medical center, the University of Hawaii, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the United States Pacific Command, the center is a training asset open to UN agencies and NGOs, and has academic affiliations with several civilian and military universities. In 1997, the World Health Organization designated it a Collaborating Center for Humanitarian Civil-Military Cooperation (COE 2000).

The center holds conferences and conducts regular training courses and research. The integrated training offered involves the major participants of disaster response: logisticians, planners, medical personnel, communications experts, relief workers, engineers, and military personnel. The task of the courses is to teach all participating organizations how to dovetail their capabilities by collaborating and communicating effectively. A prime example is the introductory Combined Humanitarian Assistance Response Training course. Designed for military personnel and civilian agencies, the course covers the fundamentals of working humanitarian operations within an international context. Offered five or six times a year, the goal is to prepare the 120 participants to integrate effectively in these operations. The center also offers courses on health emergencies in large populations, negotiation, conflict resolution, disaster epidemiology, and field communication (COE 2000).

Following the pattern set in Hawaii, which focuses predominantly on the Asia-Pacific region, in 1998 the United States Southern Command jointly established the Center for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance with the University of South Florida and Tulane University. Like its counterpart, the mission of this new center



is to facilitate collaborative education, training, research and communication services between disaster response and humanitarian assistance agencies throughout the western hemisphere. This organization undertakes pre-disaster activities, such as training, exercises, and research, and developed databases on complex emergencies, primarily in Latin America. Its key role has been to establish communication between the organizations and agencies that carry out disaster mitigation in that area of the world and act as a forum for coordination (CDMHA 2000).

One result of the kind of coordination and education sponsored at these centers was the development by the Army Medical Department and the Department of Defense of the "HDR," or Human Daily Ration. Military specialists designed the HDR to replace the basic field ration (MRE) which was often culturally inappropriate due to pork products and potentially dangerous to malnourished and dehydrated people due to their high salt and calorie content. The HDR was designed for humanitarian relief situations, is appropriate for all ethnic and religious groups, and has an improved food to packaging ratio over the heavy MRE, making it easier to deliver (see Sharp 1994, 388).

### **Qualifications**

While the evidence presented above leads to the conclusion that the army has learned from its experience in Operations Provide Comfort and Restore Hope, there is also evidence to the contrary. There is room to consider the argument that the army has not learned and is not changing its operations. Advocates of this latter position point to several factors they believe will make the fate of peace operations similar to that of counterinsurgency. Their arguments could begin by juxtaposing quotes from army leaders in the two eras. Just after his response to President Kennedy's call for special

emphasis on counterinsurgency that “any good soldier can handle guerrillas,” Army

Chief of Staff General George Decker wrote (Decker 1962, 42):

Army doctrine today establishes proficiency in unconventional warfare as a normal requirement for its versatile, modern ground forces. We believe that a thorough grounding in the basic skills of soldiering provides the foundation upon which to build this proficiency.

Thirty years later, the commander of the Tenth Mountain Division wrote (Arnold 1993, 35):

Well-trained, combat-ready, disciplined soldiers can easily adapt to peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions. Train them for war; they adapt quickly and easily to Somalia-type missions.

An alternative interpretation of developments in the post-Cold War army could work from the Desert Storm model rather than the peace operations model. In the areas of doctrine and training, the lessons of Operation Desert Storm could yet outweigh the lessons of Provide Comfort and Restore Hope. Victory in Desert Storm seemed to vindicate conventional warfighting doctrine and prompted the sentiment that “this is what we’ve trained for, and this is how wars should be fought.” The experience convinced the military leadership that the force structure—including its conventional configuration and doctrine—was correct. Thus, as had occurred in Vietnam, when estimations of the geo-strategic setting argued for forces capable of dealing with conflict less than conventional war, the army clung to its long-held conventional traditions (Waghelstein 1992, 80). As the events of the 1990s unfolded, continuing to bask in their Gulf War victory, some army leaders resisted the moves to change doctrine and training programs. The training debate has been rehearsed above, but some see it as important that even though several divisional commanders have adjusted their standard training to include peace operations tasks, the fact that they retain the power to establish training programs shows that the

army is not serious about that kind of training. Traditionally trained divisional commanders are more likely to favor traditional training.

Regarding the development of doctrine, in 1992 a senior officer instructed the army's Center for Low Intensity Conflict to stop working on doctrinal concept papers regarding peace operations "or we might have to do it" (Rinaldo 1999). The status of doctrine in the late 1990s can also be interpreted to support the position that change is not occurring. First, the revision of FM 100-5 Operations that conceptualized four types of army operations—offense, defense, stability, and support—still sits in draft. The anticipated 1998 publication never occurred, presumably as proponents of the traditional conception of two main operations—offense and defense—objected to raising OOTW to equal importance. The first editions of the key peace operations doctrinal manuals, FM 100-23 and FM 100-23-1, will not be revised. The content of the publications will be included in other manuals, which could easily be interpreted as minimizing the importance of the concepts. Further, since 1998 the proponent for FM 100-23, the Peacekeeping Institute, has been operating with only minimal manning and budgetary support.

One observer of army doctrine argued that despite the army's insistence on adaptability and the challenge of change in the post-Cold War era, it has an institutional blind spot that prevents real change from occurring. That blind spot is organization. The army has not substantively reorganized the divisional structure since World War II. Technology has changed dramatically, force structure has been slashed, doctrine has been revised, but reorganization does not occur (Fastabend 1995, 37). The implication for post-Cold War contingencies is that maintaining the current divisional structure does not

provide optimal support to peace operations, which require greater numbers of engineers, logisticians, and medical personnel than a combat division contains. The conclusion drawn here is that the lack of reorganization relegates OOTW to a permanently subordinate position, a perception that is reinforced by the much-repeated phrase: the primary mission of the army is to fight and win the nation's wars.

Despite these qualifications, my conclusion is that the army has learned from its experience in peace operations and changed its doctrine and training programs to account for those lessons. Several of the qualifications mentioned above can be erased with further explanations, although some cannot. The tenuous existence of PKI within the army, for example, is not encouraging. However, its role in joint and government programs indicates that if it were done away with, a new organization would have to be created to replace it. On the other hand, the similar statements by Generals Decker and Arnold quoted above need to be placed in context. As outlined in previous chapters, General Decker had a different interpretation of what proficiency in counterinsurgency or unconventional warfare meant than did President Kennedy. Decker's subordinates and troops in Vietnam conducted conventional combat operations. In contrast, while General Arnold saw combat training as the foundation on which to build expertise in other areas, he went to great lengths to prepare his division for the complexities of peace operations and recounted with pride the effectiveness of his division in noncombat situations.

Many proponents of peace operations resent the insistence on combat as the primary mission of the army, drawing the inference that this lessens the importance of peace operations. I do not contend that the lessons of the early 1990s made peace operations more important than fighting wars. They did, however, indicate the need to

adapt conventional forces to methods of operations that can cope with multidimensional challenges that go beyond conventional warfare. New and emerging doctrine was couched in terms that subordinate peace operations to warfighting, but OOTW and peace operations were raised to a level of importance unprecedented in the last century. A new FM 100-5 has not been published, but the 2000 draft maintains the same conceptual approach as the 1997 draft, indicating that resistance to incorporating OOTW missions into the mainstream of army operations was failing.

FM 100-23 and FM 100-23-1 will disappear, but that fact has to be placed in context. As an ongoing effect of the Goldwater-Nichols act of 1986, army doctrine is increasingly being integrated with and subordinated to joint doctrine. The guidance from TRADOC is that army doctrinal publications should not repeat material in joint publications, only elaborate on army-specific issues. The current plan is for joint publications such as Joint Publications 3-07 *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, 3-07.3 *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations*, 3-07.6 *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance*, and 3-08 *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations* to “govern” all such operations. Army doctrinal publications will be streamlined. The 2000 draft of FM 100-5 (which will become Army Manual 3.0), with its conception of offense, defense, stability, and support will be supported by two subordinate manuals: FM 100-40 on offensive and defensive operations, and FM 100-20 on stability and support operations (Modica 2000; Flavin 2000). Finally, it is interesting to note that the current Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric Shinseki, proposed “the most significant restructuring of the Army’s combat divisions since the Vietnam War.” As the beginning of a major transformation over the

next decade, his plan is for the army to create two light, mobile brigades that could deploy anywhere in the world within ninety-six hours (Myers 1999). The potential implications for peace operations are clear. The army is contemplating structural changes that would make deploying to such operations in force easier and quicker.

## **Conclusion**

The traditional application of organization theory to change in the military that emphasizes organizational inertia and the necessity for civilian intervention to effect change has difficulty accounting for the developments in army doctrine and training recounted above. Scholars taking such an approach would not expect the experience of the early 1990s to have much of an effect on the army. Their theory predicts that experience in OOTW operations such as Operations Provide Comfort and Restore Hope would not bring about change because standard operating procedures and bureaucratic politics would work against agents of change. In this instance, the obstacle of standard operating procedures was overcome by two factors. First, as the complaints in the after-action reports outlined in chapter eight revealed, the army lacked a coherent standard operating procedure for peace operations, especially those with a humanitarian aspect. Second, standard operating procedures in the form of the lessons learned program worked to bring about change rather than stymie it. We did see evidence of bureaucratic politics at work as military leaders resisted participating in peace operations and as more recent and important changes to doctrine in FM 100-5 were at least postponed. However, the consistent participation by the United States in peace operations and the creation and revision of doctrinal manuals during the last decade demonstrates that as an obstacle to change, bureaucratic politics can be overcome.

Given the changes that have occurred, traditional theorists would expect it to be the result of civilian intervention. While President Bush did direct a new emphasis on peacekeeping within the military and President Clinton initiated policies and made changes to national security strategy that encouraged change in the military, it would be difficult to categorize their involvement as “intervention.” Unlike President Kennedy’s experience in the 1960s, Presidents Bush and Clinton made policy decisions and restructured national security policy statements, and military strategy statements, doctrine, and training changed to match those decisions. They did not need to personally review training manuals, rebuke Secretaries of Defense, or cajole army generals. My contention is that this did not occur because the army leadership was more amenable to non-traditional missions—chapter eight presents evidence to the contrary, but because the elements were in place for the army to complete a learning cycle.

Applied to the changes surrounding peace operations in the 1990s, learning approaches provide greater insight into the process of organizational change than traditional approaches. Combining a learning cycle model and Goldman’s contextual factors allows us to subsume the insights of traditional theories in a more comprehensive approach. Learning cycle models can incorporate several of the insights of traditional approaches as obstacles to the completion of learning cycles and successful change. But rather than simply being the explanations for why change does not occur, bureaucratic politics, standard operating procedures, and interpretations of strategic environments are barriers to learning and change that may or may not be overcome. Whether they are overcome or not depends on contextual factors. Goldman suggests that important factors go beyond civilian intervention and the domestic political environment, and include the

international environment and the state of organizational knowledge. These factors produce the desirability, urgency, and possibility of learning and change that can combine to overcome obstacles to change inherent in organizations.


In the 1990s, traditional approaches face the difficult prospect of explaining how changes occurred without decisive civilian intervention. Starting with the assumption that change can occur, learning approaches have an advantage here. As outlined above, the domestic and international contexts were conducive to learning and change. While the state of knowledge in the army regarding peace operations was not optimal, the quick succession of operations allowed for the rapid development of the knowledge necessary to revise doctrine. With these contextual factors in place, the learning process was able to overcome organizational resistance to change. Since peace operations with a humanitarian aspect were a new mission for the army, standard operating procedures did not impede the development of new ideas about doctrine and training, integration with NGOs, and the role of support personnel in peace operations. There were no standard procedures to apply to the situations in northern Iraq and Somalia. New doctrinal concepts, especially regarding integration with NGOs, were driven by recognition that mission accomplishment required coordination with organizations possessing special expertise and resources. Additionally, the inception of the formalized lessons learned program facilitated developments in doctrine and training in effect by making change a standard procedure.

Importantly, organizational resistance to change initially focused on whether the United States military should participate in peace operations at all or attempts to restrict American participation to providing airlift. These arguments were overcome by political



decisions, often with the acquiescence of military leaders—as in the Somalia case. Later resistance to changes in doctrine and training did not focus on whether peace operations would be a military mission, but on the importance of that mission relative to conventional combat operations. As outlined above, the result was the creation and revision of key doctrinal publications and the modification of curricula at the most important army educational institutions (see Figure 8 and Table 8 below). While the warfighting mission appropriately remains primary, peace operations have become an important secondary mission for the army.

While learning approaches further our understanding of when and how military organizations might change, they do not yet fully answer all the questions surrounding the issue. For instance, they lack specification. How desirable or urgent does change need to be before it will happen? How do we know when it has reached that level? Goldman's suggestion that we examine the international and domestic environments and the state of organizational knowledge is a valuable move beyond merely focusing on external or internal factors, but leaves a lot of room for interpretation as to what elements of those environments should be examined.



**Figure 8 – 1990s Learning Cycle**

**Table 8 – 1990s Learning Cycle Summary**

Learning Cycle Element	Comments	Present in 1990s?	Peace Operations
Desirability of Learning	Favorable domestic political context.	Yes	Bush and Clinton Initiatives
Urgency for Learning	Interpretation of international events.	Yes	Peace operations call for a non-combat response
Possibility of Learning	Existence or development of new knowledge.	Yes	Knowledge quickly developed in the succession of operations
Individual Belief	Individuals see anomalies in organizational approach.	Yes	Calls for doctrine & training in lessons learned and after-action reports
Individual Action	New knowledge tested.	Yes	CMOC structure experiments
Organizational Action	Consensus developed about new knowledge; new knowledge institutionalized	Yes	Army doctrine, education, & training modified to integrate peace operations

## **Chapter 10 - Conclusion**

### **Introduction**

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States military has spent an unprecedented amount of time and resources on peace operations. The question that motivated this dissertation project was whether involvement in these peace operations has induced changes in military doctrine and training—did the military learn from its experience? Accordingly, this dissertation set out to accomplish two main tasks. The first was explore how change in organizations occurs. Organizational change is a long-standing interest in academia. Given the role of militaries in international security, it is especially important to understand how and why militaries change. The second task was to compare the effect on the American military of the counterinsurgency experience in Vietnam with that of peace operations of the early 1990s, as reflected in the doctrine and training programs of the United States Army.

While most studies of military change focus on the primary missions of armed services, this dissertation concentrated on secondary OOTW missions, what Waddell (1994) called peripheral change. Change in secondary missions could indicate merely that a military organization is adapting defensively to unwanted pressure—as was the case with counterinsurgency doctrine in the early 1960s. However, peripheral change could have potentially important implications for future, more fundamental changes in military organizations. This prospect is particularly relevant in today's uncertain strategic environment.

After considering two approaches to military change, my conclusion is that employing a learning approach is valuable since it is able to capture both the process of

change and obstacles to change. While the application of “traditional” organization theory correctly emphasizes the difficulty of change in military organizations, it places too much emphasis on the necessity for civilian intervention to bring about such change. The case study on the Vietnam era shows that even vigorous presidential intervention can fail to effect change. Learning approaches force us to consider organizations’ internal processes that can facilitate or hinder change. The experience of the 1990s demonstrates the importance of the unintended consequences of institutional routines. The lessons learned process designed to improve the army’s combat effectiveness contributed to bringing about important changes in army doctrine and training that de-emphasized the combat mission. In this concluding chapter, I review the findings of the study and discuss implications of recent changes for the army and, by extension, the American military. Changes in doctrine to accommodate the secondary mission of peace operations may have instigated a process that could lead to more fundamental changes in the army.

### **Findings**

The army’s long experience with various OOTW, from opening the American frontier to combating terrorism or conducting relief operations, rarely translated into institutional acceptance and received only minimal treatment in mainstream doctrine. Part two of this dissertation presented a case study of OOTW in the early 1960s, focusing on counterinsurgency and the Vietnam conflict. It outlined how President Kennedy introduced counterinsurgency, its application in Vietnam, and how it affected army doctrine and training. In the early 1960s, Kennedy challenged the status quo in the military when he directed the national security establishment to develop a counterinsurgency capability in order to deal with communist-inspired “wars of national

liberation.” He set up a high-level oversight panel, the Special Group—Counterinsurgency, that instructed the army to revise its doctrine and educational system to meet the needs of counterinsurgency programs. Kennedy also championed the Special Forces as the vanguard of an approach to what he perceived as a new and lasting challenge. In South Vietnam, Kennedy and his advisors interpreted developments as an insurgency and developed a policy that focused on that threat. Accordingly, the initial direction given to the military advisory group there emphasized the principal mission of internal security.

Despite Kennedy’s personal interest and explicit direction, the army’s senior leadership resisted developing a counterinsurgency capability in general and resisted executing a counterinsurgency strategy in Vietnam in particular. They maintained that the doctrine, training, and capabilities required to fight a conventional war were also suitable for dealing with insurgencies. Beyond the presidentially-directed expansion of the Special Forces, the army’s response to Kennedy’s initiatives was minimal. Counterinsurgency concepts were included in doctrinal publications and training programs, but were subordinated to the overarching emphasis on destroying enemy forces. Doctrinal manuals and army schools exhorted unit commanders to undertake offensive actions and fully employ available firepower. When Kennedy complained to his Secretary of Defense about the army’s lack of interest in counterinsurgency, the army responded with reports and lists detailing its counterinsurgency activities. However, examination of the reports reveals that much of this activity was only distantly connected to counterinsurgency.

The army's resistance to the inclusion of counterinsurgency concepts in doctrine and training was mirrored in its execution of operations in Vietnam. While Kennedy approved plans for developing South Vietnamese internal security capabilities, army advisors concentrated on building an army capable of defending against a conventional invasion from the north. When the army paid attention to insurgents, it applied its standard doctrine to the problem of destroying guerrilla forces rather than incorporating the precepts of the new counterinsurgency doctrine as promulgated by the Kennedy administration. An exception to this was the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) program run by army Special Forces under the auspices of the CIA. But instead of learning from this successful counterinsurgency model, the army modified it to bring Special Forces activities in line with conventional doctrine, directing them to focus on offensive operations. After Vietnam, the army adopted a back-to-basics approach, intensifying its conventional focus and allowing what low-intensity capabilities that had developed to diminish in the 1970s. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War refocused its attention on high technology war and the nature of future conflict in Europe.

The Vietnam case study supports the contention of standard applications of organization theory which argue that change is difficult in military organizations. Standard operating procedures, bureaucratic politics, and other barriers certainly impeded change. However, it also points out the problem with relying on civilian intervention as the predominant method of effecting change in those organizations. Despite President Kennedy's persistence and personal involvement, the army resisted modifications to its conventional doctrine and quickly removed what small adjustments had been made. We could view these events as an example of the difficulty of change in an organization or as

an anomalous case of ineffective civilian intervention, but a learning approach offers a more inclusive explanation. Combining the learning cycle of March and Olsen and Goldman's preconditions for learning, we can view the events of the early 1960s as an incomplete learning cycle. Such a model allows us to incorporate the traditional approaches' focus on obstacles to learning and change as well as attempts to change the army's approach. A learning model combining those approaches examines the domestic political conditions, the international environment, and the state of organizational knowledge. It also takes into account the potential obstacles to change at the various stages of the learning cycle.

In the early 1960s, Kennedy's campaign provided a domestic political context conducive to change, but the state of army knowledge and its interpretation of events in Southeast Asia did not promote learning. The army perceived events in Vietnam as a replay of events in Korea, expecting a conventional invasion. Thus, while many policymakers recommended a counterinsurgency approach to Vietnam, the army recommended a conventional one. Reinforcing these factors were obstacles to change in the form of organizational constraints put on military advisors and Special Forces personnel. Army standard operating procedures prevented the widespread development of credible knowledge regarding counterinsurgency as army personnel concentrated on conventional tactics. Despite this, lessons learned reports and individual accounts show that individual learning did occur in Vietnam. However, bureaucratic politics prevented the knowledge that was developed from being diffused within the organization.

Viewing the events of the early 1960s as an incomplete learning cycle allows for greater insight into the process of organizational change. The traditional approach to

explaining the lack of change in military organizations “succeeds” to some extent in this case because its major determinants of bureaucratic politics and organizational processes overcome any contemplated changes. However, it still has difficulty with this case because its major predictor of change—civilian intervention—does not prevail, despite President Kennedy’s efforts. The counterinsurgency experience in Vietnam is better explained as a case of an incomplete learning cycle in which organizational constraints on learning prevented the army from changing its approach to the conflict. Although President Kennedy’s championing of counterinsurgency doctrine provided the necessary domestic political incentives, other elements necessary for learning and change were lacking.

Part three of this dissertation presented a case study of peace operations in the early 1990s. It examined Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq and Operation Restore Hope in Somalia as precedential and representative examples of the several peace operations undertaken in that period. Experience, observations, and lessons from these and other peace operations resulted in significant changes to army doctrine, training, and educational programs. Traditional applications of organization theory which emphasize the difficulty of change have difficulty explaining this outcome. Accordingly, I applied a learning cycle model as an alternative approach to understanding change in the military. Following Goldman’s suggestion, I examined the contextual factors that could facilitate the initiation of a learning cycle. The international environment of the early 1990s was dominated by a series of complex crises that elicited responses combining peacekeeping and humanitarian relief efforts. At the same time, presidential initiatives and changes to national security strategy documents provided a domestic political environment



conducive to change in the military. President Bush's address to the UN in September 1992, President Clinton's approval of PDD-25 in May 1994, and the changes to the national security strategy in between those events are just a few examples. In Goldman's terms, desirability and urgency for learning and change were increased.

While senior military leaders were opposing American participation in particular operations during the 1990s, the experiences of army personnel in those operations were contributing to changes in doctrine and training programs. Several elements combined to develop the credible knowledge needed to effect those changes. First, the dissimilarity of peace operations to other military missions evoked consistent calls for the creation of doctrine to guide peace operations missions. Second, the lessons learned process that had been instituted in the mid-1980s to improve combat effectiveness facilitated the completion of a learning cycle. Lessons, observations, and recommendations coming out of Iraq and Somalia were collected by the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), then communicated throughout the army. In chapter eight, I examined three areas in which learning occurred. One general lesson that emerged from Operations Provide Comfort and Restore Hope was that army doctrine and training needed to address peace operations. More particularly, the operations highlighted the importance of integrating operations with NGOs. The swift inclusion of a new structure—the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC)—in army doctrine and standard procedures for joint task forces is one of the remarkable outcomes of this era. The importance of the CMOC lies not in its size – its manning rarely exceeds twenty personnel, but in its very presence. The existence of the CMOC demonstrates the army's understanding that peace operations are a different kind of operation from its conventional missions, requiring different

approaches and methods. Finally, the recent peace operations revealed the importance of support units and personnel. Peace operations usually require a greater proportion of medical, engineer, and logistical support personnel than a normal divisional deployment.

CALL disseminated these lessons, observations, and recommendations throughout the army, prompting doctrinal reviews and examination of training and educational curricula. In chapter nine, I outlined the major changes in those areas, as knowledge was transformed into new doctrine and training programs. Two new army doctrinal publications were devoted to peace operations—FM 100-23 and FM 100-23-1. As a category of OOTW, peace operations received increased emphasis in FM 100-1 *The Army*, FM 7-30 *The Infantry Brigade*, and, most importantly, FM 100-5 *Operations*. Potential developments in the next version of FM 100-5 promise to establish OOTW and peace operations as even more important in the army's conception of its scope of operations. Changes in the scenarios and curricula at army training and educational institutions demonstrate the depth of recent changes in the army. At the army's unit training centers, OOTW and peace operations scenarios are now standard fare either as additions to regular rotations or as stand-alone rotations. The core curriculum of the army's key educational institutions--the Command and General Staff College and the Army War College—include OOTW and peace operations in both course work and simulations. In addition, the army created new institutions dealing primarily with peace operations: the Peacekeeping Institute and the Center of Excellence for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance.

There is still room to debate the extent and durability of these changes, but the fact remains that they have occurred and deserve explanation, especially in light of the

common wisdom regarding the inertial qualities of military organizations. Traditional explanations lack an effective model for explaining these changes, beyond noting the role of civilian leaders. Learning approaches offer an explanation and greater insight into the process of organizational change. Such approaches view the army's experience in the 1990s as a completed learning cycle in which contextual factors and institutional developments helped to overcome organizational resistance to change. This cycle saw the institutionalization of many of the lessons derived from individual and unit experience in northern Iraq and Somalia.

### **Theoretical Conclusions**

Traditional applications of organization theory that, following Posen's (1984) lead, emphasize organizational inertia and the necessity for civilian intervention to effect change have difficulty explaining the cases examined in this study. Scholars taking such an approach would expect Kennedy's actions to have had more effect on the army than they did, and would not expect more recent changes to have been as extensive. Their theory predicts that experience in OOTW operations such as Operations Provide Comfort and Restore Hope would not bring about change because standard operating procedures and bureaucratic politics would work against agents of change. Given the changes that have occurred, traditional theorists would expect it to be the result of civilian intervention. While President Bush did direct a new emphasis on peacekeeping within the military and President Clinton initiated policies and made changes to national security strategy that encouraged change in the military, it would be difficult to categorize their involvement as "intervention." They did not personally review doctrinal and training manuals or make special visits to the Peacekeeping Institute as Kennedy did to the

Special Warfare Center. The incongruity of these two cases is a major stumbling block for the traditional approach to organizational change. The lack of change in the 1960s during a period of tremendous presidential interest and intervention, contrasted with the significant changes in the 1990s during a period in which the presidents were much less active, calls for an alternative approach and explanation of organizational change in the military.

On the basis of the cases examined here, learning approaches look like a promising alternative. Combining a learning cycle model and Goldman's contextual factors allows us to subsume the insights of traditional theories in a more comprehensive approach. Learning cycle models can incorporate several of the insights of traditional approaches as obstacles to the completion of learning cycles and successful change. Rather than being the explanations for why change does not occur, bureaucratic politics, standard operating procedures, and interpretations of strategic environments are barriers to learning and change that may or may not be overcome. Whether they are overcome or not depends on contextual factors. Goldman suggests that important factors go beyond civilian intervention and the domestic political environment, and include the international environment and the state of organizational knowledge. These factors produce the desirability, urgency, and possibility of learning and change that can combine to overcome obstacles to change inherent in organizations.

In the cases of the early 1960s and the early 1990s, a learning approach gives a more satisfactory explanation of events than traditional approaches. In the case of counterinsurgency and Vietnam, traditional approaches correctly emphasize the importance of standard operating procedures and bureaucratic politics in resisting change.

However, they have difficulty accounting for President Kennedy's lack of success in effecting change through his personal intervention. A learning approach, such as the one employed in this study, views those events as an incomplete learning cycle. It suggests that a learning cycle would not be completed due to the lack of the necessary contextual factors. While the domestic political environment was favorable for learning and change, the army's interpretation of the international environment and its state of knowledge militated against learning. As a result, within the learning process itself, standard operating procedures prevented widespread learning in Vietnam, and bureaucratic politics prevented the diffusion of the learning that did take place.

In the case of peace operations in the 1990s, traditional approaches face the difficult prospect of explaining how changes occurred without conclusive civilian intervention. Starting with the assumption that change can occur, learning approaches have an advantage here. As outlined above, the domestic and international contexts were conducive to learning and change. While the state of knowledge in the army regarding peace operations was not optimal, the quick succession of operations allowed for the rapid development of the knowledge necessary to revise doctrine. With these contextual factors in place, the army completed its learning cycles, overcoming organizational resistance to change as it modified doctrine and training programs. The obstacle of standard operating procedures was overcome by two factors. First, as the complaints in the after-action reports outlined in chapter eight revealed, the army lacked coherent standard operating procedures for peace operations, especially those with a humanitarian aspect. Therefore the way was clear for the development of new ideas about doctrine and training, integration with NGOs, or the role of support personnel in peace operations.

Second, standard operating procedures in the form of the lessons learned program worked to bring about change rather than stymie it. We did see evidence of bureaucratic politics at work as military leaders resisted participating in peace operations and as more recent and important changes to doctrine in FM 100-5 were at least postponed. However, the consistent participation by the United States in peace operations, the creation and revision of doctrinal manuals during the 1990s, and the curricular changes at important army educational institutions demonstrate that, as an obstacle to change, bureaucratic politics can be overcome.

Traditional approaches have trouble accounting for instances like those in the 1990s in which organizational change does occur, especially in the absence of decisive civilian intervention. However, learning approaches also have problems. Goldman's contextual factors are useful to consider while exploring organizational change, but they lack specification of sufficiency. Just as traditional approaches have difficulty in explaining how much civilian intervention is enough, so it is hard to tell when the domestic or international environments are conducive enough to make learning and change desirable and urgent. How desirable and urgent does learning need to be to overcome institutional resistance to change? These contextual factors can also be criticized for being too broad—how do we know what aspects of the domestic and international environments to examine? At the same time, they can overlook potentially important factors. For example, there does not appear to be a “clean” way to incorporate learning from the experience of others beyond including it in the international environment. Vicarious learning, learning by contagion, or the diffusion of knowledge is an important area in the literature dealing with learning that this study has not examined

(see March 1981, Huber 1991).<sup>1</sup> Further, while several theorists employ the learning cycle model, the model does not make it clear exactly how individuals and organizations move from one step of the cycle to another. This may be a theoretical limitation due to the idiosyncrasies of different organizations. In the previous chapter, I outlined how individual observations and experience were turned into organizational procedures. In some instances, this could be traced precisely—as in the case of Major Nelson who served as the operations officer in the Mogadishu CMOC and then helped to write FM 100-23-1. In many instances, however, the process of how individual experience or belief is translated into doctrinal revisions is lost in bureaucratic mazes.

Learning models such as the ones applied in this study also raise the question of the nature of change. Evidence suggests that, during the 1990s, substantial changes occurred in the army's approach to the secondary missions of OOTW. How can we assess the real depth of these changes? On the one hand, it seems clear that if a major war involving the United States were to break out, the lessons about peace operations would be pushed aside as warfighting doctrine assumed center-stage. On the other hand, the effect of these changes appears to be reaching further into the organizational essence of the army with significant changes to FM 100-5 and emphasis in training programs on the appropriate attitude for peace operations and non-traditional skills for soldiers, such as negotiations. In chapter two, I touched on the theoretical literature regarding the

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<sup>1</sup> A contemporaneous study considers the effect of different national military cultures on the development of peace operations doctrine. It also considers the effect of developments in one military on another (see Cassidy, forthcoming).

nature and scope of change. Combining different perspectives and terminology, the general consensus is that there are two kinds of change: incremental, adaptive change and major, transformative or “quantum” change.

Miller and Friesen (1984) suggest that incremental change regularly occurs, while major change occurs only infrequently. Because of the inertia inherent in an established organization, it adapts and evolves in line with existing goals, programs, and structures. Quantum change occurs only when there are important, unmistakable problems to be faced. Similarly, Tushman and Romanelli (1985) see organizations as relatively stable entities, exhibiting only incremental change for long periods of time as they adapt their patterns of activity to match the external environment. Fundamental transformations occur when changes in the external environment render organizational activity and systems ineffective. Applying these concepts to the United States Army, however, is not straightforward. Picturing incremental change in the army is not difficult. The fluid nature of FM 100-5 allows different missions to enter and depart the army’s repertoire. The 1960s saw counterinsurgency come and go; the 1990s saw OOTW and peace operations enter army doctrine, but there is no guarantee they will remain. Given the army’s fundamental task of national defense, it is harder to conceive of quantum change in that organization. While Miller and Friesen’s and Tushman and Romanelli’s descriptions of adaptive change seem plausible, their conceptions of quantum or transformative change are somewhat vague—perhaps due to its rarity. Learning theorists take a slightly different perspective that contributes to understanding the distinction and processes of incremental and fundamental change.



Attempting to distinguish between different kinds of learning—and different kinds of change—several scholars (e.g., Argyris & Schon 1978, 1996; Hedberg 1980) conceive of lower and higher levels of learning. Lower-level learning is often associated with adaptive processes. It involves solving problems and correcting errors within organizational routines. Higher-level learning could be identified with transformative change, since it redefines organizational norms and values, creating new frames of reference within which new behaviors can develop. Argyris and Schon (1978, 20-26; 1996, 20-22) suggest there are two kinds of learning cycles—single- and double-loop—which reflect these notions of lower- and higher-level learning. A single feedback loop connects detected error to standard organizational procedures. In single-loop cycles, members of an organization respond to errors in performance or changes in the environment with adjustments that maintain the organization's accepted norms and frames of reference. These cycles are characterized by learning that modifies procedures without changing the values of the organization. This kind of learning is concerned primarily with effectiveness—with how best to achieve existing goals. This perspective on learning fits well with March's conception of organizational change as the result of the routine processes that relate organizations to their environments. Organizational members respond to their contexts and adapt their procedures accordingly (March 1988, 169). As we have seen in this study, military members had to respond to peace operations and adapt their procedures to those types of missions.

In some cases, error correction requires a modification in the organizational norms and values which underlie its standard procedures. In double-loop learning cycles, the response to detected error encompasses inquiry into both organizational practices and

organizational values. The double loop refers to two feedback loops that connect the observed effects of action with both the practices and the values embodied in the organization's procedures and doctrine. The result of double-loop learning is a new set of priorities and norms together with associated practices. Again, it is difficult to imagine the army neglecting the norms and values associated with national defense, but perhaps we could envision it adding missions to its repertoire, such as peace operations, that require the development of new attitudes and norms.

Argyris and Schon admit that it is often impossible to make the distinction between single-and double-loop learning since certain elements are more fundamental to an organization, and others are more peripheral. A particular norm may be quite peripheral and could change, or be added, without affecting the organization's values as a whole. For Argyris and Schon, therefore, it is possible to speak of organizational learning as more or less double-loop. In place of a binary distinction between single- and double-loop learning, they conceive of a spectrum of learning processes that may or may not challenge core organizational values (Argyris & Schon 1978, 25-6).

This does not move us nearer the goal of a definitive specification of the species and genera of change. Instead, it points to the contingent nature of change. The evidence presented in this study suggests, first, that Pfeffer (1982, 229) is correct when he theorizes that incremental change can lead to more profound change. As incremental changes build up to address problems, they can raise more fundamental questions about organizational procedures and purposes. The further implication of this study is that Greenwood and Hinings (1988, 293) are correct when they say that understanding organizational change involves investigating both the process of adaptive response to

altered environments, and the intricacies of strategic choice as organizational leaders shape the direction and scope of change. This study has concentrated on the former process of adaptive response to the new environment of peace operations. The army modified its doctrine and training programs in order to accomplish the missions it faced in the post-Cold War world. Doing so, however, raises questions about the appropriate way for a military service to approach these missions. The army leadership is now faced with the task of dealing with the consequences of the doctrinal and training adaptations made for peace operations.

### **Implications**

The army is faced with a significant dilemma, as indicated by the debate surrounding training for peace operations. The army must maintain readiness to fight major theater wars while frequently undertaking peace operations. Conducting those peace operations inevitably reduces readiness for major conventional conflict; maintaining readiness for major theater wars constrains the development of peace operations capabilities. The developments outlined in this study beg the question of whether the peace operations genie is out of the bottle. Will the changes witnessed during the 1990s eventually bring about more fundamental changes in the army? Has the army embarked on a double-loop learning cycle?

The open systems approach to organization theory introduced in chapter two proposes that organizations tend to map the complexity of environmental elements into their own structure (Scott 1981, 22). Organizations operating in more complex and conflicted environments will exhibit “greater administrative complexity and reduced program coherence” (Scott & Meyer 1988, 128). Over time, organizations adapt so as to

reflect the environment they inhabit. This suggests that the post-Cold War era will see further developments within the army and the military as a whole, reflecting the perceptions that the new era is more complex than the bifurcated Cold War era.

As noted above, several theorists taking this approach emphasize the processual nature of change rather than sudden, revolutionary change. They suggest that fundamental change begins at the periphery of an organization's structure and functions. Actions are taken to solve some small problem in what is regarded as a viable system. The action taken is not radical, but is a conservative attempt to preserve the system with the least possible amount of change. However, the corrective measures often have unanticipated consequences which lead to more radical developments (Pfeffer 1982, 227-233; March 1988, 168-171). Does this broad theoretical sketch describe events in the army over the last decade? The combination of the lessons learned program and the experiences in Operations Provide Comfort and Restore Hope have brought about a surprising amount of change. People calling for doctrinal guidance after deploying to northern Iraq could hardly have expected the issue to contribute to a reconceptualization of FM 100-5 *Operations*. Is there more to come?

Observers of military organizations contend that we are in a transitional period in which new ideas about the purpose of military organizations are developing. Moskos and Burk (1998, 172) point to the recent spate of peace operations as evidence of a new emphasis on "nonwarfighting" military missions which raise questions about the very role of the military as well as the relative importance of the various types of OOTW. As we have seen in the opposition of senior military leaders to participation in, and training for, peace operations, tension exists in the military over these issues, specifically

regarding many members' self-image as specialists in violence, ready for combat. The potential incompatibility of military forces and several aspects of peace operations has not been lost on observers. Holmes (1998, 209) argues that expecting to accomplish humanitarian goals through an institution whose first aim is to produce specialists in the infliction of death and destruction is "wishful thinking."

The incompatibility of the means to the ends also raises questions about the effect of the ends on the means. What is the effect on the military of participating in operations with underlying goals and principles of neutrality, impartiality, and humanity? Do they undermine the traditional military principles of offensive, objective, and surprise? The fact that units returning from peace operations require several months of retraining to reach combat readiness indicates that this has to be an important consideration in deployment decisions (see Rivette 1996).

Peace operations clearly differ from conventional combat missions in at least six ways (Farrell 1995, 203-4). First, peace operations usually involve the dispersal of forces to escort convoys, monitor cease-fires and the like. This contradicts the fundamental military principle of concentration of force. Second, during peace operations military forces must exercise restraint, using force only after all other means to achieve their objectives have failed, and using the minimum amount of force required to achieve them. In war, the limitations on the application of force are much less restrictive. Commanders seek to configure a force posture which will maximize the amount of force they can bring to bear on opponents. Third, the consent of other parties on the ground is often of central importance in peace operations. In war, such consent is irrelevant, as force is applied directly to compel opponents to submit. Fourth, peace operations forces must often

appear to be impartial, whereas impartiality is obviously irrelevant in war. Fifth, in peace operations, the military services often not only have to work with forces from other states, but also with intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and NGOs. In war, the services can concentrate on cooperating with each other and allied forces. Sixth, the primary objective of war for the armed forces is the destruction of the enemy's military capability. Everything else, including protecting the local populace and gaining their support is, at best, secondary. By contrast, forces assigned to peace operations try to stabilize a situation to facilitate political and humanitarian activity, for which the maintaining of the confidence of all sides may be crucial. While both combat and peace operations are military endeavors, the fundamental distinction lies in dissimilar political aims which drive the above differences. The commitment to victory in the American tradition of war as a virtual crusade is ill suited to the arena of peace operations in which victory and defeat are difficult to define.

How will the military deal with the dilemma of having to prepare for operations that are to a large extent incompatible with their primary mission, and the recent doctrinal elevation of the status of those operations? Some have suggested that the United States should establish a "peace operations force" that would train specifically for and deploy to peace operations missions, allowing combat units to maintain their focus on fighting and winning wars (see CDI 1997). This would address many of the training problems and organizational issues involved in peace operations deployments. Peace operations forces could concentrate on skills appropriate to those missions and be organized into units with disproportionately more support personnel in order to accommodate the logistical, engineering, and medical requirements of such operations. Those who advocate this

approach contend that relying on a “versatile” force trained for combat, providing it with predeployment peace operations training, and then combat-oriented retraining is inefficient, potentially ineffective, and increasingly a luxury for a shrinking army (Baker 1993, 37). They suggest that the army reorganize into at least two separate corps (see Waddell 1994). One would contain a high concentration of armored forces, rely on high technology and prepare for high intensity contingencies. The other corps would contain soldiers programmed for OOTW and capable of rapid deployment. It would emphasize manpower over armor and technology, and its training would emphasize judgment over firepower. Such a specialized peace unit would make retraining unnecessary and obviate the necessity for developing what many see as irreconcilable mindsets within versatile units as they move from a peace operations to a combat focus and back again.

However, specialization has its own problems. First, a peace operations force often needs to be an effective combat force. The specialized peace unit concept implies part-time combat training, but combat effectiveness requires more than part-time effort. Second, peace operations demand a range of skills and resources that can be met by bringing together various army units, but it would be unrealistic to expect a single unit to become proficient in all aspects of peace operations: security, logistics, engineering, medical services, and so on. Finally, in order to support the number and scale of peace operations experienced in recent years, such a force would consume a considerable portion of the active duty strength of the army. In 1999, two divisions were declared unfit for combat duty and none of the army’s ten divisions were rated at the highest level of readiness. The lowest ratings were attributed directly to the divisions’ participation in the peace operations in the Balkans (Graham 1999). These ratings reflect the problems

with both specialization and versatility. They clearly indicate that relying on the versatility of combat forces is taking a toll, but they also show that the demand on a peace unit would be tremendous.

The insistence on combat as the primary mission of armed forces and the idea that peace operations skills should be built on a warfighting foundation (see Joint Pub 3-07.3 1999, IV-1) are evidence that the army is currently relying on the versatility model. This reflects a consideration of the risks involved. If the army prepares for war, and therefore conducts peace operations suboptimally, it assumes one kind of risk, usually political. If it prepares for peace operations and then cannot fight a war, it assumes a greater risk. In addition, combat capabilities given up now might take years to rebuild, whereas ad hoc responses to peace operations requirements have proved sufficiently effective, if not ideal.

Military developments over the next decade will be an interesting study for organization theorists. The army clearly wants to keep its traditional focus on warfighting, but some applications of organization theory suggest that international events and the recent developments in the army's secondary missions may combine to bring about more fundamental changes. Signs of further progress towards a more peace operations-focused army would include the development of forces and capabilities associated with the peace unit proposed above. In this regard, the brigade initiative of Army Chief of Staff Shinseki would be worthy of further investigation (see Myers 1999). General Shinseki is restructuring two army brigades in order for them to meet the rapid deployment needs of the post-Cold War era. They are designed to rely less on heavy armor and more on technology, especially precision munitions. The intriguing part of



Shinseki's proposal is that he sees it as a model for a fundamental transformation of the army over the next decade. Given the unintended consequences of the lessons learned program for peace operations, such a transformation has the potential to change the army even further.

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